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Abstract 
 
The study investigates the effect of the compositions of board of directors on firm 
performance in Indonesia. This country offers a specific institutional environment, 
which provides a natural setting to further examine the effectiveness of the board in 
mitigating agency conflicts. The conceptual framework is derived from agency theory, 
assuming that the governance mechanisms affect the behaviour of contracting parties. 
The theory predicts that a board’s independence determines the effectiveness of its 
monitoring role and organizational outcome. The study presents a cross-sectional 
analysis of 190 non-financial companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange during 
2002-2004.   
 
Indonesian firms exhibit ownership concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families 
and this provides them with sufficient voting rights to influence management and control 
decisions. Accordingly, the agency problems stem from the conflicts between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders as such ownership enables controlling 
owners to commit expropriation. The agency problem is further exacerbated by the 
presence of family members of controlling owners serving in management and on the 
boards. This study argues that the involvement in management and on the boards creates 
the absence of separation between management and control decisions that potentially 
negates the link between governance mechanisms and firm performance. This 
dissertation is the first to study the impact of such involvement on the association 
between board composition and firm performance. This provides sufficient justification 
that the study offers significant contribution to the governance literature as it applies to 
Indonesia. 
 
The Jakarta Stock Exchange officially requires that listed firms’ boards consist of at 
least 30% independent directors, or that the number of independent directors be 
proportional to the shareholding by minority investors, whichever is higher. The results 
show that most of the domestic-listed firms demonstrate a compliance with such 
regulation. However, the study fails to document a significant relationship between the 
fraction of outside directors and firm performance. Further testing reveals that the 
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proportion of independent directors is insignificantly related to prior firm performance. 
This indicates that the inclusion of independent directors is irrespective of the agency 
problem specific to the firm and is merely driven by the listing requirement. 
 
The prevalence of ownership concentration by controlling families has been claimed as 
providing the rationale to construct a particular framework where the family serves as 
the unit of analysis. Although Indonesia adopts a two-tier system, such a framework 
implies that the substance of combined leadership might occur in Indonesia whenever a 
family member of the controlling owners is assigned as board chairperson. The study 
shows that most of the Indonesian listed firms have affiliated leadership, where in some 
instances the family member of controlling owners serves as board chairperson. Using 
the family as the unit of analysis, this finding provides undeniable evidence that 
combined leadership exists in the two-tier system. Independent leadership is found to 
have a positive relationship with firm performance, and such a relationship is robust 
after controlling for interdependence, measurement, linearity, and endogeneity issues. 
Governance reform, therefore, should address the board leadership structure that 
promotes board independence and, accordingly, board monitoring effectiveness. 
 
The analysis reveals that the identity of large shareholders needs to be analyzed 
separately. Shareholding by controlling owners is found to have a negative association 
with firm performance. This finding suggests that the presence of dominant large 
shareholdings in the hands of families is more likely to be the source of the agency 
problem rather than to serve as a governance device that alleviates agency conflicts. The 
finding implies that governance reform that seeks to reduce dominant control by the 
family needs to be addressed. Foreign investors demonstrate a positive relationship with 
firm performance. Further analysis reveals that ownership by foreign investors is the 
antecedent of independent board leadership. This finding suggests that this type of large 
shareholder induces better governance as the leadership board independent is positively 
related to firm performance. This suggests that Indonesia would be better off whenever a 
friendly foreign investor regulation is in place. 
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This study finds that the controlling owners of Indonesian listed firms typically appoint 
their family members to serve in management and on the boards. The analysis reveals 
that such appointments create a different impact on the corporate control and firm 
performance. This study finds that the entrenchment effect of family involvement on the 
board is higher than that of such involvement in management. This finding suggests the 
necessity to disaggregate the family control devices. Nevertheless, such involvements 
provide supportive evidence that controlling owners engage in excessive control 
enhancing mechanisms that facilitate the extraction of private benefit with relatively 
ease. Accordingly, this finding implies that Indonesia needs to establish a corporate 
system that prevents the dominant owners from engaging in excessive control-enhancing 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
One of the primary functions of effective corporate governance is to provide investors 
with strong protection in exercising their rights (La Porta et al., 2000). Such protection is 
an important issue in the finance literature, as there is a high possibility that a firm’s 
resources will be expropriated by insiders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that strong 
protection will reduce such expropriation and hence, will convince potential 
shareholders and creditors to finance the firm. Eventually, effective corporate 
governance will link the firm’s resources with the most productive channel (Shleifer & 
Wolfenzon, 2002) 
  
At the country level, the finance literature has documented that corporate governance is 
a prerequisite condition for economic growth. La Porta et al. (1997) find that the 
countries with the higher scores in corporate governance exhibit higher valuations and 
breadth of debt and equity. This suggests that the development of financial markets is 
strongly linked to the level of corporate governance. At the firm level, better corporate 
governance is associated with higher market valuations (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 
2003) and operating performance (Brown & Caylor, 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
Complementarily, the lack of corporate governance has been claimed as raising 
economic vulnerability and decreasing a firm’s value. Johnson et al. (2000) find that the 
countries with the poorest corporate governance in East Asia were the most badly 
affected by the Asian economic crisis in 1997,1
 
 while the work of Mitton (2004) reveals 
that firms with poorer corporate governance experienced lower performance during the 
crisis.  
Agency theory views corporate governance as a device to limit the self-interest 
behaviour of the agent (Denis & McConnell, 2003). This theory assumes that a firm’s 
value is inversely related to the opportunistic behaviour of the agent. Therefore, better 
                                              
1 Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that corporate governance has higher predictive power to this crisis than 
macro economic indicators and that worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers 
and thus a larger fall in asset prices in countries with weak corporate governance. 
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corporate governance is believed to have a significant association with higher firm 
performance. According to Denis (2001) and Gillan (2006), corporate governance 
consists of several devices which could be broadly categorised as either internal or 
external mechanisms (see Section 2.4 for further discussion). This notwithstanding, they 
suggests that the board of directors is at the apex of governance mechanisms responsible 
for protecting shareholders’ interests.  
 
This study investigates the effect of board composition on firm value in Indonesia. 
Specifically, the study examines various aspects of board composition, such as the 
proportion of independent directors, leadership structure and board size. The theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development are derived from agency theory (see Chapters 2 
and 5 for further discussion). The research paradigm follows realism as the ontological 
choice and the epistemology borrows from the positivism approach (see Section 6.2 for 
further discussion). 
 
1. 2. Corporate Governance Issues in Indonesia 
Indonesia was severely hit by the East Asian economic turmoil that erupted in late 1997 
(Patrick, 2001). As the absence of sound corporate governance was the main source of 
the crisis (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2000), the finding of Patrick (2001) 
indicates that there is a lack of corporate governance adopted by Indonesia. The work of 
Nam and Nam (2004) confirms such a notion, as they find that Indonesia exhibits the 
lowest score for corporate governance among East Asian countries. Accordingly, 
corporate governance is of considerable importance for Indonesian firms. 
 
The crisis has reinforced the importance of corporate governance in the economic 
recovery process. According to the National Committee of Corporate Governance 
(NCCG), such recovery requires both domestic and foreign investment and such 
investments being contingent upon the presence of good corporate governance. 
Consistent with this view, a survey by McKinsey (2001) indicates that corporate 
governance is perceived by market participants in Indonesia as the most important factor 
affecting their investment decisions. The same survey reveals that a company with good 
corporate governance is afforded a 27% potential premium by the investment market. 
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These findings indicate that there is strong demand for sound corporate governance in 
Indonesia. 
 
In response to the crisis, the government has conducted corporate governance reform, 
such as the establishment of the NCCG and a reorganisation of the legal system 
designed to promote sound practice. The NCCG believes that an appropriate corporate 
governance system in Indonesia will encourage both domestic and foreign investments 
necessary to enhance economic recovery. As part of the reform, the NCCG endorsed the 
Code of Good Corporate Governance. In line with this code, the Capital Market 
Supervisory Agency (CMSA) and the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) officially require 
that listed firms’ boards comprise at least 30% independent directors, or that the number 
of independent directors be proportional to the shareholding by minority investors, 
whichever is higher. According to the agencies, this requirement is needed to assure 
market participants that the authority agencies are aware of the fundamental problems 
experienced by firms in Indonesia.  
 
Indonesia is not exceptional in requiring that a proportion of directors serving on a 
firm’s board be independent. Several countries outside the UK and US have advocated 
or mandated a minimum standard for the inclusion of independent directors on the 
boards of listed companies (Dahya & McConnel, 2005). More recently, regional 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) in Europe and the ADB in Asia have also encouraged member countries to 
adopt such recommendations toward a more prominent role for outside directors 
(Nowland, 2008). This prescription typically requires the firms to increase the 
representation of independent directors on the boards. As Dahya and McConnel (2005) 
observe, the movement toward greater outside director representation underlines the 
presumption that boards with more independent directors tend to make better decisions.  
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1. 3. Significance of the Study 
1.3.1. Institutional Setting 
Although academic research has addressed the association between board composition 
and firm performance, these studies have mostly investigated firms operating in 
developed economies, particularly the US. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) suggest that 
the US results regarding the board-performance relationship may not be generalised. 
They argue that “…while the assumption of a utility-maximizing agent is universal, each 
country’s regulatory and economic environment, the strength of capital markets, and 
current governance practices are different“(Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998, p.384). Different 
business environments, it is claimed, create distinct corporate governance and 
accordingly, “…comparing US models in isolation can lead to futile conclusions” 
(Dehaene, De Vuyst & Ooghe, 2001, p.383).  
 
The US institutional environment is commonly cited as being characterised by strong 
legal protection (La Porta et al., 1999), which eventually leads to a dispersed ownership 
and active institutional investors, as well as a large, deep and active market (Erickson et 
al., 2005)2. This setting enhances the simultaneous working of internal and external 
governance mechanisms in reducing the self-interest behaviour of agents (Brunello, 
Graziano & Parigi, 2003). Authors such as Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright (2004) believe 
that departure from the US setting has a significant impact on the firm-level governance 
structure, its effectiveness, and therefore, its impact on firm value3
 
. Accordingly, Vafeas 
and Theodorou (1998) argue that the importance and value of various governance 
structures should be separately examined in each country. 
The differences between the institutional settings of Indonesia and developed countries 
might be attributed to the investor protection provided by the legal system, the 
ownership structure, the financing pattern, and the market for corporate control. The 
Indonesian legal system imitates the Dutch legal system, which follows French civil 
                                              
2 Indeed, Denis (2001) and Denis and McConnell (2003) suggest that the legal system is the main feature 
of institutional setting and that feature characterizes the so-called “second generation of corporate 
governance research”. 
3 In the work of Klapper and Love (2004), institutional setting is referred to as country-level governance 
mechanism.  
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tradition (see section 4.2 for further discussion). This tradition provides investors with 
poor protection due to judicial discretion and narrow application of duty of loyalty and 
duty of responsibility (Johnson et al., 2000), which eventually creates ownership 
concentration and a specific financing pattern (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000). A study by 
the ADB (2001) indicates that the bank-oriented system is the salient feature in 
Indonesia, where the role of the market for corporate control is less significant and 
ownership is stable and concentrated in the majority owners. However, lending banks 
and debtors in Indonesia typically belong to the business group, which is owned by the 
same controlling family (Patrick, 2001). This group-affiliated financing pattern leaves 
the bank with less independence to monitor management action. The weak legal system 
and the absence of monitoring by lenders has been quoted as facilitating controlling 
owners pursuing their private interests with relative ease at the expense of minority 
shareholders and firm performance (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Claessens et al., 
2002).  
 
In Indonesia, the ownership of firms is generally concentrated in the hands of a few 
families (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001) or within a coalition between families (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). In this environment, the agency problem arises from the divergence of 
interests of majority and minority shareholders, which departs from the traditional model 
of owner-manager conflict. Indeed, La Porta et al. (1999) find that this type of agency 
problem is prevalent in most economies, implying that the framework of dispersed 
ownership is irrelevant.  
 
The majority-minority conflict in Indonesia is exacerbated by pyramidal and cross-
holding structures, which lead to divergence between cash-flow and voting rights4
                                              
4 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) documented that approximately 80% of listed companies in 
Indonesia are owned by families through pyramidal shareholdings. This figure indicates that most of 
Indonesian firms are part of business groups. Patrick (2001) argues that the prevalence of business groups 
in Indonesia is a result of the link between political power and family businesses that creates crony 
capitalism.   
. This 
wedge provides majority owners with control disproportionately greater than their 
investment. According to Fan and Wong (2002), the wedge lessens the incentive 
alignment effect and at the same time exacerbates the entrenchment problem. 
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Consequently, this gives the controlling owner the incentive and channel to commit 
expropriation. Claessens et al. (2002) find that Indonesian firms exhibit the lowest 
performance in Asia as a result of excessive expropriation by controlling shareholders, 
indicating that the agency problem in Indonesia is the most severe among Asian 
countries.  
 
Another important feature of Indonesian listed firms is the existence of family-based 
control-enhancing mechanisms adopted by majority owners. Specifically, control of the 
firm by family ownership is further enhanced through the appointment of family 
members to serve as directors and in top management positions (Tabalujan, 2002)5
 
. 
While Nam (2001)argues that such family-based governance minimises monitoring cost, 
he also argues that the “…beneficial effect of large shareholders can be expected only 
when the management is separated from ownership or when proper corporate 
governance mechanisms are in place and operating so that outside shareholders can 
effectively oversee corporate management” (Nam, 2003, p.2). A study by ADB (2000) 
indicates that these conditions are generally not fulfilled in most Asian enterprises. 
Therefore, family involvement on the board and in management raises an empirical 
question concerning the impact of such involvement on the association between internal 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
Although the prevalence of family involvements in management and control decisions in 
East Asia has been documented, empirical studies directly and fully addressing this issue 
are limited. For example, Klasa (2002) focuses on the involvement on the board, while 
Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2003) emphasise the role of Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) who are family members of controlling-owner. This study shares some 
similarities with the work of Yeh (2005), Yeh and Woidtke (2005), and Yeh, Ko and Su 
(2003), but these more recent studies aggregate such involvements and focus on the 
direct effect of such on firm performance. Accordingly, this dissertation further 
examines the impact of these involvements on the overall effectiveness of monitoring 
                                              
5 The work of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) offers supportive evidence to this proposition as they 
find that the presence of managers from the controlling family are positively related to the concentration 
of control. 
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roles by the board in terms of the firm performance. Furthermore this dissertation argues 
that such involvement might create a combined leadership although officially Indonesia 
has mandated that firm adopt a two-tier board system. Given the fact that there is no 
empirical work incorporating this issue, the study is expected to significantly contribute 
to filling gaps in governance literature in relation to Indonesia. 
 
1.3.2. Methodological Issue 
The common features of Asian economies are the prevalence of ownership concentration 
and reliance on external financing (Claessens et al., 2002). Despite these similarities, the 
level of investor protection varies across countries and raises an endogeneity problem 
between the governance arrangement and its institutional environment (Klapper & Love, 
2004). Joh (2003) suggests that a single-country study is more beneficial, in that through 
maintaining the same institutional setting it eliminates the endogeneity problem. Thus, 
by focusing on Indonesian listed firms, this study will eliminate endogeneity issues. 
 
Theoretically, effective monitoring by the board will be reflected in better performance 
of the firm. However, the empirical studies reported arrive at inconclusive findings 
where such findings might be attributed to interdependence and endogeneity issues. 
Interdependence refers to the substitutability and complementary relationships among 
governance mechanisms which constrain empirical studies to investigating the 
association between particular governance mechanisms and firm performance in an 
isolated context (Rediker & Seth, 1995). Endogeneity refers to the direction of causality 
between the existing governance mechanisms and prior firm performance that might 
lead to spurious correlation and therefore complicate the interpretation of empirical 
findings (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; 2003). In addition, Block (1999) raises a non-
linearity issue in the association between the board and firm performance. By controlling 
for these issues, this study is intended to overcome the shortcomings of previous 
research.  
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1.4. Key Concepts  
The key concepts are derived from agency theory that hinges upon the separation 
between ownership and control in corporations (Fama, 1980). Such separation raises the 
agency relationship, where the principals delegate responsibilities to the agents (Baiman, 
1990). The agent and principal enter a mutually agreed contract that is incomplete in 
nature (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Within agency theory, individuals are assumed to be 
motivated solely by self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The incomplete contracts 
and self-interest behaviour potentially prevent the formulation of a cooperative solution 
among contracting parties to achieve the firm’s objectives (Baiman, 1990). 
 . 
The separation of ownership and control creates the divergence of interests of the 
principals and the agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Shareholders could promote the 
assurance that their interests are respected by management through establishing an 
internal governance mechanism responsible for control decisions whenever such 
mechanism is independent of management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The independence 
property will enable this mechanism to conduct the objective assessments of 
management performance that increase the sensitivity of management performance to 
the disciplinary action provided by the market for corporate control. Eventually, an 
independent internal control mechanism is more likely to better align the interests of the 
agent with those of the principal. As control reduces the opportunistic behaviour of the 
agent, all else being equal, the resultant lower potential agency cost will lead to better 
firm performance. 
 
Corporate governance consists of several devices or mechanisms that could be broadly 
categorised as either being internal or external (Gillan, 2006). Nevertheless, governance 
mechanisms might complement or substitute for each other, where various specific 
governance configurations are possible to produce similar outcomes (Danielson & 
Karpoff, 1998). The substitution argument implies that board monitoring would be 
considerable importance in the absence of other governance mechanisms while the 
complementarities argument suggests that board monitoring role would be effective 
whenever other strong governance mechanisms exist (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
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Accordingly, all else being equal, the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance is more likely to be affected by the presence of alternative governance 
mechanisms. 
 
An optimal control system might be achieved whenever there is a balance of power 
between the agent and the principals (Jensen, 2000). If the power is concentrated in the 
agent, it might prevent the labour market for corporate control to discipline management 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The absence of the threat of dismissal as a 
necessary condition for corporate control discourages managers from pursuing such 
action that would maximize the interests of principals (Fama, 1980). Under this 
circumstance, the manager might prefer to choose the optimal self-interest behaviour 
that is detrimental to firm performance and shareholders’ wealth. All else being equal, 
the effectiveness of the board in improving firm performance through their monitoring 
role would be reduced whenever the power is concentrated in the agent. 
 
1. 5. Research Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between board composition 
and firm performance in the context of Indonesia that has been identified as being 
characterized by a specific institutional environment. The accounting rate of return is the 
measure and benchmark for firm performance. This measure has been selected, as a 
meta-analysis by Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) find that accounting 
measures produce a consistent relationship between board composition and firm 
performance as compared to those of market-based performance indicators. Specifically, 
the objectives of the research are as follows:  
1. To examine whether the presence of independent directors serving on a board has a 
positive association with firm performance. 
2. To investigate whether the presence of an independent director serving as chairman 
of the board has a positive association with firm performance.  
3. To determine whether the association between board composition and firm 
performance is moderated by control-enhancing mechanisms of controlling 
shareholders.   
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4. To examine whether the association between board composition and firm 
performance is moderated by the presence of external large shareholders.  
5. To investigate whether the association between the above variables and firm 
performance is influenced by firm size, leverage, and industry type. 
 
1. 6. Research Strategy 
There are two alternative underlying assumptions in investigating the association 
between board composition and firm performance. The first posits that board 
composition is endogenously determined by internal and external factors. The cost and 
benefit of particular board composition are specific to the firm and the board 
composition reflects the trade-off between cost and benefit for that particular firm. This 
implies that corporate governance mechanisms vary across the firm systematically and 
depend on the firm’s specific needs. This line of reasoning hinges upon the view that 
firms have selected a particular composition of their boards of directors that is 
appropriate to their need. Accordingly, the likelihood of an empirical relationship 
between board composition and firm performance is reduced. 
 
The alternative assumption is that certain board composition is appropriate for all firms. 
Consequently, firms that do not demonstrate such specific governance configurations 
will have lower value. This line of reasoning is based on the presumption that 
governance configuration within a particular firm is determined by the distribution of 
power between the contracting parties. Accordingly, it is possible that firms adopt sub-
optimal governance mechanisms in order to accommodate the interest of particular 
contracting parties at the expense of others. Under this view, there is likely to be an 
empirical relationship between board composition and firm performance.  
 
As previously mentioned, a study investigating the association between board 
composition and firm performance might follow one of two competing assumptions. The 
first posits that board composition is endogenously determined by internal and external 
factors implying that the likelihood of an empirical relationship between board 
composition and firm performance is reduced. The alternative assumption is that certain 
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board composition is appropriate for all firms suggesting that there is likely to be an 
empirical relationship between board composition and firm performance. Although such 
competing assumptions exist, studies in emerging markets remain to support the 
assumption that governance mechanisms drive organizational outcome. For example, the 
score of corporate governance index has been documented as having a positive impact 
on firm performance (Klapper & Love, 2004), firm size (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 2003), and firm value (Durnev & Kim, 2002). In the case of South East 
Asia, the interaction between firm-level and country-level has been documented as 
having a negative association with the incentive of controlling owners to deprive 
minority shareholders from their rights. Nowland (2008) provides a more convincing 
support to the assumption of the existence of empirical relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. After controlling for the endogeneity issue, as an 
internal validity consequence of the competing assumption, he finds that board 
compositions affect firm performance. Indeed, The World Bank (2005) finds that the 
lack of governance mechanisms, in general, and ineffective boards, in particular, are the 
salient features of Indonesian firms. Thus, minority shareholders are afforded less 
protection against excessive expropriation by controlling owners. This finding implies 
that Indonesian firms choose sub-optimal governance configurations that best suit the 
interest of controlling shareholders in the contracting environment. As such, this study 
follows the assumption that certain board composition is suitable for all firms, and 
therefore, that an empirical relationship between board composition and firm 
performance exists.  
 
The competing assumptions of the relationship between governance and organizational 
outcome have been claimed as raising endogeneity problem that, eventually, complicate 
the interpretation of empirical results (see section 3.2.2.4 for further discussion). Indeed, 
endogeneity problem, which refers to the direction of causality on the relationship 
between governance and firm performance, is a major concern for firm-level variables 
that inherently plagues empirical governance studies (Drobetz, 2003; Black, Jang & 
Kim, 2004, 2006). Nevertheless, literature suggests various methodological approaches 
to control for such a problem. Therefore, although it is assumed that that empirical 
relationship between board composition and firm performance exists, this dissertation 
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controls for endogeneity problem by using lagged data for independent and dependent 
variables (Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog, 2000) and applying two step least squares 
(2SLS) (Seifert, Gonenc & Wright, 2005) to address such an issue (see section 8.4.2.4 
for further discussion). 
 
According to Bhagat and Black (2002) two approaches may be taken in investigating the 
association between board composition and firm performance. The first investigates 
board composition and its decision-making process in discrete tasks such as CEO 
turnover, executive compensation, and takeovers. The second approach directly 
examines the effect of board composition on overall firm performance. However, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note that the effect of certain board composition on firm 
performance is less likely to be detectable, as firm performance is a function of so many 
different factors. Hence, they contend that a cleaner test is required in investigating such 
relationships in order to control for the firm-specific effect and directly test for the 
desired effect. Further, they believe that a more successful measure would be the impact 
of changes in board composition on firm performance.  
 
It has been asserted that corporate governance was not a significant concern in Asia until 
the Asian crisis has prompted the importance of corporate governance (Nowland, 2008). 
He suggests that board composition in Asia simply reflect the interest of controlling 
owners and implies that representation by an outside director was the exception rather 
than the norm in such firms prior to the Asian crisis. Accordingly, it might be argued 
that the inclusion of independent directors serving on boards in Indonesian firms has 
been triggered by the requirement to appoint independent directors endorsed by the 
CMSA and JSX. Consequently, this requirement provides a natural setting in which to 
investigate the effect of changes in board composition. As such, this study will adopt a 
direct approach in examining the association between board composition and firm 
performance. 
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1. 7. Research Method 
The starting point of the data constructions is the companies listed on JSX as of 31 
December 2002, the date independent directors became mandatory. This study uses 
cross-sectional data consisting of 190 non-financial companies listed on the JSX in 2002 
(see Section 6.3.2 for further detail). This period is selected as it produces the data that 
enables examination of the effect of board composition on firm performance. The 
dependent variable is the firm performance measured using Return on Assets (ROA) and 
Return on Equity (ROE). The independent variables are the proportion of independent 
directors, board leadership structure, board size, ownership structures, and controlling-
family involvement in management and in the board and control variables (see Section 
6.3 for further detail). Analysis will use ordinary least squares to enable this study to 
conduct the multivariate tests necessary for the hypothesis testing (see Section 6.3.for 
further discussion). 
 
1. 8. Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents theory related to the board of 
directors and its association with firm performance. Chapter 3 discusses the related 
empirical literature discussing the association between the board of directors and firm 
performance. Chapter 4 reviews the institutional setting of Indonesia. Chapter 5 
develops the testable hypotheses. Chapter 6 discusses the research method. Chapter 7 
identifies statistical assumptions and provides a summary of descriptive statistics. 
Chapter 8 presents univariate and multivariate analyses. Chapter 9 discusses conclusions 
of the study and policy implications. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the purpose of the thesis, the research questions, and the 
significance of the study are presented. This chapter discusses the agency theory 
underlying the study, corporate governance and the board of directors. The purpose of 
this chapter is twofold. The first is to provide a deeper background to agency theory, 
agency conflict, and the mechanisms to overcome such conflict. The second is to 
provide a basis for developing hypotheses on the association between board composition 
and organisational outcomes in relation to Indonesia (see Chapter 5). The chapter starts 
with agency theory and the nature of agency problems. The subsequent sections discuss 
corporate governance emphasizing the role, property and leadership structure of the 
board of directors. The last section summarises the discussion 
 
Indonesian listed firms are characterized by ownership concentration in the hand of 
controlling families (see Chapter 4 for further detail). Further, the controlling owners 
typically appoint their family members to serve on the board and in management (see 
Chapter 4 for further detail). Such characteristics might have important implications for 
the separation of management decisions and control decisions. Therefore, such control 
potentially affects the nature of board independence and the association between internal 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Accordingly, this chapter also discusses 
family ownership and family involvement on the board and in management. 
 
2.2. Agency Theory and the Nature of Agency Problems 
Agency theory posits that an agency relationship exists whenever one or more 
individuals (principals) hire another person (agent) to perform a service (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The principal and agents enter a mutually agreed contract, which 
specifies the rights and responsibilities of each party. Jensen (1993) suggests that agency 
relationships hinge upon the proposition of separation of ownership and control, which 
was firstly observed by Berle and Means (1932) in joint-stock companies. The 
separation of ownership and control becomes a norm of modern corporations as it 
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creates an efficient form of economic organization (Fama, 1980). This separation leads 
to a transfer of corporate control from the corporate owner to professional managers. 
Within this framework, a firm serves as a nexus of contracts between various parties 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to coordinate different factors of production in order to 
achieve a specific goal (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972)6
 
. Accordingly, the firm’s outcome is 
determined by its production factors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Agency theory assumes that individuals are motivated solely by self-interest, which may 
be conflictive where “…cooperative behaviour in maximizing the welfare of the 
principal is not consistent with individual self-interest” (Baiman, 1990, p. 342). This 
view is based on the premise advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) who state 
that “…if both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal”. This 
premise implies that the agents necessarily prefer to maximize their wealth and this 
preference potentially diverges from the preferences of shareholders7
 
.  
Agency relationships rely on the contract as the first best solution in order to mitigate the 
divergence of interests between those of contracting parties (Hart, 1995)8
 
. However, 
Baiman (1990, p. 346) suggests that the contracting parties “…do not have unlimited 
computational ability” to acquire and process information. This view implies that it is 
impossible for individuals to foresee all possible future contingencies and incorporate 
them into the contract. Therefore, agency theory assumes that the contract is incomplete 
in nature. Baiman (1990) argues that the divergence of interest and incomplete contracts 
are the main source of agents’ failure to maximize the interest of the principals that 
eventually constitutes agency problems specific to the firm.   
                                              
6 The nexus of contract view also “…dispels the tendency to treat organizations as if they were persons” 
(Jensen, 1993, 327). Consequently, the organizations have neither preference nor social responsibility 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
7 Accordingly, the behaviour of the organization is the equilibrium behaviour of a complex contractual 
system made up of maximizing agents with diverse and conflicting objectives. In this sense, the behaviour 
of an organization is like the equilibrium behaviour of the market (Jensen 1993). 
8 Contract is assumed to be incorporated ex-ante. The agent is assumed to be risk-averse and work-averse 
and therefore the agent tends to limit the sensitivity of their wealth relative to the outcome of the firm 
when a contract is incorporated. 
 16 
It has been argued that the nature of agency problems depends on the ownership 
structure within the firm as such structure determines the distribution of corporate 
control among contracting parties (La Porta et al., 1999). Based on the work of Berle 
and Means (1932), the first generation of the governance literature assumes a dispersed 
ownership in public corporations (Denis, 2001; Denis & McConnell, 2003). In the 
dispersed firms, large numbers of shareholders have only a small fraction of ownership 
individually. This implies that individual shareholders will bear the higher cost and reap 
only a small fraction of the benefit of monitoring effort. Therefore, in this situation, 
shareholders are less likely to monitor managers given the higher monitoring cost. If all 
shareholders adhere to this view, corporate control will rest in the hands of management, 
which has an incentive to increase their perquisites. Eventually, it is believed, the ‘free-
rider problem’ associated with dispersed ownership will become the main cause of 
weak, diffused shareholder control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Agency problems in such 
firms spring from the conflict between powerful management and the disempowered 
dispersed shareholders.  
 
However, academic research has documented the prevalence of ownership concentration 
in most economies. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) find that ownership by the top 
three largest shareholders is a feature of 46% of the larger non-financial firms in 49 
countries. In the concentrated firm, majority shareholders have sufficient voting power 
to influence a firm’s operation. Accordingly, the control of the firm will rest in the hands 
of majority shareholders, who have the power and incentive to exercise expropriation in 
relation to minority shareholders. This finding challenges the assumption of dispersed 
ownership and implies that the dispersed ownership assumption becomes an irrelevant 
framework. The irrelevance of the framework of dispersed ownership is reinforced by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claiming that the dominant agency problem in most 
countries is related to the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, rather 
than shareholders and managers. 
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2.3. Agency Theory and Corporate Governance 
The basic model of agency theory predicts that the shareholders’ wealth is inversely 
related to the self-interest behaviour of the agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) where 
such behaviour might be mitigated by the presence of corporate governance (Denis, 
2001)9
 
. In the earlier literature, the dominant view of corporate governance hinges on 
the conflict between manager and shareholders. However, Gillan (2006) suggests that 
agency problems may also stem from conflict between managers and the various 
stakeholders as each contracting party has their own interests, and these interests may 
differ from those of others involved. Accordingly, this study defines corporate 
governance as a check and balance system that assures that one party will not benefit at 
the expense of others. This might be achieved whenever such system enables various 
stakeholders to exert “…control over the corporation by exercising certain rights” (John 
& Senbet, 1998, p. 374). This view implies that corporate control is the most important 
aspect of corporate governance. 
Mizruchi (1983) observes that the finance literature has underlined the importance of 
differentiating between management and control. In the work of Thompson (2003, p. 32) 
control is defined as the “…function in industry concerned in the determination of the 
corporate policy and...affecting the executive”. In a similar vein, Scott (1974, p.37) 
suggests that the concept of control hinges upon the authority to define the “...sphere of 
decision which concerns the basic parameters within which the corporations forming a 
particular unit of capital are to act”. On the other hand, management refers to 
“…activities which relate to the sphere of decision concerning the implementation of 
corporate strategy and hence to the immediate day-to-day administration of company 
operations” (1974, p.37). Similarly, Thompson (2003, p. 32) suggests that managing 
refers to “...the execution of policy, within the limits set up by administration, and the 
employment of the organization for the particular objects set before it”. Therefore, 
                                              
9 While Allen and Gale (2002) identify two distinct models of corporate governance - namely, Anglo-
Saxon and Continental European - the OECD (2004, p. 13) suggests that “there is no single model of good 
corporate governance”. According to Maher and Andersson (1999), the underlying theory of corporate 
governance dictates its model and definition. 
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managing could be seen as day-to-day decision making (implementation), which is 
derived from strategic policy (basic parameters).  
 
In a related distinction, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the decision process 
consists of initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring. Initiation and 
implementation are in the domain of management decisions, while ratification and 
monitoring are control decisions. They believe that management decisions should be 
separated from control decisions in constructing a proper check and balance system. 
This view implies that combining the two decisions in the hand of managers facilitate 
them to pursue opportunistic behaviours. In this context, corporate governance is 
intended to adequately ensure that management decisions are separated from control 
decisions so that it enables the shareholders to influence the policy decision within the 
firm through establishing strategic policy and basic parameters. In other words, 
corporate governance mechanisms serve as the devices through which shareholders 
retain corporate control and influence management decisions in order to ensure that their 
interests are well respected. 
 
2.4. Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Agency literature classifies the governance mechanisms into two main categories: 
internal and external (Denis, 2001)10. External mechanisms rely on the market for 
corporate control to discipline the firm (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Borio et al., 2004) and 
the legal system that serves as a country-level governance mechanism providing 
investors with particular protection (La Porta et al., 1998; 2000) while internal 
mechanisms refer to large shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986) and boards of directors (Wagner III, Stimpert & Fubara, 1998)11
                                              
10 Dennis and McConnell (2003), Denis (2001), Claessens and Fan (2002) and Gillan (2006) use this 
classification in their literature survey although the focus and depth of discussions varies across studies. 
Denis (2001, p. 197) argues that “…while the lines between these categories are not perfectly distinct, 
they do provide a useful base categorization scheme”.  
. 
11 Although executive compensation schemes and governance provisions might serve as the governance 
devices, such scheme and provisions have been quoted as being endogenously determined by the board 
composition and ownership structure. See for examples Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Ryan Jr. 
and Wiggins III (2004), and Mallette and Fowler (1992). In addition, Gul (2001) argues that leverage 
might serve as a governance mechanism as it leads to the lender monitoring.  
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2.4.1. Legal System 
The legal system has been referred to as a country-level governance mechanism in the 
finance literature12
 
. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) suggest that the legal system 
affects the cost to firms in adopting a particular governance configuration, and the 
benefits derived there from, suggesting that country-level governance determines the 
firm-level governance. The work of Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic (2005) confirms such 
a notion and finds that the firms operating in the countries with a strong legal system 
have a higher score of firm-level governance. However, firms operating in countries 
with a weak legal system might adopt strong firm-level governance in order to 
compensate for inadequate investor protection provided by the legal system (Klapper & 
Love, 2004). According to Durnev and Kim (2002) this strategy will benefit the firms in 
their abilities to raise external capital.  
Fan and Wong (2002) suggest that shareholders and creditors are willing to finance a 
firm because they have the right to influence management decisions and extract a return 
on their investment from the manager. According to Beck and Levine (2003) the law and 
its enforcement determine the ability of financial suppliers to exercise their rights where 
these rights are necessarily exercisable in the presence of strong investor protection 
provided by the legal system. Consequently, a strong legal system will encourage 
financial suppliers to finance the firm’s operations. This view has been confirmed by 
empirical studies documenting a positive relationship between a strong legal system, the 
valuation and breadth of both debt and equity (La Porta et al., 1997) and financial 
market development (Beck & Levine, 2003). 
 
As La Porta et al. (1998) observe, the effectiveness of legal systems in protecting 
investors is substantially determined by the origin of the legal tradition, which could be 
broadly characterized as being either civil or common law. In French civil law, political 
power heavily determines the development of codification and, accordingly, such a law 
restricts the judicial system to pursuing a discretionary interpretation of duty of loyalty 
                                              
12 See, for example, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2004), Dyck and Zingales (2004), Boutchkova 
(2003) and Durnev and Kim (2005). 
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and duty of responsibility concepts (Johnson et al., 2000). Consequently, a civil law 
tradition narrowly applies such concepts, which lessens its adaptability to other 
precedents and environments (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2003). In contrast, 
common law provides the judicial system with a higher discretionary capacity because 
such law is codified by the judges based on their sense of justice (Johnson et al., 2000). 
The lower discretionary powers applicable in civil law thus provide investors with less 
protection than the common law tradition (La Porta et al., 1998). Johnson et al. (2000) 
find that, even in the developed countries, the civil law system is less preventive of 
expropriations by controlling shareholders through self-dealing and share dilution.  
 
Agency theory suggest that corporate shares are a property arrangement providing 
shareholders with power (through voting rights) and incentive (through cash flow rights) 
to negotiate and enforce contracts with various parties (Fan & Wong, 2002). La Porta et 
al. (1999) argue that property rights can be enforced by the state and shareholders. In 
economies where property rights enforcement by the state is weak, the shareholders will 
enhance the power of enforcement through increasing and accumulating ownership of 
the firm. This view implies that ownership concentration will be observed in an 
environment where property rights enforcement by the state is weak (La Porta et al., 
1999). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the benefits of ownership concentration 
are larger in less developed countries where property rights are not well defined and 
protected by the judicial system.  
 
2.4.2. Market for Corporate Control 
Agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and control is an efficient form of 
modern corporations, where the viability of such separation hinges upon the role of an 
efficient market for corporate control (Fama, 1980). Within this framework, the market 
serves as the ultimate device in disciplining production factors and providing incentives 
such that these factors combine to achieve acceptable outcomes (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972). Consistent with this view, Kaen (2003) posits that an efficient market for 
corporate control provides continuous pressure that forces management to perform 
 21 
better. The market for corporate control consists of a corporate market (Manne, 1965), 
labour market (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), and product market (Hart, 1983)13
 
.  
The product market reflects the first layer of signals of the managerial performance to 
produce a competitive product. According to this framework, the performance of the 
product, and therefore of management, will be reflected in the share price of the firm. A 
lower price signals poor performance of the product in the market and underperforming 
management14. The market will respond by replacing management accordingly through 
the manager market for corporate control. Nevertheless, the removal of poorly 
performing managers might be facilitated by a corporate market for corporate control 
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983)15
 
.  
The inefficiencies and failure to maximize firm performance have been quoted as 
exposing the company to the corporate market for corporate control that may 
consequently remove inefficient management (Maher & Andersson, 1999). According to 
Berglöf and Claessens (2004), the corporate market for corporate control, which 
operates through mergers and acquisitions, enables potential owners to take over a firm 
and correct management failure not addressed by existing owners. They believe that 
“…the mere prospect of such a hostile takeover could influence management even if it 
never happened” (Berglöf & Claessens, 2004, p.11). This view implies that the ultimate 
objective of the market for corporate control is to provide management with sufficient 
incentive to pursue value-maximizing behaviours and to ensure that management 
performs well.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
13 See also Jensen & Ruback (1983) for the literature review. 
14 The value of the share price provides information to the labour market in revaluing management 
performance (Fama, 1980).  
15 McColgan, (2001) argues that although takeovers might be motivated by either efficiency gains or 
disciplinary mechanism, the finding of empirical studies is commonly consistent with the disciplinary 
hypothesis towards managers who fail to maximize shareholder’s wealth.  
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2.4.3. Board of Directors 
2.4.3.1. The Role and the Properties of the Board 
The board of directors has appeared in the finance literature as an internal institution 
representing shareholders in governing the firm. According to Dahya and McConnel 
(2005), regulations in most economies commonly require listed firms to establish a 
board of directors in accordance with specific compositional requirements. These 
requirements underline the argument that views the board as a legally induced institution 
and thus the presence of a board departs from economic rationale16. Alternatively, 
Jensen (1993) argues that the presence of a board of directors is a market induced 
mechanism representing production factors, although it is almost impossible to expect 
that this representation is naturally shown up in the board. Under this view, the specific 
task of the board is to articulate shareholders’ objectives through establishing goals and 
procedures, control systems, and strategic decision making (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This 
view is based on the premise that voice is more important than exit strategy, since the 
latter is a weak defence against management interests (Maug, 1998). In this 
circumstance, the board represents shareholders’ interests in order to ensure that such 
interests are articulated in the decision making process within the firm. However, the 
agency framework claims that the board is primarily assigned as a control device in 
relation to management decisions (Hung, 1998). According to Jensen (2000, p. 49), the 
ultimate goal of internal control mechanisms is to provide a “…early warning system to 
put the organization back on track before difficulties reach a crisis stage”17
 
. 
Control responsibility implies that the board is responsible for strategic decision-making, 
which is concerned with the basic parameters regarding the action of particular corporate 
units (Scott, 1979).  According to Smith and Walter (2006), control constitutes power, 
which Mizruchi (1983) defines as a latent process, the consequences of which are felt, 
but possibly empirically unobservable. Eventually, the power enables the holders “…to 
define the boundaries within which decisions can be made and…allow subordinates to 
                                              
16 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that if this is true, the board, as an internal institution, may be 
absent in some countries where the existence of the board is not required by the law. 
17 Agency theory predicts that firm value is an inverse function of agency cost associated with the 
perquisite taking by the agent. Accordingly, minimizing agency cost is consistent with maximizing the 
residual claim of shareholders (Kang & Sorensen, 1999). 
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make decisions” (Mizruchi, 1983, p.428). This view suggests that the board might leave 
the operational course of strategic policy to management while the power to influence 
management decision remains in the hands of the board (Bunting & Mizruchi, 1982). In 
this context, a corporate board is intended to control management decisions in order to 
ensure that such decisions are consistent with the interests of the principal. Mizruchi 
(1983) argues that the board will possess actual power whenever they have the authority 
to select, evaluate and replace management, where removing management is the most 
important authority since it grants the board the bottom line of control.  
 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the effectiveness of board monitoring determines 
the level of agent perquisite taking. For Alchian and Demsetz (1972), monitoring refers 
to the activity which assesses the outcome of a production team’s effort, determines 
whether the outcome is suitable to a certain standard and disciplines production factors 
which perform below standard18. Such activities comprise intervention in certain 
company operations and acquisition of information to identify the target area of 
intervention (Maug, 1998)19
 
. Fama (1980) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) believe that 
monitoring potentially discourages agents from pursuing opportunistic behaviour and 
therefore induces them to achieve higher performance. They suggest that monitoring 
enhances the sensitivity of agents’ performance to the labour market for corporate 
control, where disciplinary action and opportunity offered by the market will provide 
sufficient incentive for agents to pursue actions consistent with the targeted outcome. 
Accordingly, the ultimate outcome of effective monitoring is higher firm performance.  
Despite its benefit, there are costs associated with monitoring effort. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that the principal will choose to adopt a monitoring mechanism 
whenever its cost is less than the decrease in the value of equity. They believe that 
maximizing the value of equity provides an incentive to the principal to monitor 
management. In a similar vein, Fama (1980) argues that lower-cost monitoring 
mechanisms are likely to survive in a competitive environment. Within this view, the 
                                              
18 Fama and Jensen (1983) differentiate between ratification and monitoring as the elements of control. 
Although the terms used are different, they are similar in substance.  
19 In a broader sense, monitoring refers to all value-enhancing activities (Maug, 1998). 
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board could be seen as a monitoring device to discipline management, lower in cost than 
other mechanisms such as the market for corporate control. For example, a takeover 
process might be expensive and time consuming (Denis, 2001), while the product 
market provides signals only when the failure of management to deliver efficient 
product is evident.  
 
Agency theory posits that the boards would effectively perform their monitoring role 
whenever they are independent of management (Dalton et al., 1998). Independent 
incorporates a self-determining concept, in which the fate of directors is unconstrained 
by management decisions. The unconstrained property is a necessary condition enabling 
the board to exercise objective judgment of managerial performance that enhances the 
market mechanism for low-cost transfer of control (Fama, 1980)20
 
. This view implies 
that the monitoring role is best performed by independent directors who have no 
affiliation with management (Rahejaa, 2003), where the higher representation of 
independent directors is believed as encouraging the separation between management 
decisions and control decisions. Consequently, the board would be in a better position to 
exercise a monitoring role whenever it comprises sufficient independent directors 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Based on this proposition, many countries have taken heed of 
the call for more independent directors, assuming that this will lead to better decisions 
(Dahya & McConnel, 2005). 
Complementary to the independence, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) suggest that the 
boards might benefit the firms whenever the directors have sufficient knowledge 
regarding the projects being ratified and monitored. This property enables the board to 
pursue an accurate assessment of the project proposed by management. According to 
Rahejaa (2003), the information property determines the effectiveness of the board-
monitoring role in replacing inferior projects with superior ones, and therefore permits 
the board to prevent the firm from benefiting management at the expense of 
shareholders. Eventually, independent directors with sufficient knowledge will lead to a 
more active board in challenging management proposal and thus better protect 
                                              
20 See also Clarke (2007) for further discussion on the concept of director independence. 
 25 
shareholders’ interest (Millstein & MacAvoy, 1998). However, Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) claim that management naturally has superior information surrounding the 
projects. In this circumstance, the board might face an information asymmetry problem, 
conditional on the presence of particular mechanisms which enhance better information 
flow from management to the directors. This mechanism might be achieved through 
establishing an appropriate board composition and leadership structure.  
 
2.4.3.2. Board Model and Leadership structure 
According to Hopt and Leyens (2004), there are two distinct board models: the unitary 
system and the two-tier system21
 
. In the one-tier system, shareholders elect the directors, 
which in turn appoint management. This system allows executives to serve on the board, 
which thus comprises both executive and non-executive directors. This dual role is 
believed to have two competing effects. The presence of executive directors might 
enhance information flow between board and management, and therefore might mitigate 
information asymmetry (Rahejaa, 2003). However, dual roles might reduce board 
independence and therefore compromise its monitoring role. Commenting on this dual 
role, Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggest that executive directors might experience a 
trade-off in disclosing information to the board. If the management reveals sufficient 
information to the board, the manager may obtain better advice, but will be accurately 
scrutinized by the board. This provides the manager with the incentive to conceal 
sufficient information to the board in order to avoid accurate monitoring. In this 
circumstance, the board may commit to reducing monitoring in order to maintain 
information supply from management.  
As a consequence of the dual role, firms in a unitary system might choose to adopt either 
combined or separated leadership. A combined or duality leadership refers to the 
situation where the CEO also holds the position of chairperson of the board, while 
separated leadership exists whenever a non-executive director serves as board 
                                              
21 According to Bebchuk and Roe (1999), path dependent theory suggests that the governance system of a 
country depends on the structure when the economy began. The system spreads over the world through 
conquest and colonial system (Gevurtz, 2004). Accordingly, the unitary system is prevalent in Anglo-
Saxon countries such as the US, UK and Commonwealth countries, while the two-tier system is 
commonly observed in the continental European economies and their former colonies. 
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chairperson (Fosberg & Nelson, 1999). Agency literature suggests that leadership 
structures have important implications for the board’s independence and therefore the 
effectiveness of their monitoring role. This view is grounded on the premise that the 
board chairperson has the authority to organize board activity and therefore grants the 
chairperson the greatest influence over the board. Nevertheless, both leadership 
structures have their own advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Proponents of separated leadership argue that the chairperson and the CEO have 
different roles and that these should be separated (Dalton et al., 1998). Fama and Jensen 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) claim that CEO duality signals the absence of separation of 
management decisions from control decisions so that it reduces the firm’s 
competitiveness for survival. Moreover, Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) posit that 
combined leadership grants management the ability to influence board composition and 
tenure, set board meeting agendas, control information flows and influence the 
development of corporate strategy. This, in turn, enables management to control the 
board, and accordingly, prevents the board from monitoring management effectively 
(Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Consequently, the lack of board independence associated 
with combined leadership will hamper the board in its capacity “…to respond early to 
failure in its top management team” (Jensen, 1993, p.866). Therefore, the presence of 
duality implies that management actually defeats the check and balance system that 
enhances managerial entrenchment.  
 
However, separated leadership might dilute managerial power “…to provide effective 
leadership by increasing the probability that actions and expectations of management 
and the board are at odds with each other” (Baliga, Moyer & Rao, 1996, p.42). This 
might create potential rivalry between the board chairperson and the CEO, which limits 
innovation and entrepreneurship by the CEO because the board and the CEO might have 
different perspectives and time-horizons regarding the project being proposed by 
management. Further, separated leadership generates investor confusion, as there are 
two public spokespersons within the firm, the board chairperson and the CEO. In 
contrast, combined leadership permits clear-cut leadership, which is necessary for 
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strategy formulation and its implementation, and therefore might lead to superior 
performance 
 
The firms in a two-tier system have supervisory and executive boards. The members of 
the supervisory board are elected by shareholders22. Eventually, the supervisory board 
elects the executive board, which is similar to the top management team in a one-tier 
system. The two-tier system prohibits an individual from serving in both supervisory and 
executive boards and therefore the supervisory boards comprise non-executive directors 
entirely. This dual chambers system leads to a formal separation between management 
decisions and control decisions (Moerland, 1995) that provides a basis for rationalizing 
effective monitoring by the board (Adams, 2002). Although the scope of responsibility 
of the board might include advisory and control duties, the formal separation suggests 
that the two-tier system emphasizes the monitoring role as compared to the one-tier 
system (Moerland, 1995). However, the modes of appointment of the supervisory board 
members vary across two-tier countries23
 
. 
Based on the work of Berle and Means (1932), the first generation of the governance 
literature hinges on the assumption of a dispersed ownership in public corporations, 
where the agency problems stem from the conflict between manager and corporate 
owners (Denis & McConnell, 2003). However, in most economies the ownership of the 
firms is concentrated in the hands of few wealthy families that provide them with almost 
complete control of the firm (La Porta et al., 1999; Lemmon & Lins, 2003). This finding 
suggests that the dominant agency problem in most countries is related to the conflict 
between the controlling family and minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and 
therefore dispersed ownership becomes an irrelevant framework 
 
The prevalence of the family control has been quoted as providing a rationale to use the 
family, instead of individuals, as the unit of analysis and accordingly a family-based 
                                              
22 Germany follows the co-determination approach and some portions of the members of the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) are elected by the employees. 
23 For example, in Indonesia and Taiwan, the members of the management board are elected directly by 
shareholders.  
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approach has important implications for governance research. This approach is based on 
the premise that the family members of the controlling owners share the same interests 
and accordingly they will pursue similar and collective behaviour in the contracting 
environment (Urtiaga & Tribo, 2004). For example, one implication of family members 
sharing the same interests is that family ownership includes shareholding by the family 
members and by parties considered to be under the influence of the family24
 
. Put 
differently, the aggregate shareholdings of family members of the controlling owner are 
treated identically to the shareholding of a single person in the framework where 
individuals serve as the unit of analysis. According to Claessens et al. (2002), using the 
family as the unit of analysis is more beneficial as this approach better portrays the real 
control of the firm. 
Studies investigating board composition generally follow the common practice in 
categorizing the directors such as insider directors, affiliated directors and independent 
directors (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p.2)25
 
. This categorization assumes that insider and 
affiliated directors are more likely to preserve the interest of management as they share 
the same interests. Lukviarman (2004) argues that such categorization in one-tier studies 
is applicable to family-controlled firms although it requires a modification. Particularly, 
he notes that affiliated director should be defined as the owner-related directors that 
might include the relatives of the controlling shareholders or individuals with personal 
ties with the controlling shareholders. This view assumes that the affiliated director 
would prefer to give assurance that the interests of the controlling family are well 
respected.  
In the concentrated firms, the management acts solely for the controlling family and 
therefore potentially lead to a greater agency problem (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Following the approach using the family as the unit of analysis, the interests of family 
                                              
24 See, for example, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Baek, Kang 
and Park (2004).  
25 Inside directors are person who are currently officers of the company. Affiliated directors are the 
relatives of officers, person who are likely to have a business relationship with company such as 
investment bankers and lawyers, or persons who were officers in the recent past. Independent directors are 
outside directors without such affiliation. The differentiation between inside directors and outside 
directors in the Indonesian context is detailed in section 4.4.2.  
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members of controlling owners serving in the board might be argued as necessarily 
similar to those of management, which has been assumed as representing the interest of 
the controlling family solely. Consequently, the family as the unit of analysis has two 
important implications on the concept of director’s independence. Firstly, the interest-
sharing assumption implies that the directors of controlling family members necessarily 
represent the interest of their family as their fate is constrained by their family. Given 
that the management acts solely for the controlling family, this argument implies that 
such directors share the same interest with management. Secondly, the collective action 
assumption implies that such directors will pursue collective actions with the 
management in securing the interests of the controlling family.  This might be achieved 
whenever such directors have sufficient information about the company operation. 
Consequently, this view suggests that the directors who are the family members of 
controlling-owner are unconstrained by information access. According to agency theory, 
the information access and the similarity of interests between those of the directors and 
management serve as the criteria in differentiating between independent and insider 
directors. This line of reasoning implies that the directors who are the family members 
of controlling-owners have properties identical to those of insider directors. 
 
The board of directors is internal institution responsible for monitoring management 
behaviour. Such an institution might effectively monitor management whenever control 
decisions are separated from management decisions. This view is based on the premise 
that the separation will enhance the board independence of management necessary for 
fulfilling monitoring responsibility. Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that board leadership 
structure might serve as an indicator of the separation between management and control 
decisions. They posit that combined leadership signals the absence of the separation that 
potentially impairs the board independence in performing objective assessment of 
managerial performance. Further they argue that combined leadership exist whenever 
insider director, who has affiliation with management, serves as a board chairperson. 
 
Theoretically, a combined leadership exists only in the one-tier system, where the 
system permits individuals to serve in both managerial and directorial roles. In contrast, 
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the boards in the two-tier system consist of non-executive directors entirely and 
therefore this system necessarily adopts separated leadership. However, it has been 
argued that the family members of controlling owners serving in the boards have 
identical properties to insider directors. Consequently, when the controlling family 
appoints their family members to the management team and as chairperson of the board, 
the outcome may be the type of combined leadership problem advanced by Jensen 
(1993). This argument implies that combined leadership, to some extent, is also 
prevalent empirically in a two-tier regime, whenever the controlling owner appoints 
their family members to serve as board chairperson 
 
2.4.3.3. Board Size 
Along with independent directorships and leadership structure, board size (which refers 
to the number of directors serving on the board) has been identified as having an impact 
on the effectiveness of the board in fulfilling its responsibilities. Yermack (1996) argues 
that boards consisting of a small number of directors operate most effectively. This view 
is grounded on the premise that a larger group is more likely to be prone to 
communication and coordination problems. Furthermore, the literature also suggests that 
the directors on smaller boards are less risk averse and react more quickly to changing 
market conditions (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Consistent with this view, the work of 
Harris and Raviv (2008) implies that smaller boards reduce potential free-riding 
problems associated with larger boards. Consequently, smaller boards tend to enhance 
discussion of important issues, rather than compliance with CEO proposals, which 
assists in facilitating an effective monitoring role.  
 
However, the number of outside directors is determined by the “expertise that each 
additional director brings to the board compared with the cost arising from free riding 
that occurs with the appointment of an additional director” (Heaney, 2007, p.4). 
Therefore, larger boards can be beneficial where an outside director brings expertise 
with him/her that is appropriate to a monitoring role. Moreover, it has been argued that 
larger boards can have a positive impact on the advisory role. Coles, Daniel & Naveen 
(2008, p.334) suggest that qualities befitting such a role are “…more likely to come 
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from outsiders on the board.” Similarly, Dalton et al. (1999) posit that some firms need 
to appoint additional outside directors to ensure a quality of advice otherwise 
unavailable from inside directors. With the benefit of this better advice, a larger board 
thus enables the firm to formulate an optimal strategy in pursuing its ultimate goal. 
 
2.4.4. Ownership Structure 
2.4.4.1. Large Shareholders  
Within agency theory, corporate governance is derived from the separation between 
ownership and control. According to Barca and Becht (2001) ownership structures 
determine the nature of agency conflict and therefore the very purpose of governance 
mechanisms. In the dispersed firm, agency problems stem from conflict between 
managers and owners. Within such firms, corporate governance is intended to limit self-
interested agent behaviour. By contrast, agency conflict in concentrated firms is between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders. In such cases, the intention of the 
governance mechanism is to prevent expropriation by controlling owners. However, the 
ownership structure may limit the effectiveness of corporate control, as it determines the 
distribution of control, and accordingly the power of contracting parties within an 
organisation (Lannoo, 1999). 
 
In a dispersed firm, minority investors do not have an incentive to monitor management 
individually because they bear the cost of monitoring and reap only a small fraction of 
its benefit (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If all small owners behave in the same way, 
monitoring tends to be weak in such firms unless another substitute mechanism exists. 
Given the free-rider problem, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose the presence of large 
shareholders as a governance mechanism in order to prevent management from pursuing 
opportunistic action. Given their significant ownership share, it is argued that large 
shareholders will pursue monitoring since they will reap substantial benefit from this 
action. Therefore, the role of large shareholders in monitoring management is a response 
to the free-rider problem associated with dispersed ownership. 
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Maug (1998) argues that monitoring by large shareholders is also associated with the 
capital gain because of their private information from monitoring actions. It is suggested 
that such benefit is theoretically supported since the trade-off between liquidity and 
control does not exist. Moreover, a blockholder is able to exercise voice strategy in order 
to protect their interest because they have a significant shareholding, which provides 
them with the power to vote against management actions. Accordingly, the power of a 
blockholder facilitates disciplinary action and provides the condition necessary for 
effective corporate governance (Smith & Walter, 2006). Empirical work claims that the 
presence of a blockholder may mitigate the agency problem as this type of owner has the 
incentive to monitor and the power to discipline management (Clyde, 1997; Jiambalvo, 
Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2002; Jones, Lee & Tompkins, 1997).  
 
According to La Porta et al. (1999, 2000), a particular level of stockholding provides the 
large shareholder with almost complete control over the firm’s decisions. This 
ownership structure determines the incentive and power of the large shareholder to 
commit expropriation from the firm. As documented by several studies, most of the 
firms around the world generally have controlling ownership, which is entrenched and 
sufficiently powerful to design the contract (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000). Having control 
of a firm, an owner can divert firm’s resources where this diversion can take various 
forms such as salary, transfer pricing, and non-arm length transaction.  
 
Theoretically, the disadvantage of single controlling ownership could be mitigated by 
certain ownership patterns. Maury and Pajuste (2005) argue that the most important 
dimension of control associated with majority shareholders rests in its contestability, 
which requires the presence of multiple large shareholders. A higher contestability 
associated with the existence of multiple blockholders increases the marginal cost of 
stealing, which lessens the incentive of expropriation and therefore enhances firm 
performance. However, the contestability becomes lower if a coalition consists of 
blockholders with greater voting rights and lower cash flow rights. They suggest that a 
higher wedge between voting and cash flow rights will lead to a decrease in the marginal 
cost of stealing. Nevertheless, it is suggested that contestability potentially improves the 
 33 
alignment of interests of those contracting parties, implying that the benefit of a check 
and balance system would be achieved whenever control of the firm is optimally 
distributed among contracting parties26
 
. This perspective underlines the importance of 
unrelated blockholders, who have incentives to collect information and monitor 
management, and sufficient voting power to over-ride or oust management, as a 
governance mechanism. 
However, the role of the large shareholder as a governance mechanism depends on the 
institutional setting in which the firm operates. The work of Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
reveals that concentrated ownership is positively related to the private benefits of control 
in the less developed capital markets while Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a negative 
relationship between the proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders and 
firm performance in Malaysian firms. These results are inconsistent with those from 
European firms, where the presence of blockholders is related to better firm 
performance, indicating that blockholders in Asian economies collude to divert profits 
from the firm, while in European countries, they play a monitoring role (Faccio, Lang & 
Young, 2001). Accordingly, it is argued that the presence of domestic blockholders by 
families in Asia exacerbate agency problem. 
 
The role of the large shareholder as a governance mechanism also depends on the level 
of corporate governance of their country of origin. Doidge (2004) argues that developed 
countries like the US provide strong investor protection through various regulations and 
market mechanisms which, in turn, force firms to adopt sound corporate governance 
practices. This protection facilitates continuous scrutiny by shareholders (Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz, 2004) and, consequently, investing firms face performance pressure 
that ensures they monitor their foreign investment (Boardman, Shapiro & Vining, 1997). 
Accordingly, it is beneficial for the host economy to sell a fraction of a company to a 
foreign firm that has already operated in that country with good governance practice (La 
                                              
26 Based on the control distribution, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) differentiate between dictatorship-
firm and democracy-firm. However, this classification is based on the shareholder right to contest 
management decisions provided by company by law and charter. The former refers to the firm where 
management has an effective control and the latter refer to the case where shareholders might effectively 
challenge management proposals. 
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Porta et al., 2000). This investment pattern is believed to bring about improvement in 
corporate governance of host firms, since investing firms will demand such 
improvement to secure their investment.  
 
2.4.4.2. Majority Shareholders and Control-enhancing Mechanisms  
The identity of owners is an important aspect of ownership structure as higher ownership 
by different types of shareholders has been documented as producing a different impact 
on the association between control of the firms and organizational outcome. In the work 
of Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2002), the term ‘large owner’ refers to 
institutional shareholders, where their substantial ownership has been claimed as 
providing necessary incentive and economic rationale to collect information and monitor 
management. Eventually, such shareholders are expected to have a positive association 
with value-enhancing activities. For example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) argue 
that firms under investigation for manipulation of earnings have less outside 
blockholders, suggesting that better informed blockholders reduce the perceived benefit 
of managing accruals. Ultimately, a significant shareholding enables the institutional 
shareholder to oust poorly performing management, thus providing managers with 
incentive to perform better. In other work, the term ‘large shareholder’ refers to the 
family ownership that is prevalent in Asia, European, and Latin America (Lins, 2003). 
Khan (1999) posits that family-based control, especially in Asia, has been accepted as an 
indisputable fact. According to Nam (2001), such patterns of ownership might be 
attributed to the specific culture, wealth accumulation and entrenched interest, and 
investor protection provided by the legal system.  
 
The prevalence of ownership concentration by the controlling family has been asserted 
as providing rational justification to use the family as the unit of analysis and 
accordingly has important implications for governance research. Although this approach 
lacks theoretical support, there is significant incidence of governance research taking 
this approach. Some studies investigate the level of ownership by controlling families 
and its association with firm performance (Baek, Kang & Park, 2004; Mitton, 2004). 
Others examine the association between ownership concentration by a controlling family 
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and firm performance in the presence of specific moderating factors (Bae, Kang & Kim, 
2002).   
 
The family control is further enhanced through pyramidal and crossholding 
ownerships27 that are believed to affect the nature of the association between the 
governance mechanism and the organizational outcome (La Porta et al., 1998). 
According to Claessens et al. (2002) pyramidal and cross-holding ownership create the 
divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights. This deviation would lessen the 
incentive alignment effect as controlling owners hold fewer cash-flow rights, and at the 
same time boost the entrenchment effect as majority owners carry greater voting rights 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Joh, 2003). Morck and Yeung (2003) suggest that the deviations 
necessarily provide sufficient incentive to commit expropriation of minority 
shareholders and facilitate tunnelling activities detrimental to minority wealth28
 “…serious problems can arise from the nature of the financial markets 
where there is information asymmetry between banks and borrowers 
and between equity issuers and purchasers. Thus, there could be a 
possible failure of the dominant owners under dominant family-based 
corporate governance system to appreciate the interests of minority 
shareholders”. 
. 
Accordingly, such patterns of ownership tend to exacerbate agency conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders. In this context, Khan (1999, p.15) argues that 
 
Aside from pyramidal and crossholding ownership, controlling family involvement in 
management teams and on the board of directors has been documented. However, 
studies elaborating upon such involvement are limited. These studies commonly start out 
with the research question as to whether the involvement of a controlling family on the 
                                              
27 In a similar spirit, ADB (2001) differentiates three strategies pursued by the family to control the firm. 
The first is direct family ownership, where the family directly owns a substantial portion of shares of firms 
and becomes the controlling shareholder. The second is indirect control via a base company where the 
family gain complete control of one or more strategic base companies that have substantial equity 
participation in the subsidiaries (simple pyramidal structure). The third is indirect control via complex 
shareholdings where the family controls the group’s member companies through its own shareholdings, 
investments made by the base companies, holdings of a non-profit foundation, and subsidiaries’ equity 
participation. 
28 Joh (2003) finds that independent firms outperformed firms affiliated with large business groups in 
Korea before the economic crisis. This finding thus implies supportive evidence for the tunnelling 
hypothesis, where business groups might serve as a tunnelling channel. 
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board and in management, empirically exists, and whether such involvement is related to 
the organizational outcome. Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2003), Khanthavit et al. 
(2002), Nam (2004) and Lins (2003) investigate the controlling family involvement in 
management and confirm that controlling-family members occupy a significant 
proportion of top management positions. Consistent with this finding, Nam (2003, p. 32) 
suggests that, in most Asian countries, “…controlling owners are typically preoccupied 
with conducting the managerial function themselves”.  
 
As previously presented, the prevalence of family control provides a rationale to use the 
family as the unit of analysis. One implication of this approach is that family ownership 
includes shareholding by the family members and by parties considered to be under the 
influence of the family (Claessens et al., 2002)29
 
. In other words, the shareholding of a 
single family member is treated identically to the aggregate shareholdings of family 
members of the controlling owners. Given the substantial shareholding of their family, 
the family members of controlling owners serving in management and on the board are 
treated equally to the individual insider who owns a substantial shareholding in the firm. 
Accordingly, when the family members of controlling owners serve in management, the 
outcome may be the type of managerial ownership problem advanced by Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1988). 
Agency theory predicts that agency problems arise whenever the ownership of the 
production factor is separated from its control (Monks & Minow, 2004). In such cases, 
the agent is assumed to be a professional manager who is less likely to have a significant 
shareholding in the firm. In this circumstance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
management do not bear any cost associated with perquisite taking when they own zero 
shareholding in the firm they manage. As such, the agent’s wealth is less sensitive to 
organizational outcome and therefore provides the agent with the incentive to pursue 
actions to benefit themselves at the expense of principals. In contrast, if managers hold a 
fraction of ownership, perquisite taking will cost managers in terms of discounting their 
                                              
29 Claessens et al. (2002, p.2746) note that “ We do not consider ownership by individual family members 
to be separate, and we use total ownership by each family group—defined as a group of people related by 
blood or marriage—as the unit of analysis”.  
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shareholding value. Based on this argument, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
higher insider ownership potentially lessens management incentive to pursue self-
interested action and therefore enhances the convergence of interests of agent and 
principal. 
 
Despite its advantages, insider ownership has also been noted as having a negative effect 
on agents’ behaviour. Fan and Wong (2002) and Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) 
suggest that higher insider ownership leads to entrenchment problems as such ownership 
provides insiders with sufficient voting power to secure their position. The disadvantage 
of an entrenchment effect is grounded on the premise that a necessary condition for 
effective corporate governance is that badly performing managers may be replaced 
(Macey, 1997). In this circumstance, firm disciplinary mechanisms are unable to 
function to remove poorly performing managers whenever an entrenchment effect 
associated with higher insider ownership exists (Volpin, 2002). Previous study reveals 
that the association between CEO turnover and firm performance is negated by the 
presence of insider ownership (Gibson, 2003) as such insiders have excessive influence 
over the decision-making process (Campos, Newell & Wilson, 2002). This view is 
consistent with Nam (2003, p.2), who argues that “…the beneficial effect of large 
shareholders can be expected only when the management is separated from ownership, 
or when proper corporate governance mechanisms are in place and operating so that 
outside shareholders can effectively oversee corporate management”.  
 
Other studies examine the prevalence of such involvement on the board. For example, 
Khoo (2003) finds that about 85% of listed Malaysian companies had owner-managers 
and the post of CEO, chairman of the board or vice-chairman belonged to a member of 
the controlling family or a nominee. According to Yeh and Woidtke (2005), such 
involvement facilitates controlling owners transferring corporate resources to 
themselves, thereby expropriating the minority shareholders’ wealth and curtailing firm 
performance. This view is grounded on the premise that family members share the same 
interests and act collectively (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Urtiaga & Tribo, 2004; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This framework implies that the interests of controlling-
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family members serving on the board are assumed to be necessarily similar to the 
management, which acts solely for the controlling family (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Accordingly, the directors who are family members of controlling-owner could be seen 
as having similar attributes to insider directors and potentially negate the board 
independence of management and therefore compromise the monitoring role.  
 
The negative effect of such involvement is confirmed by Yeh and Woidtke (2005), who 
find that family members serving on the board of a firm are associated with firm value 
discount. The same study also finds that corporate value is lower whenever members 
from the controlling family serve on the management team and that the insider 
dominated board structure is attributable to agency problems due to separation between 
control and cash flow rights. Consistent with this result, Yeh, Ko and Su (2003) find that 
when family members serve as directors or in top management positions, the potential 
damage of their expropriation on minority shareholders and corporate value will be 
higher. In similar vein, Ho and Wong (2001) find that the percentage of family members 
on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, suggesting 
evidence supportive of an entrenchment hypothesis. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Agency literature suggests that incomplete contracts require governance mechanisms in 
order to alleviate agency problems related to the separation of ownership and control. 
Governance mechanisms consist of several devices and the board of directors is at the 
apex of internal mechanisms. Within this theory, the board is primarily assigned as a 
monitoring device in order to reduce self-interested agent behaviour. An effective 
monitoring role might be fulfilled whenever a board demonstrates independence of 
management and possesses sufficient information regarding its firm’s operation. The 
ultimate outcome of effective monitoring by the board will be reflected in better firm 
performance. 
 
Recent governance studies find that, in most economies, the ownership of the firm is 
concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy controlling families, suggesting that the 
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dispersed ownership becomes an irrelevant framework. In Indonesia, family control is 
further enhanced through the involvement of their family members on the board of 
directors and in management positions, which results in two competing effects. 
Nevertheless, ownership concentration provides a basis for rationalising the family as 
the unit of analysis. Following this approach, this dissertation argues that the family 
members of controlling owners serving on the board will have identical properties with 
those of insider directors. This argument implies that the substance of combined 
leadership might exist in the two-tier system, particularly whenever the controlling 
owner appoints their family members to serve as board chairperson. Accordingly, the 
board independence issues in a one-tier system, to some extent are also applicable to 
Indonesia with its two-tier system. A review of relevant empirical work will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3:  Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the underlying theory of board composition and its association 
with firm performance were discussed. It has been documented that agency theory 
predicts that board composition might affect firm performance as it enhances board 
monitoring effectiveness. This chapter discusses in depth the empirical studies 
investigating the association between board composition and organizational outcome. 
This chapter is intended, firstly, to document the existing empirical studies in this area, 
and secondly, to identify the research gap, which serves as a basis for rationalizing the 
significance of the study in the context of Indonesia. It begins with discussing the 
motivation and contribution of existing empirical research. The following sections 
present the organizational outcome indicators and the results of previous studies. The 
last section summarizes the discussion. 
 
According to Zahra and Pearce II (1989), the attributes of the board determine its role 
and its effectiveness, and subsequently affect the relationship between board and firm 
performance. They posit that board attributes refer to its composition, characteristics, 
structure and process, and state that there is dynamic interaction between these 
attributes. However, their model reveals that composition is an exogenous attribute 
while characteristics, structure, and process are endogenously determined by 
composition attribute. This provides justification for the claim that the board 
composition is the most important attribute of the board institution.  
 
3.2. Motivations and Contributions 
Empirical work investigating board composition advances various rationales justifying 
the importance of the study. However, the main motivation remains unchanged: to 
empirically test the underlying theory concerning the association between board 
composition and the behaviour of contracting parties. It is assumed that such an 
association is reflected in the observable and significant relationship between board 
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composition and particular organization outcome (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). 
Accordingly, most of empirical work begins with research questions asking whether the 
different board size, leadership structure (either combined or separated), and the 
proportion of outside directors to total number of directors, lead to different decisions 
and presumably, produce different outcomes.  
 
The objective of earlier studies, which mostly focus on US firms, is arguably simple: to 
examine directly the effect of certain board composition on firm value, where this effect 
is assumed to be straightforward30
 
. Recent empirical work commonly begins with the 
argument noting the shortcomings and the inconclusive finding of earlier studies. This 
argument, it is believed, would justify further investigation of the same theme in a 
different setting and using different methods. Thus, the scholarly raison d’être of these 
works is twofold. The first is to contribute to academic literature by seeking empirical 
confirmation of the underlying theory. The second is to challenge the generalisation of 
previous findings by verifying either its external or internal validity. 
3.2.1. External Validity 
External validity refers to the verification of a previous finding in a different setting 
using a similar method. Most empirical studies investigating board composition fall into 
this category. This stream of work argues that firms in different populations possess 
specific characteristics that might affect the relationship between board composition and 
firm outcome. The specific population might refer to the firm size, type of industry and 
growth opportunity.  
 
As Daily and Dalton (1993) observe, studies researching board composition focus 
heavily on larger firms. They argue that firm size might confound such a relationship. 
Specifically, larger firms tend to be complex and face more internal and external forces, 
which reduce the ability of any given individual to initiate change, to affect the direction 
of the firm and to influence the organizational outcome. Consequently, the complexity 
of a large firm complicates the relationship between governance structures and 
                                              
30 See for example Daily and Dalton (1992) and Fosberg (1989). 
 42 
organizational performance. By contrast, a small firm adopts simpler structures and 
systems, resulting in a more narrow focus, which makes it easier to direct and change the 
direction of a company. Thus, CEO and directors are less constrained by the 
organizational and structural system in small firms, and therefore more able to influence 
the outcome of the firms. This implies that the effect of board composition on firm 
performance is more likely to be observable in small firms.  
 
Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) contend that firm performance varies 
systematically across industries. This indicates that industry characteristics may 
confound the association between board composition and firm performance. 
Accordingly, studies addressing this issue should account for industry effect. Based on 
this argument, Judge (1994) argues that focusing on a single industry sufficiently 
justifies the importance of the study as an intra-industry comparison is more meaningful 
than a between-industry comparison.   
 
The association between board composition and firm performance might also be affected 
by the presence of incremental agency conflict embedded in the growth opportunity 
(Hutchinson & Gull, 2004). The motivation for a study focusing on this issue is 
grounded on the premise that investment opportunity sets may exacerbate agency 
conflict due to the higher information asymmetry problem. Growth options, unlike 
assets-in-place, are discretionary investment opportunities specific to the firm, which 
require specific control mechanisms in order to be pursued. Therefore, the optimal board 
for a growth firm might require a composition different from those of a non-growth firm. 
Boone et al. (2007)) argue that a growth firm emphasizes the board advisory role, rather 
than the monitoring role, and this focus may complicate the association between board 
composition and firm performance.  
 
The non-US based studies commonly begin with similar underlying presumptions. This 
work presumes that an environmental setting can potentially affect internal governance 
structure and its effectiveness. According to Vafeas and Theodorou (1998, p.384), 
“…while the assumption of a utility–maximizing agent is universal, each country’s 
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regulatory and economic environment, the strength of capital markets, and current 
governance practices are different” and therefore the US results regarding the board 
structure-performance relationship may not be generalized. Accordingly, they suggest 
that the importance and value of various governance structures should be separately 
examined in each country. This argument is consistent with an institutional perspective, 
which contends that, to some extent, the specific environment faced by the firm might 
have a substantial impact on the firm’s structure, governance, and its accomplishment.  
 
The US institutional environment is commonly cited as characterized by strong legal 
protection31
 
 (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000) which eventually leads to a large, deep and 
liquid market, active institutional investors, and a dispersed ownership (Erickson et al., 
2005). This setting it is believed would enhance the simultaneous working of both 
internal and external governance mechanisms in reducing self-interest behaviour from 
agents (Brunello, Graziano & Parigi, 2003). The departure from the US setting 
potentially affects the effectiveness of corporate governance, in general, and internal 
mechanisms in particular. Consequently, the motivation for the study refers to the 
verification of the underlying theory in different institutional environments. 
Park and Shin (2004) find that the differences between the Canadian institutional setting 
and that of the US hinge upon the ownership structure and the small number of 
institutional investors. Specifically, they contend that ownership of Canadian firms is 
concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders. This setting implies the existence of 
illiquid markets that force the institutional investor to actively monitor management as 
the market provides less liquidity to pursue an exit strategy. In such an environment, 
institutional investors would make demands for board representation in order to secure 
their investment. They argue that the directors representing institutional investors would 
result in a different impact on the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance as compared to those representing non-institutional shareholders.    
 
                                              
31 Indeed, Denis and McConnell (2003) suggest that the legal system is believed to be the main feature of 
an institutional setting and that feature characterizes the so-called “second generation of corporate 
governance research”. 
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The difference in institutional setting between Australia and the US has been 
documented by Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright (2004) contending that the market is small 
in the Australian corporate governance system. This setting is less likely to encourage an 
active market for corporate control. Consequently, they argue that the effectiveness in 
“…inducing boards to be strict monitors and take corrective action in case of failure, 
may not be comparable to the US and the UK” (p. 2). Therefore, they believe that it is 
important to investigate the relationship between the board of directors and firm 
performance as it may help to “…differentiate between the role of market specific 
factors versus governance characteristics” (p.3).  
 
Some European evidence has emerged, although the number of studies is limited. These 
studies commonly refer to ownership structure and financing patterns as the main 
differences in institutional settings between those of US and European countries. 
Traditionally, firms in the European Union are stakeholder oriented and are 
characterized by the a prevalence of insider dominated control and relational investment 
and the reliance on credit markets and less on equity markets that make ownership fairly 
concentrated and stable over time (Lehman & Weigand, 2000). This pattern of 
investment may mitigate agency problems as it enhances collective action by small 
owners and reduces information asymmetry.  
 
A cross-country analysis of European-based firms by Krivogorsky (2006) suggests that 
management’s objective is not necessarily to maximize stock prices, nor to be sensitive 
to firm performance within this environment.  It is argued that although the law systems 
are quite distinct, the individual codes in a single country expresses relatively common 
views on issues related to the importance of board composition, ownership structure, and 
its influence on firm performance. However, Klapper and Love (2004) find that the 
effectiveness of investor protection provided by the legal system varies across European 
countries. This finding suggests that different institutional settings exist across this 
region. Thus, although a common view might prevail, the different levels of investor 
protection might lead to the inherent endogeneity problem of cross-country analysis as 
this study suffers from different institutional settings among European countries.  
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Analysis of a single, European-based country has also been documented, although the 
number is still limited. The Belgium evidence by Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001) 
starts with the description that this economy is characterized by ownership 
concentration, less active institutional investors, fewer listed firms and a higher level of 
majority shareholders’ involvement in management decisions. Similarly, an Italian-
based study reveals that its institutional setting is also typified by concentrated 
ownership, the absence of large independent shareholders and limited bank monitoring 
(Brunello, Graziano & Parigi, 2003). It is suggested that these features lessen the 
effectiveness of internal mechanisms to discipline poorly performing managers as the 
controlling shareholders dominate the board of directors and the management team. 
Postma et al. (1999) claim the lack of take-over mechanism and low investor protection 
in the Dutch institutional setting. According to Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001) 
the different business contexts between those of US and European countries might create 
distinct corporate governance and accordingly “…comparing US and UK models in 
isolation can lead to the futile conclusions” (p. 383). 
 
The Asian-based work commonly starts with the similar presumption to those of 
European-based studies. These studies are motivated by the importance of verifying the 
findings of developed countries in different business contexts. However, unlike their 
European counterparts, the agency problem of Asian firms is exacerbated by the 
existence of coalitions between controlling shareholders and blockholders (Faccio, Lang 
& Young, 2001), excessive control by majority owners, and heavy reliance on external 
financing (ADB, 2000). Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2002) suggest that most Asian 
economies exhibit lower degrees of investor protection.  
 
The Malaysian evidence by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reveals that that economy has 
different institutional settings to those of the US. First, ownership of the firm is highly 
concentrated, where the majority control is further enhanced through pyramidal and 
cross-holding ownership. This implies the absence of a corporate market for corporate 
control and hence leaving minority shareholders without protection except through 
adopting an exit strategy, which is a weak defence against management control. 
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Secondly, the higher degree of owners’ involvement in management decisions suggests 
the absence of separation of ownership and control and increases the likelihood of 
expropriation from minority shareholders. Thirdly, the lack of a merit system in the 
lending process, as a result of a close relationship between firms, bank and government, 
encourages morally hazardous lending practices. Similarly, Yeh, Ko and Su (2003) posit 
that the specific institutional setting of Taiwan hinges upon the prevalence of ownership 
concentration, low institutional ownership, an inactive market for corporate control and 
less investor protection provided by the legal system. These institutional features thus 
provide majority investors with higher degrees of control. Accordingly, they contend 
that the relationship between board composition and firm performance of Asian firms 
might demonstrate different patterns from those in the US and UK.  
 
Change in an economic system, as a result of political change, has been identified as 
providing sufficient rationale to support the importance of a study. An economic system, 
in general, can be broadly categorized as either being derived from capitalism or 
socialism. The political system change in Russia, which led to the switching of the 
economic systems from socialism to capitalism, has been argued as having an impact on 
corporate governance demand (Peng, Buck & Filatotchev, 2003). This switching 
triggered mass privatization of former state-owned enterprises that then created a 
demand for corporate governance. Given the earlier stage of market development, the 
internal governance mechanisms might produce different outcomes as compared to 
developed countries. However, governance reform might produce performance 
improvement as the new directors have less political connection with former communist 
regimes. Based on these arguments, Peng, Buck and Filatotchev (2003) contend that 
investigating Russian firms after mass privatization significantly contributes to the 
governance literature.  
 
3.2.2. Internal Validity 
Complementing external validity, several studies have challenged the findings of 
previous research by using different approaches. This so-called internal construct 
validity covers broader aspects of empirical methodology such as measurement, 
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definition of variables, linearity, interdependence, and endogeneity issues. Internal 
validity is also related to the approach capturing the outcome of board monitoring 
effectiveness (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Indeed, this stream of work might propose the 
different prediction as a result of a different underlying theory of empirical analysis. The 
following section presents further discussion of the internal validity of empirical work.  
 
3.2.2.1. Theoretical Background  
A study investigating the relationship between board composition and organizational 
outcome might adopt one of many existing underlying theories (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
According to Hung (1998), a theory reflects the argument of a different school of 
thought that proposes a different role and, accordingly, a different prediction regarding 
the effect of board composition on firm performance. Specifically, the association 
between board composition and organizational outcome could be analysed using 
resources dependence theory, class hegemony theory, a legalistic approach, stewardship 
theory and agency theory (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Hung, 1998). 
 
Resources dependence theory emphasizes the advice and service role, where the board is 
responsible for providing information to the executives and for securing the vital 
resources (Pfeffer, 1972). This view implies that such roles are best performed by 
interlocking directors that increase coordination, reduce transaction costs, and improve 
access to the resources and information (Provan, 1980; Pearce II & Zahra, 1992). Class 
hegemony theory argues that the boards serve as a device of elite capitalists to 
consolidate and maintain their power in order to control social and economic 
institutions. Accordingly, the main responsibility of the board is to create inter-
organizational relationships in order to ensure the sustainability of the firm. Within this 
view, only individuals of the ruling elite class may serve as directors and the exclusivity 
of this structure provides assurance that the interest of the elites are protected (Ratcliff, 
1980). Zahra and Pearce (1989) posit that empirical studies borrowing the resources 
dependence and class hegemony theories are limited. 
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Agency theory views the board as an ultimate mechanism of internal corporate control. 
This theory assumes that managers are self-interested individuals and therefore the main 
role of the board is to monitor management in order to ensure that the interest of 
shareholders is well respected. Unlike the agency framework, stewardship theory 
assumes that the individual is trustworthy rather than self-serving (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997).  This implies that managers are good stewards of the corporation, and 
therefore the steward and principal might establish mutual cooperation and a “goal 
alignment”. Consequently, stewardship theorists believe that managers will perform 
better whenever they are trusted and granted decision-making authority. In this 
framework, a governance structure will be optimal if it permits coordination between 
board and management (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) as the board is 
expected to focus on their advisory role.  
 
The legalistic approach posits that boards contribute to firm performance by performing 
their mandated responsibility, where the directors are entitled to the legal power to fulfil 
their responsibility. This approach is intended to obtain empirical confirmation regarding 
the impact of specific legal provisions on the association between the board composition 
and organizational outcome. It is asserted that the regulations imposing minimum 
inclusion of independent directors were pioneered by Cadbury Report of UK (Dahya & 
McConnel, 2005), which is derived from the perspective of agency theory (Hung, 1998) 
and accordingly, the theoretical background and the prediction of the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance is similar to that of agency theory. An 
example of this study is found in Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001) of New Zealand 
investigating the effect of the Company Act 1993 on the association between board 
composition and firm performance while similar work from Spain has been has been 
documented by Anson and Rodríguez (2001).  
 
Zahra and Pearce II (1989) observe that most empirical studies use agency theory as 
their conceptual framework. However, some empirical works have simultaneously 
borrowed agency theory and stewardship theory. Empirically, such theories have been 
quoted as having two competing predictions in relation to the effect of board 
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composition on firm performance. According to Desai, Kroll and Wright (2003), 
stewardship theory predicts that the proportion of independent directors serving on the 
boards has a negative association with market return, while under agency theory the 
proportion of independent directors is expected to have a positive association with such 
a return. Tian and Lau (2001) test these hypotheses using accounting earnings as 
performance indicators. 
 
3.2.2.2. Interdependence among Governance Mechanisms 
An important issue pertinent to the association between board composition and firm 
value is the interdependence between governance mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996). According to Berglöf (1997), interdependence refers to the substitutability and 
complementary relationships among governance mechanisms32
 
. The work of Heinrich 
(1999) provides a rationale for the coexistence of different configurations of corporate 
governance as the consequence of the multitude of agency problems, which may 
produce equal outcomes. Consequently, a firm may choose a certain governance 
configuration across the mechanism or within the mechanism that most effectively meets 
its organizational and environmental context (Du & Dei, 2002). In support of this notion, 
Danielson and Karpoff (1998) find that governance mechanisms vary across firms 
without any uniform pattern, suggesting that firms adopt certain governance 
combinations that best address their specific issues. However, specific combinations of 
instruments “…which reinforce each other in minimizing agency costs fit together better 
than alternative combinations” (Heinrich, 1999, p.2).  
The substitution argument posits that the importance of a particular monitoring device 
depends on the presence of multiplicity of control mechanisms while the 
complementarities argument suggests that the effectiveness of the board monitoring role 
is contingent upon the presence of other strong governance mechanisms (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995). A number of studies investigating the association between board 
composition and firm performance have addressed the substitutability issue among 
                                              
32 Other studies use contingency perspective as a synonym term to the interdependence framework. See 
for example Beatty and Zajac (1994) and Kang and Zardkoohi (2005). 
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governance instruments and supported the existence of substitution effects among 
governance variables. Coles and Hesterly (2000) find that board independence becomes 
a significant negative predictor of organization outcome when there is interaction 
between board and leadership. This result suggests that the market views insider 
directors positively when the board chairperson is independent of management for the 
reason that insider directors provide information necessary to make effective decision 
making.  
 
In a broader coverage of governance mechanisms, the work of Rediker and Seth (1995) 
implies that the importance of the board as a monitoring device depends on the presence 
of a multiplicity of control mechanisms. Berry, Fields and Wilkins (2006) examine the 
interdependence between the proportion of independent directors, insider ownership, 
large shareholder, and directors representing venture-capital firms. They find that 
independent directors have a negative association with venture-capitalist directors, 
suggesting that independent directors were added to compensate for venture capitalist 
directors in order to maintain board independence. This study provides supportive 
evidence that as higher agency costs occur due to decrease in insider ownership, other 
mechanisms such as independent directors, venture-capitalist directors, and unaffiliated 
blockholdings change in ways that help to mitigate agency problems. Zajac and 
Westphal (1994) report that CEO incentives (equity holding) are negatively related to 
the level of board monitoring as represented by the proportion of independent directors 
and separated leadership. They suggest that this finding supports the view that 
monitoring by boards is less important when the incentive structure is strong.  
 
The complementary relationship among governance mechanisms has been documented 
by agency studies. Methodologically, these studies commonly rely on the cumulative 
score of a particular governance index as a construct of governance level, where a higher 
score is believed to have better governance arrangements. This approach assumes that 
governance mechanisms complement each other and these complementarities are 
reflected in the higher cumulative scores. Based on this proposition, some studies have 
used a governance composite index. Durnev and Kim (2005) and Mitton (2004) use a 
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governance index of CLSA, which incorporates governance mechanisms and provisions. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) borrow a governance index developed by International 
Shareholders Service, namely Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ), consisting of four 
aspects such as board composition, compensation, takeover defences, and auditing. 
Others have constructed particular governance indices that suit the specific objective of 
the study. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct a governance index focusing on 
the provisions that potentially reduce shareholder rights, consisting of five major items 
such as tactics for delaying hostile bidding, voting rights and their mechanisms, 
director/officer protection, state laws, and other takeover defences. Black, Jang and Kim 
(2006) and Bai et al. (2004) use a specific index incorporating governance mechanisms 
and particular provisions.  
 
Coles and Hesterly (2000) believe that most empirical studies ignore the 
interdependence issue as such studies partially examine the single subset of governance 
mechanism in an isolated relationship. This might contribute to the spurious findings and 
inconsistent estimator of regression analysis that complicates the interpretation and 
generalisation of the results (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Accordingly, studies 
investigating the relationship between board composition and firm performance should 
control for the presence of other governance mechanisms available within a specific 
institutional context. Nevertheless, the literature is inconclusive as to whether the 
relationships between governance mechanisms are complementary to, or substitutes for, 
each other33
 
. 
3.2.2.3. Linearity 
Generally, directors can be characterized as either insider or outsider (Dalton et al., 
1998). The standard view of agency theory posits that outsider directors represent 
independence of management, but can be impaired by receiving incomplete information 
regarding firm operation, while insiders are well informed, although their independency 
from management may be compromised (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). 
Therefore, the board potentially lessens the conflict between manager and shareholder if 
                                              
33 See for examples, Rediker and Seth (1995) and Agrawal & Knoeber (1996).  
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the directors are independent of management and have sufficient knowledge of the firm 
(Ward, 2003). In support of this notion, Green (2005) suggests that the board would 
optimally monitor management whenever there is a balance between independence and 
information properties. In this circumstance, the presence of insiders serving on the 
board potentially mitigates the information problem, while outside directors encourage 
an objective assessment of management performance. Accordingly, an optimal board 
composition comprises insiders and outsiders who bring different attributes, skills and 
knowledge to the board (Bhagat & Black, 2002). 
 
Given that the optimal board comprise a balance of insider and outsider directors, Block 
(1999) argues that there exists an optimum point of inclusion of outsider directors 
serving on the board. Particularly, adding outside directors to the board is beneficial 
whenever the optimum point has not been reached. This inclusion will encourage board 
independence and therefore promote the effectiveness of its monitoring role. Eventually, 
higher board independence enhances the convergence of interest between those of 
principal and agent, which leads to better firm performance. After the optimal level has 
been achieved, the incremental benefit of having additional outsiders on the board will 
diminish due to the information asymmetry problem. This argument implies that there 
exists a non-linear relationship between both insider and outsider directors and firm 
value.  
 
A study by Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) incorporates this issue and employs 
quadratic and cubic terms in overcoming such issue. Their work reveals that firm 
performance is related to outside director in quadratic terms and in cubic terms, 
suggesting that the relationship is non-linear. Moreover, a polynomial shape is found in 
the relationship between outside director and firm performance, suggesting that firm 
performance tends to fall as outside directors increase, but then rises after outsider 
directors constitute approximately two-thirds of the board. Instrumental variables 
analysis also reveals that the representation of outside director has a curvilinear 
relationship with performance. Baysinger and Butler (1985) confirm that the relationship 
between board composition and relative financial performance is not strictly linear with 
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some forms of diminishing marginal return when adding independent directors to the 
board. To capture the non-linearity relationship, they divide the independent director 
representation into discrete categories based on those above and below average. They 
argue that such grouping reflects the sharp differences in board staffing philosophies. In 
similar vein, Block (1999) decomposes the sample into deciles groups and finds that the 
pattern of such a relationship clearly yields a non-monotonic relationship.  
 
The departure from optimal composition has been quoted as the source of boards’ failure 
to effectively pursue their roles. Bhagat and Black (2002) suggest that the trend towards 
a greater proportion of independent directors on boards is evident in the US. Their work 
reveals that between 1970 and the late 1990s, the US witnessed a switch from insider-
dominated to outsider-dominated boards. The switching became dramatic after 1990, 
when significant numbers of corporations had a supermajority of outside directors on 
their boards. However, a supermajority of independent directors emphasizing the 
monitoring role might have a perverse effect (Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991). Due to 
the threat of disciplinary actions by outside directors, managers may become risk-averse, 
which forces them to reduce time horizons, change risk preferences, and limit the 
sensitivity of their wealth to the outcome. These factors tend to discourage managers 
from pursuing riskier projects with potentially positive returns. 
 
Although potentially non-linearity problems might prevail, several studies continue to 
adopt linear relationship approaches without sufficient procedures to control for such 
problems. Examples of this approach are found in the work of Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) and Vafeas (2000). They investigate the boards of UK firms and fail to support 
an unconditional empirical link between board structures (the proportion of outside 
directors and leadership structure) and organisational outcome34
 
. Similarly, Judge, 
Naoumova and Koutzevol (2003) examine Russian firms and also fail to support the 
association between insider directors and firm performance. 
 
                                              
34 However, they control for the non-linearity relationship between ownership and firm performance. 
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3.2.2.4. Endogeneity 
An important issue pertinent to the association between governance mechanisms and 
firm performance is the endogeneity problem that has been quoted as a major concern 
for firm-level variables (Black, Jang & Kim, 2004; 2006). Endogeneity refers to the 
direction of causality on the relationship between governance and firm performance that 
inherently plagues empirical governance studies (Drobetz, 2003). Such issues potentially 
confound the interpretation of research findings as the governance improvement might 
enhance firm performance although, in reverse, firms might improve particular 
governance mechanisms in response to poor prior firm performance (Börsch-Supan & 
Köke, 2002). For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of 
additional independent directors has a positive relationship with firm performance, and 
they interpret this finding as supporting evidence that governance improvement 
encourages firm performance.  
 
However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) claim that the probability of independent 
directors being added to the board rises following poor firm performance. They argue 
that governance mechanisms could be considered as a response to the prior poor 
performance in order to convince the market that the firms have adopted new strategies 
to overcome such performance problems. Within this context, empirical cross-sectional 
analysis may reveal that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors 
demonstrate lower performance and, consequently, independent directors will be 
interpreted as having a negative effect on the firm performance. This finding suggests 
that prior poor performance might drive outsider representation on the board. 
Conversely, the work of Yeh and Woidtke (2005) reveals that an insider-dominated 
board is negatively related to prior performance. They argue that this pattern indicates 
that majority owners pursue the entrenchment strategy to reduce the board monitoring 
role in order to retain their control of the firm.  
 
In a broader perspective, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that endogeneity is also 
related to the optimal differences of governance portfolio, suggesting that firms may 
endogenously and optimally choose different governance practices that best suit their 
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specific challenge. This so-called reverse causation also implies that more profitable 
firms may choose weaker governance as they have less need for outside capital (Black, 
Jang & Kim, 2004).  By contrast, Nowland (2008) contends that a particular governance 
improvement depends on the resources available to the firm implying that better prior 
performance is associated with better corporate governance. Although producing 
conflicting results, these studies indicate the existence of the association between prior 
performance and the existing board composition. 
 
Governance-performance studies have taken different routes in controlling for 
endogeneity problems. Lemmon and Lins (2003) propose an approach to addressing 
endogeneity concerns by examining changes in the variables of interest rather than their 
level. Similarly, Nowland (2008) uses panel data to relate changes in board measures to 
changes in firm performance. He argues that such an approach provides a direct test as 
to whether improvements in board-related governance mechanisms are associated with 
better performance and therefore inherently control for unidentified firm-specific 
variables. Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2000) use lagged data for independent and 
dependent variables while Durnev and Kim (2005) measure the dependent variables 
using an estimate of projected need for outside capital rather than an outcome-based 
measure.  
 
According to Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005), if a governance variable is 
endogenously determined, the OLS estimation will produce biased results while two step 
least squares (2SLS) will result in better estimates of the relationship between a 
governance variable and performance. They posit that 2SLS involves identifying 
instrument variables that are correlated with the key independent variable and 
uncorrelated with the dependent variables. Examples of this approach are found in the 
work of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), Lehman and Weigand (2000), and 
Black, Jang and Kim (2004; 2006). The 2 SLS model adopted by empirical research is 
consistent with Börsch-Supan and Koke (2002) who suggest that a structured model 
might mitigate the endogeneity problem.  
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Although the structured model has been widely adopted, there is a lack of empirical 
consensus and theoretical support in identifying the determinants of particular 
governance mechanisms.  Accordingly, empirical studies have proposed different 
models concerning the determinant of particular mechanisms35
 
 that exacerbate the 
difficulties in identifying independent and instrument variables. Moreover, the 
complementarities and substitution relationships between governance instruments imply 
that all of the governance variables are related to organizational outcome. As governance 
studies focus on the effect of particular mechanisms on firm performance, consequently, 
adopting a simultaneous equations approach to resolving the endogeneity is difficult to 
implement, “…because most instrumental variable candidates have been used as 
determinants in the regressions” (Fahlenbrach, 2003, p.24). Consequently, the 
effectiveness of a simultaneous model in resolving such a problem is questioned 
although such a model is econometrically robust (Coles, Lemmon & Meschke, 2007).  
3.3. Outcome Approach  
Agency theory posits that the main role of the board is to monitor management in order 
to prevent management from pursuing self-interest actions (Baiman, 1990). Jensen 
(1993) suggests that the effectiveness of a board’s monitoring role depends on the level 
of board independence from management where such independence is determined by the 
leadership structure and the representation of outsider directors. As an effective 
monitoring device potentially enhancing firm performance, empirical studies follow the 
assumption that the effect of separated leadership and a higher proportion of outsider 
directors will be reflected in a better outcome achieved by the firm. 
 
However, empirical studies have documented the absence of consensus regarding the 
most suitable indicator measuring organizational outcome. Indeed, there are two 
approaches to studying the effect of board composition on organizational outcome. The 
first approach examines the effectiveness of the board monitoring role in the specific 
event that potentially affects shareholders’ wealth. The second approach directly 
investigates the effect of board composition on the overall firm value. 
                                              
35 See for example Mak & Li (2000, 2001), Rediker & Seth (1995), Bathala & Rao (1995) 
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3.3.1. Specific Task 
Governance studies have investigated the monitoring role of the board using the discrete 
approach. This approach involves the board decision of a particular task to capture the 
outcome of monitoring effectiveness by the boards of directors.  The advantage of this 
approach is it uses tractable data of the outcome, which makes it easier for the researcher 
to find statistically significant results (Bhagat & Black, 2002) and hence is potentially 
more powerful because it is less prone to unobservable factors contaminating the 
statistical relationship and is less likely to experience endogeneity problems (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003).  However, the discrete approach “…does not tell us how board 
composition affects overall firm performance” (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p.235). A 
discrete approach mostly refers to a specific task such as CEO turnover, management 
compensation, and takeover defence (McColgan, 2001). This approach commonly starts 
out with the proposition that different board composition reflect different levels of the 
monitoring role that lead to different outcomes of specific tasks.  
 
The CEO turnover refers to the sensitivity of management turnover to prior poor 
performance Studies addressing such issues posit that corporate governance is intended 
to enhance the interest alignment between those of management and shareholders by 
removing poorly performing managers. According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), the 
threat of termination might discipline managers whenever there is high probability that 
managers are more likely to leave their firms following poor prior performance. 
Subsequently, if there is a threat of dismissal, a CEO is assumed to take “…this threat 
into account when deciding how to run the firm” (Lausten, 2002, p.395). Thus, the threat 
of removal is expected to improve the alignment of interest of management and 
shareholders as it potentially reduces opportunistic behaviour by managers.  
 
Some studies have investigated the effect of independent director representation on the 
sensitivity of poor performance to CEO turnover. They commonly start with the 
assumption that the task to monitor and replace poorly performing managers is likely to 
fall mainly on the outside directors as they have an incentive to build the firm’s human 
capital reputation as a decision control expert (Weisbach, 1988). Accordingly, it is 
 58 
predicted that the stronger relationship between poor performance and the probability of 
a CEO being replaced would be observed in the outsider-dominated and separated 
leadership board36
 
.  
Executive compensation refers to the level of compensation and its sensitivity to 
performance. Within agency research, board composition has been quoted as having an 
impact on compensation schemes. This proposition is grounded on the premise that self-
interest agents prefer to maximize their wealth in regard to the compensation where its 
success depends on the ability to reduce the board’s monitoring role. As the monitoring 
role is determined by board independence, it is expected that different levels of outsider 
director representation and leadership structure will affect executive compensation 
schemes. Specifically, agency research predicts that lower levels of CEO compensation 
and pay-performance contracts would be more likely to be observed in the firm with 
higher fractions of outsider directors and separated leadership. Conyon and Peck (1998) 
find that in UK firms the link between pay-performance is more sensitive with outsider-
dominated boards, while the work of Ryan and Wiggins III (2004) documents that 
amongst US firms, equity-based pay is less likely to be found in the firm with higher 
proportions of insider directors. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Boyd (1994) 
find that CEO compensation is positively related to CEO duality, while Conyon and 
Peck (1998) fail to support such a relationship. 
 
Takeover defence refers to the adoption of a particular provision, which provides a 
target firm with certain tactics to prevent a potential bid including greenmail, golden 
parachutes, and poison pills. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) suggest that different 
board composition might produce different outcomes with regards to the adoption of 
takeover defences. On the one side, some firms might use such provision to defeat offers 
and to create managerial entrenchment if the board is controlled by management. This 
view hinges upon the proposition that takeover is an important external governance as 
the changes in ownership are associated with the subsequent management turnover 
(Crespi-Cladera & Renneboog, 2003; Koke, 2004). Thus, takeover could be viewed as a 
                                              
36 See for example Goyal & Park (2002) and Lausten (2002). 
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turnover threat to the manager and takeover defence potentially related to an attempt to 
entrench management. Accordingly, the adoption of takeover defence provisions is more 
likely to be observed in a firm with a less independent board. Empirical work of 
Sundaramurthy (1996) confirms such a prediction and documents that the percentage of 
outsider directors loyal to the CEO is positively related to the adoption of anti-takeover 
provisions. Mallette and Fowler (1992) find that combined leadership is positively 
associated with the adoption of a poison pill.  
 
In contrast, other firms might adopt takeover defences in order to benefit shareholders. 
Under a shareholder-interest view, such provision is intended to extract the highest 
possible price from the bidder in a control contest. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) 
argue that this benefit might be achieved if the board demonstrates sufficient 
independence of management in representing shareholder interests. They find that the 
average stock-price reaction to the announcement of the adoption of a poison pill is 
positively significant when outside directors comprise a majority of the board and 
negatively significant when they do not. 
 
Complementary to the CEO turnover, management compensation and takeover defence, 
some studies propose the use of particular indicators of organizational outcome. These 
studies argue that the effectiveness of a board monitoring role might be reflected in the 
different firm’s achievements. Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk (1991) address this issue by 
using average R&D spending per employee as the proxy of organizational outcome. 
Berry (2006) takes a different route by employing the state of the firm 11 years after an 
IPO, where firms are classified as either being survive, acquired, or bankrupt. Judge Jr. 
(1994) constructs social performance composite measures consisting of charity care, 
Medicaid revenue, and bad debts to total revenue. They claim that adopting specific 
outcomes significantly contribute to the theoretical developments. As Judge Jr. (1994) 
argues, the use of specific outcomes is intended to develop a more integrative 
perspective on organizational effectiveness.  
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3.3.2. Financial-based Performance  
Complementary to the discrete approach, some studies investigate the direct effect of 
board composition on the overall firm performance. In this regard, the overall firm 
performance is measured using financial-based indicators. This approach allows the 
researcher to directly examine the bottom line of agency theory, which posits that board 
composition matters in predicting firm performance as it reduces perquisite taking by an 
agent. According to Bhagat and Black (2002), the main disadvantage of this approach 
lays in the use of less tractable data on the outcome. Therefore, they suggest that the 
firm performance, as the outcome of board monitoring, should be addressed carefully. 
 
The indicators of the overall firm performance used by empirical research vary across 
studies. However, these indicators could be broadly categorized as either being 
“accounting-based” or “market-based”. Accounting-based generally refers to the audited 
accounting information, while market-based relies on firms’ share prices, which serve as 
a direct proxy for shareholders’ wealth. Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) 
observe that studies investigating the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance mostly utilize six financial indicators such as Return on Asset (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE), Earning per Share (EPS), profit margin, market value of share, 
and market to book value.  
 
Some studies use market-based indicators as the proxy for firm performance. Barnhart et 
al. (1994) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) use market to book value while Lawrence 
and Stapledon (1999), Postma et al. (1999), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) utilize market 
return. However, these indicators have been modified variously across studies. For 
example, Bhagat and Black (2002) use industry adjusted market return, while Lawrence 
and Stapledon (1999) use cumulative abnormal return. Other studies select accounting-
based indicators measuring firm performance. Lehman and Weigand (2000) employ 
ROA, while Hutchinson and Gull (2004) choose ROE as performance indicators. 
Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001) use ROE and ROA, while Tian and Lau (2001) 
and Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori (1989) adopt both accounting and market-based 
measures as performance indicators. 
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Nevertheless, the various measures indicate that empirical work experiences a lack of 
consensus regarding the most suitable measure of firm performance. Indeed, the work of 
Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) reveals that the empirical relationship 
between board composition and firm performance is sensitive to the operational 
definition of performance. Given this sensitivity issue, accordingly, empirical work 
commonly adopts various performance indicators in order to test the robustness of the 
results. 
 
3.4. Results 
Empirical works investigating the relationship between the proportion of insider/outsider 
directors and firm performance have documented inconclusive findings (Appendix 1). A 
positive relationship is found in Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001), Hossain, Prevost 
and Rao (2001), Hutchinson and Gull (2004) and Krivogorsky (2006). Other studies 
present a positive relationship between the proportion of insider directors and firm 
performance (Kesner, 1987), a negative relationship between the proportion of outsider 
directors and firm performance (Lawrence & Stapledon, 1999; Bhagat & Black, 2002; 
Del Guercio, Dann & Partch, 2003; Erickson et al., 2005) while an insignificant 
relationships have been documented by Fosberg (1989), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Peng, Buck and Filatotchev (2003) and Tian and Lau (2001)37
  
. Moreover, the 
inconclusive findings are also found in a single study. For example, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) find that the fraction of non-executive directors is insignificantly 
related to firm performance in OLS result, while 2SLS reveals a negative relationship. 
The work of Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori (1989) documents a positive relationship 
with market return and an insignificant relationship with accounting performance. 
The inconclusive finding is also found in the empirical work addressing the issue of the 
relationship between leadership structure and firm performance (Appendix 2). Some 
studies present empirical support of a positive relationship between an independent 
                                              
37 Rosenthal (1979) suggests the likelihood of a tendency in empirical research to publish studies that find 
statistically significant effects only. This so-called “file-drawer problem” implies that studies producing 
insignificant relationships mostly remain unpublished. 
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leadership and firm performance (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Coles, McWilliams & Sen, 
2001; Desai, Kroll & Wright, 2003; Carapeto, Lasfer & Machera, 2005) and a positive 
association between combined leadership and organizational outcome (Davidson, 
Worrell & Cheng, 1990; Tian & Lau, 2001). A negative relationship is found in the 
work of Rechner and Dalton (1991) while an insignificant relationship is presented by 
Daily and Dalton (1993, 1995), Schmid and Zimmermann (2008), Brickley, Coles and 
Jarrell (1997), Chen et al. (2006) and Fosberg and Nelson (1999). 
 
3.5. Concluding Remark  
Studies investigating the association between board composition and firm performance 
advanced external and internal validity motivations, providing academic rationale to 
further investigate such issues. The external validity refers to the verification of previous 
findings in different settings using similar methods. The motivations of US-based 
studies refer to the presumption that a firm in a particular population possesses specific 
characteristics, which might affect the relationship between board composition and that 
firm’s outcome. The importance of non-US based studies hinge upon the presumption 
that the departure from the US institutional setting might affect the structure and 
effectiveness of firm level governance. Accordingly, the importance and value of 
various governance structures should be separately examined in each country. With 
regard to internal validity, there are three important methodological issues; namely 
endogeneity, interdependence, and linearity. The failure to adequately control for these 
issues is believed to lead to spurious results, which contributes to the inconclusive 
findings.  
 
Although the inconclusive findings have been quoted as providing motivation to conduct 
a meta-analysis study, Hubbard, Vetter and Little (1998) argue that the systematic 
replication of research is more useful than a meta-analysis. This view is complementary 
to Cortina (2002) and Fuller and Hester (1999), who challenge the result of meta-
analysis as a final finding. According to Kang and Zardkoohi (2005), a meta-analysis by 
Dalton et al. (1998) finds the potential for further moderating influences. Consequently, 
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a well-designed primary study replicating previous research remains necessarily required 
in the theory development38
 
. 
The previous discussion reveals that research gaps exist in empirical studies 
investigating the association between board composition and firm performance. The first 
refers to the external validity, which suggests that replicating work in non-US settings is 
still needed. Secondly, such study is expected to address internal validity issues 
sufficiently in order to overcome the shortcomings of previous work. This implies that 
replicating such study focusing on the context of Indonesian settings might provide a 
significant contribution to the governance research whenever such study adequately 
controls for internal validity issues. The next chapter will provide the detail of 
Indonesian institutional settings and discusses the legal system, market for corporate 
control, ownership, and board of directors and management of Indonesian listed firms.  
                                              
38 In addition, Allen and Preiss (1993) suggest that replication and meta-analysis are complementary. 
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Chapter 4: The Institutional Setting of Indonesia 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, theoretical and empirical work discussing the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance was presented. It was argued that 
board composition might affect organizational outcome and that the impact is contingent 
upon the presence of other governance mechanisms. This chapter elaborates the state of 
the institutional setting within Indonesia and its impact on firm-level governance. As 
such, the objective of this chapter is threefold. The first is to document the state of the 
institutional setting of Indonesia. A second objective is to identify the existing 
governance mechanisms available in Indonesia. A third objective is to provide a basis 
for rationalizing the impact of other governance mechanisms on the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance incorporated in the hypothesis development. 
This chapter begins with discussions of the legal system, the market for corporate 
control, and shareholders’ rights as stipulated by the existing regulations. The following 
section will discuss corporate ownership and control and the board of directors. The last 
section will summarize the discussions. 
 
An institutional setting has been referred to as the country-level governance that 
potentially affects the firm-level governance (Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2007). A study 
by Stulz and Williamson (2003) indicates that corporate governance systems appear to 
differ systematically across economies as a consequence of different cultures. This view 
is consistent with Nam (2001) claiming that culture might determine the pattern of 
corporate control. In the works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) institutional setting refers 
to the investor protection provided by the legal system. Such a setting has been quoted 
as shaping the financing pattern, ownership structure and the effectiveness of firm-level 
governance (Lehman & Weigand, 2000). 
 
4.2. Legal System 
Indonesian legislation consists of various forms as a consequence of its categories and 
hierarchical sources (Tabalujan, 2005). Within the Indonesian legislation system, the 
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National Assembly (NA) is the supreme institution in the country and its legislative 
product is the NA decree39. However, the decree commonly provides the general rule, 
such as the constitution and the judicial system, while the specific detail of a particular 
decree is stipulated in the Law (ratified by the President and House of Representatives) 
and/or the decrees of subordinate agencies. In 1999, subsequent to the crisis that erupted 
in 1998, the NA initiated a legal reform mandating the existing administration to reform 
the legal system in order to eliminate corruption, collusion, and nepotism40
 
. The 
assembly believed that such behaviour of misconduct prevented the corporate sector 
from exercising good corporate governance which became the main source of the 
economic crisis and political turbulence in late 1998. The legal reform included 
establishing good government and restructuring the legal system of the corporate sector 
in order to eliminate crony capitalism that relies on special privileges from political 
connection (ADB, 2001). As it was endorsed by the supreme institution in the 
Indonesian political structure, this decree provided the government with the strong legal 
foundation to reform the broader aspects of good governance.  
According to path dependence theory, the existing practice of corporate governance is 
determined by the tradition where the particular economy begins (Bebchuk & Roe, 
1999). Wibisono (1996) suggests that the initial phase of the Indonesian economy began 
with establishing state-owned enterprises through the nationalization of Dutch 
companies, where between 1600 and 1945 the Dutch occupied and established the East 
India colony, the former name of Indonesia (Brown, 2003). In the period of colonization, 
the Dutch government chartered the Dutch East India Company, which was fully 
responsible for governing the colony of Indonesia. Such colonization has been quoted as 
spreading the legal tradition (Gevurtz, 2004), suggesting that the colonial system 
established the source of the Indonesian legal system (Tabalujan, 2002). This implies 
that the Indonesian legal system and the governance structure imitate the Dutch system.  
 
                                              
39 In August 2000, the National Assembly endorsed the decree No: III/MPR/2000 concerning the official 
hierarchy of legislation (see Appendix 3). 
40 See Ketetapan MPR No.: IV/1999. The resignation of a powerful leader, General Suharto, provided 
Indonesia with the opportunity to conduct several improvements to its regulatory framework (Robertson-
Snape, 1999) to potentially enhance good governance in the corporate sector.  
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La Porta et al. (2002) argue that the Dutch legal system follows the French civil law 
tradition, suggesting that the Indonesian judicial system originated from the French civil 
tradition. Such tradition has been identified as providing the court with little discretion 
in interpreting the duty of loyalty and the duty of responsibility (Johnson et al., 2000) 
and therefore being less adaptive to the changes in the business environment. 
Accordingly, the civil court is more likely to produce a decision in favour of the 
defendant in relation to a shareholder lawsuit towards directors’ and managers’ breaches 
of fiduciary duties (Johnson et al., 2000). Furthermore, Hoadley (2004) argues that such 
imitation creates an imperfect copy of European models due to the differences in culture 
and the prerequisite conditions. This is particularly relevant in Indonesia where the 
judicial system has proven ineffective in promoting law enforcements due to the lack of 
institutional support, political interference, and the corruption within the judiciary 
system (Lindsey, 2002; 2004). 
  
As summarized in Table 1, several works have researched the quality of law and its 
enforcement and the specific regulation with regard to investor protection in Indonesia. 
Overall the table indicates that the Indonesian legal system is less protective of the 
financial supplier. The score of bankruptcy arrangement is 4.5 out of 8: the second worst 
among the countries studied, suggesting that investors and creditors will face severe 
difficulties in pursuing their rights (Claessens, Djankov & Klapper, 2003). Lower scores 
are also found in the anti-director and creditor rights (Claessens, Djankov & Nenova, 
2000) implying higher uncertainty of investor and creditor claim resolution. Moreover, 
the score of creditor right is 0, suggesting that the legal system leaves the lender 
completely unprotected. The rule of law and enforcement also displays a lower score, 
suggesting that investor protection provided by the legal system is weak (Durnev & 
Kim, 2005). This finding is consistent with the work of Lindsey (2002) who argues that 
the court emphasizes ‘rule-by-law’ instead of ‘rule-of-law’ in Indonesia. The overall 
judicial system exhibits the poorest quality among economies around the world (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2003) and among East Asian countries (Krishnamurti, 
Sevic & Sevic, 2005). 
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Table 1: Score of Investor Protection Provided by Legal System of Indonesia 
Description Score Lowest Score Highest Score 
Anti director right 1 2 0 5 
Bankruptcy  arrangement2 4.5  0 8 
Creditor right2 0 0 4 
Rule of law and enforcement3 3.33 0 10 
Overall judicial system4 3.5 0 6 
Sources: 
1 Claessens, Djankov and Nenova (2000) 
2. Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2003) 
3. Durnev and Kim (2005)  
4. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (2003)  
 
In 1999, the office of Coordinating Ministry for Economics, Finance and Industry 
established the National Committee for Corporate Governance (NCCG)41
 
 that is 
responsible for designing and promoting good corporate governance. The committee 
believes that sound corporate governance will provide companies with an advantage that 
is necessarily needed in the competitive environment. The committee has developed the 
Indonesian Code for Good Corporate Governance that is “…intended to be implemented 
as soon as possible…and serves as a guide to excellence in corporate governance for the 
business world” and for related agencies (National Committee for Corporate 
Governance, 2001, p.1). The committee posits that the code was derived from the 
international best practices, although adjustments have been made in order to promote 
the congruence between such practice and the Indonesian legal and regulatory 
environments. Such an assertion is confirmed by a study by the World Bank (2005) 
concluding that the Indonesian formal rules of corporate governance did not differ 
substantially from the OECD principles adopted by its member countries. However, the 
same study notes that “...corporate governance practices often fall short of the 
requirements of the OECD principles” (World Bank, 2005, p.2). 
4.3. Market for Corporate Control 
The ADB (2000) recommends East Asian countries reform industrial development 
policies emphasizing the importance of eliminating rent-seeking activities that rely on 
the various forms of government protection and subsidies. This recommendation implies 
that the reliance on the protection and subsidies is the salient feature of the firms in that 
                                              
41 See Kep.10/M.EKUIN/1999.  
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region that lead to the prevalence of crony capitalisms (Pomerleano, 1998). Consistent 
with this view, the ADB (2001) notes that, in the earlier phase of long-term industrial 
development plans42, the Indonesian government provides emerging industries with 
various protections and low-interest rates. This strategy is believed to create the 
industrialist elite: predominantly the families with strong links to General Soeharto and 
his ruling political party. Although General Soeharto resigned from the office in the 
earlier part of 1999, the mutual relationship between the political elite and the families 
persists43
 
. According to Nam (2004; 2004), the excessive government protection is more 
likely to prevent fair competition and consequently lessen the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control. 
The literature claims that the market for corporate control is an important governance 
mechanism (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Berglöf & Claessens, 2004), where the 
effectiveness of this mechanism requires a liquid and efficient market, a strict trading 
rule, and the adequate disclosure of information (Maher & Andersson, 1999; World 
Bank, 2005). However, such a market in Asian economies has yet to make a satisfactory 
progress (Nam, 2004; Nam & Nam, 2004) as the capital markets in these economies are 
characterized by a thin trading volume, low liquidity, and large volatility (Zhuang, 
1999). For example, an Indonesian-based study by Setiawan and Hartono (2003) finds 
that the market reacts positively to dividend increase announcements suggesting that the 
Indonesian capital market fits semi-efficient form in term of information. However, this 
study finds that the market reaction to such announcements by growth firms differ 
insignificantly from those of non-growth firms, suggesting a failure to support the 
                                              
42 The industrialization began in the early 1970s when the government endorsed the continuous long-term 
industrial development plan. These plans were originated by General Soeharto who established the 
government under the title of Orde Baru (New Order).  The plans focused on the agriculture-based 
industry in the earlier phases, manufacture-based in the mid-term and high tech-based industry in the long-
term stages.  
43 For example Tempo (national weekly magazine, 17 November, 2008) reports that there was a strong 
signal that the General Yudhoyono administration (the existing President) ordered the capital market 
agencies (JSX and CMSA) to suspend Bumi Resources Tbk in order to prevent this share from dropping 
further in its price. Bumi Resources Tbk is owned by the Bakrie family, where one of the family members 
(Aburizal Bakrie) serves as the Ministry of Social Welfare. Perkins (2005) presents anecdotal evidence of 
such a relationship and uses “corporatocracy” as the term to represent such a relationship.  
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hypothesis that Indonesian capital markets fit semi-efficient form with respect to 
decision. 
 
During 1992-1997, Indonesia experienced 40 mergers and acquisitions in the country 
(2001). However, there were only five external takeovers, while the rest were internal 
takeovers for tax purposes, indicating that the market disciplinary mechanism, through 
hostile takeover, was inactive in Indonesia.  Accordingly, such a market has been 
claimed as a discouraging corporate market for corporate control (Zhuang, 1999). 
Although merger and acquisition occurs after the crisis, Nam, Kang and Kim (1999, p.2) 
argue that the existence of the takeover of non-financial firms and banks by foreign 
investors during corporate and financial sector restructuring is more likely to reflect 
“…fire sale in the midst of crisis than the emergence of an active market for corporate 
control”. 
 
4.4. Firm-level Governance in Indonesia 
Although corporate governance might be argued as being market-induced mechanism, 
OECD believes that a regulation system and code of conduct concerning corporate 
governance are necessary in order to facilitate the effectiveness of such governance. 
Accordingly, the discussion of corporate governance in a particular country should refer 
to a specific regulation regarding the corporate governance. Within Indonesian context, 
the central features of the Indonesian legal system regulating the corporate sector44
                                              
44 The House of Representatives ratified the CL in 2007, that replaces CL 1995, and CML in 1995. Prior 
to the enactment of CL 1995, official business law is Wetboek van Koophandel, Staatsbald 1847 and 
Ordonnantie op de Indonesische Maatschappij op Andeelen, Staatsbald 1939, enacted by the Dutch 
colonial government.  Thus, although Indonesia gained its independence almost fifty years ago, the basic 
regulations remain to follow corporate acts enacted by the Dutch government in the period of colonial 
system. 
 are 
Company Law (CL) 40/2007 and Capital Market Law (CML) 2005 that provide the 
most relevant regulatory framework of corporate governance (Tabalujan, 2002). The 
CML provides the basic provision of the authority and responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Finance, CMSA and JSX in governing the mechanisms of the stock exchange. CL 
provides general mandatory guidance for organizational structure, decision making 
 70 
mechanisms, the rights and obligations of shareholders and the fiduciary duties of the 
board of directors and the board of commissioners. 
 
CL stipulates that the bottom line of corporate control and decision making rests in the 
hand of shareholders where the shareholders might delegate their decision making rights 
to the board of commissioners and board of directors. Therefore, the governance of 
corporation in Indonesia involves shareholders, board of commissioners and board of 
directors. Figure 1 exhibits the typical structure of a publicly listed company based on 
the CL and its comparison with the Netherlands two-tier model and the US one-tier 
system45
 
. 
Figure 1:  Organizational Structure of a Publicly Listed Company in USA, the 
Netherland and Indonesia 
 
 
Sources: Postma et al. (1999), Indonesian Company Law 2007, Anand (2008)  
 
                                              
45 Under Indonesian jurisdiction, the company might choose one of the forms permitted by law, including 
personal reliance service, commanditer verechnistze, and limited liabilities. 
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Figure 1 reveals that the shareholders’ meeting is the supreme institution of Indonesian 
firms. Ordinary shareholder’s meetings should be held at least once per year within the 
first six moths after the year end. Invitations should be made no later than fourteen days 
prior to the meeting by registered mail, and announcements of the meetings should be 
published in the two national newspapers. At least half of all shareholders should attend 
the meeting in order for strategic decisions to be legitimate; unless the firm’s Article of 
Association (AoA) stipulates a higher shareholder representation. If the quorum is not 
reached, a second invitation is made and the quorum is one-third of total shareholders. If 
a second meeting fails, the district court will take over the quorum upon the request of 
the company. Extraordinary meetings might be held upon the request of shareholders 
with at least ten percent stockholdings. 
 
The board of directors and the board of commissioners are the subordinated institutions 
of shareholders meeting. The directors and commissioners are elected by shareholders 
that diverge from the US and Netherlands models where the supervisory board or the 
board of directors are elected by shareholders and subsequently the supervisory board or 
the board of directors elect management board or top management team. Therefore, 
within Indonesian context, the board of commissioners and the board of directors are 
parallel institutions. 
 
4.4.1. Ownership and Control 
The CL grants shareholders voting rights in a shareholders’ meeting which enables them 
to involve in the decision making process. The minimum number of shareholders 
required to be represented in the shareholders’ meeting varies across corporate actions. 
Changes in AoA require two-thirds of shareholders to be represented, and decisions 
should be approved by two-thirds of those attending. Mergers, transfers of asset, 
bankruptcy, and dissolution should be attended by three-quarters of the shareholders, 
and the decision should be approved by three-quarters of attendees. However, CL 
specifies that shareholders or their representatives should attend the general meeting in 
order to be able to exercise their voting rights. This provision eliminates the possibility 
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of proxy voting and therefore prevents the lower-cost mechanism of voting to work46
 
. 
Moreover, CL stipulates that the official voting system is one share one vote and follows 
simple majority rule, unless the AoA state otherwise. Although this provision does not 
necessarily prevent cumulative voting, simple majority rules enables controlling 
shareholders to easily outvote any minority proposals, leading to the case where majority 
control is left unchallenged. 
CL provides shareholders with the right to obtain sufficient and accurate information 
about company operation, and requires companies to disclose information necessary for 
investment decisions (Article 9). Complementary to this act, CMSA requires companies 
to disclose the quarterly financial statement, transactions by significant shareholders, 
significant non-financial information, and inter-company affiliations such as affiliated 
lending or guarantees (KEP-17/PM/2002). CMSA also mandates the firm and public 
auditors to comply with auditing rules (KEP-20/2002). Further, CMSA and JSX also 
require the firms to establish an independent board committee responsible for auditing 
assignments and designed to promote the accuracy of information (KEP-03/2000, KEP-
40/2003 and KEP-41/2003). 
 
Article 45 regulates the dissenting right in the event of disagreement with corporate 
action and grants shareholders the right to request redemption of their shares at a normal 
and reasonable price. Article 51 provides shareholders with pre-emptive rights in the 
event that additional shares are issued. In addition, both CL and CMSA decrees stipulate 
severe penalties for management and directors’ misconduct behaviour. CL (Article 30) 
specifies the mechanisms to resolve a dispute between firms and shareholders that 
includes the right to apply for the court to investigate the company, the right to file a 
lawsuit against management and directors, and the right to claim dissolution of the 
company. This mechanism enables shareholders to inspect the company’s documents 
necessary under particular circumstances with respect to the magistrate’s decision. 
                                              
46 According to Alijoyo et al. (2004) domestic investors are widely spread over the country and therefore 
the cost to attend the meeting is considerably high. Further, they claim that several companies have taken 
corporate action (mergers, major sales, acquisitions, and significant related party transactions) in the 
shareholders’ meetings where the minimum quorums are less than those required by regulation.  
 73 
However, the right to call for court intervention is only entitled by shareholders or 
groups of shareholders with at least ten percent stock ownership. As this shareholding 
level is the exception rather than the norm in Indonesia (Claessens et al., 2000a), this 
provision potentially protects the firms from the minority investors’ litigation47
 
.  
Indonesia exhibits a relatively high concentration of ownership in the hands of a few 
families (Asian Development Bank, 2000; 2001). Major and top five families own 
16.6% and 40.7% of total outstanding shares of listed companies respectively 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). The median shareholding by the top three 
immediate shareholders is 62% in Indonesia, 12% in the US, 28% in Australia, 15% in 
the UK, 13% in Japan, and 20% in Korea (La Porta et al., 1998). These studies indicate 
that Indonesia exhibits the highest ownership concentration in the East Asian region and 
around the world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that higher ownership concentration, 
to some extent, provides majority owners with unchallenged control as such owners 
possess sufficient voting power to outvote minority shareholders proposals. 
Consequently, the agency problems in Indonesia stem from the conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders. 
 
The determinants of ownership concentration have been attributed to the effectiveness of 
the legal system and cultural responsibility. La Porta et al. (1999) contend that property 
rights can be enforced by the state and shareholders. In economies where property rights 
enforcement by the state is weak, the shareholders will enhance the power of 
enforcement through increasing and accumulating ownership of the firm. In other words, 
if shareholders perceive that the legal system is unable to properly protect their rights 
against being compromised by company insiders, one way to protect their investment is 
to become a controlling shareholder with concentrated ownership (Nam, 2001). This 
argument seems to be empirically supported in the Indonesian setting as this county 
demonstrates lower investor protection provided by the legal system and at the same 
time higher ownership concentration. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the 
                                              
47 In Korea, for example, the right to file a lawsuit against a breach of management fiduciary duties is 
entitled to a group of shareholders with 0.1% stockholding.  
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benefits of ownership concentration are larger in less developed countries where 
property rights are not well defined and protected by the judicial system. 
 
Complementary to the legal perspective, Indonesia culture has been claimed as being 
heavily influenced by Confucianism (Adnan, Chatterjee & Nankervis, 2003). In such 
culture, the individual is expected to support a hierarchical system of social relations, 
and the emphasis is on the value of family and filial piety, implying the head of the 
family is responsible for fulfilling family obligation “…by themselves providing job 
opportunities to their family members” (Nam, 2001, p.6)48
 
. In this circumstance, higher 
ownership concentration enables majority owners to appoint their family members to 
serve in management and on the boards as it provides the owners with almost complete 
control of the firms. Indeed, in most Asian countries, “…controlling owners are typically 
preoccupied with conducting the managerial function themselves” (Nam, 2003, p.2) and 
leads to the family-based governance system. Accordingly, the existence of family-
based firms in Asia could be interpreted as a function of this cultural responsibility.  
Asian culture is grounded on family values; one fundamental one being that a family is 
responsible for maintaining its wealth over generations (Backman, 2004; Morrison & 
Conaway, 2007)49. This implies that the survival of family-based firms is an important 
aspect of this culture that might be achieved through developing a close relationship 
within political circles50
                                              
48 This view is consistent with expropriation hypothesis advanced by La Porta et al. (2000) claiming that 
expropriation might take the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the firm and appointing 
possibly unqualified family members to managerial positions. In Asian culture, the family boundary 
usually extends well beyond nuclear families (Nam, 2001). 
. Nam (2001) argues that such a relationship creates mutual 
symbiosis, where the family provides political contributions and, in return, receives 
particular protection and support. This view relies on the premise that elites are self-
interested and they cooperate to entrench themselves, even at considerable cost (Morck 
& Steier, 2007). In this circumstance, the private benefit of control would be easily 
secured that enables a controlling family to accumulate the wealth, at the expense of 
49 Gadhoum (2000) supports this view and argues that family members benefit from on-the-job-
consumption and prefer free cash flows in order to accumulate wealth for their descendents.  
50 See Lindblad (2004) for further discussion of such relationships in the context of Indonesia. 
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minority shareholders51
 
. Nevertheless, such relationships might be achieved whenever 
majority shareholders control substantial proportions of corporate ownership that 
facilitate them securing rent-seeking activities and preventing information leaks (Fan & 
Wong, 2002).  
The problem associated with the ownership concentration is further exacerbated by the 
pattern of corporate ownership. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that 67% of 
listed companies in Indonesia are subordinately owned by other companies, controlled 
by the same shareholder, forming pyramidal ownership. The same study also finds 
crossholding patterns in a few companies52
 
. These forms of ownership have been 
claimed as creating a divergence between ownership and control rights and serving as a 
means for majority owners to extend their control of the firms (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Eventually, this divergence determines the ability and incentives of the controlling 
owners to deprive minority shareholders of their rights (La Porta et al., 2002). 
According to Claessens et al. (2002), the ratio of divergence in Indonesia is 78% and this 
figure is among the highest in East Asian countries. This finding suggests that the 
controlling right of majority shareholders substantially exceeds their ownership right. 
The same study also finds an inverse relationship between the ratio of such divergence 
and company performance, suggesting that this wedge constrains the firms from 
achieving better organizational outcomes. The finding implies that such forms of 
ownership lessens the sensitivity between the wealth of controlling owners and company 
performance, and therefore provides incremental incentives to commit expropriation of 
minority shareholders. Johnson et al. (2000) believe that such patterns of ownership 
might serve as a legitimate tunnel for the controlling owners to divert firms’ resources.  
 
The wedge between voting and control rights requires the existence of subordinating 
firms controlled by the same owners, where the higher wedge indicates the higher 
number of subordinating firms involved in the pyramidal ownership (Morck & Yeung, 
                                              
51 See for example Baek et al. (2004) in the case of internal mergers in Korea. 
52 Company Act 1995 prohibits direct crossholding while indirect crossholding is not stipulated, nor 
regulated.  
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2003). Consistent with this view, controlling families in Indonesia engage in excessive 
business diversification (Claessens et al., 1999) that lead to a higher ratio of divergence 
between ownership and control. Patrick (2001) claims that such a diversification forms a 
business group that typically also controls a bank within the group, where the primary 
role of the bank is to collect public funds and channel the funds to other companies 
within the group53
 
.  He argues that the banks serve as a “cash cow” for other companies 
controlled by the same family. This pattern of business groups leaves the bank 
management with little independence to exercise prudent and sound business decisions. 
Consequently, monitoring by the bank is more likely to be absent as the creditor and 
debtor are owned by the same shareholder.  
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) conclude that 53.4% of Indonesian listed firms 
have no second largest owner with at least 10% shareholding, suggesting the absence of 
unrelated large shareholders in most firms. According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), the 
presence of unrelated blockholders, who are independent of controlling owners, might 
serve as governance mechanisms as such shareholders have the incentive and economic 
rationale to monitor management. However, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) indicate 
the different role of blockholders across economies. Specifically they suggest that 
blockholders promote contestability toward the control of majority shareholders in 
European countries and therefore serve as a monitoring mechanism. In Asian countries, 
blockholders are more likely to collude with majority shareholders to divert firms’ 
resources. Consistent with this view, the work of Menkhoff and Gerke (2002) reveals the 
prevalence of interlocking family control that may exacerbate agency problems in East 
Asia. These studies indicate that the presence of domestic blockholders in Indonesia play 
an insignificant monitoring role.  
 
4.4.2. The Board of Directors and Management 
The CL requires firms incorporated under Indonesian jurisdiction to establish “dewan 
direksi” (a board of directors) and “dewan komisaris” (a board of commissioners). 
                                              
53 The Banking Law prohibits the bank to own company shares directly or indirectly. This provision is 
different from those of Germany and Italy that permits the bank to own firms’ shares.  
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Companies that go public or engaged in public funds or issue obligations must have at 
least two directors and two commissioners, while the private company is obligated to 
establish one commissioner. Both management and supervisory boards are appointed 
directly by shareholders at the annual general meeting, and hence, those two boards are 
parallel internal institutions (figure 1). Therefore, this official pattern of appointment 
creates the divergence from the original model. Nevertheless, the boards possess the 
authority to dismiss management (World Bank, 2005) and this, it is argued by Mizruchi 
(1983), is the most important aspect of the board power as it grants the board with the 
bottom line of control. According to Perrow (1976), this right will allow the board to 
subordinately leave management decision to the executives and still retain control. This 
right provides the board with the power to serve as governance mechanisms that 
potentially affect management behaviour.   
 
CL stipulates that the directors are responsible for performing managerial duties and to 
be involved in the daily operations of the company (art 1.4 and 82). The board of 
commissioners is held liable for monitoring and supervising the board of directors (art 
1.4 and 97). In the two-tier system, the managerial duties and day-to day operation is the 
responsibility of management board while the monitoring is the liability of the 
supervisory board (Maassen, 2002). In one-tier system, management is responsible for 
performing managerial duties while the board of directors is held liable for monitoring 
and supervising management (Monks & Minow, 2004; Clarke, 2007). Accordingly, 
based on their fiduciary duties, in the Indonesian context, the board of directors is best 
viewed as the management team while the board of commissioners is identical to the 
board of directors in the one-tier system and the supervisory board in a two-tier 
system54
 
. 
The board of commissioners comprises non-executive commissioners entirely as the CL 
prohibits an individual from serving in both board of commissioners and the board of 
directors. Based on this provision, the board of commissioners might be argued as 
                                              
54 Although literally confusing, this implies that studying the board in Indonesia should refer to the board 
of commissioners (dewan komisaris) rather than the board of directors (dewan direksi). 
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adopting two-tier system. Although the scope of responsibility of the board might 
include advisory and control duties, the formal separation suggests that the two-tier 
system emphasizes the monitoring role as compared to the one-tier system (Moerland, 
1995). As the board of commissioners adopts two-tier system, accordingly, the board 
comprises non-executive commissioners entirely. Such commissioners have been 
referred to as outsider commissioners that have been argued as being independent of 
management and representing the interest of diffused shareholders against opportunistic 
behaviour of management. However, corporate ownership in Indonesia is concentrated 
in the hand of controlling owners that leads to the divergence of interest between those 
of controlling owners and minority shareholders rather than traditional manager-
shareholders conflict. Therefore, the concept of outsider commissioners in Indonesia 
requires a modification in accordance with its specific agency problem. 
 
The concept of independent commissioners hinges upon their affiliation that serves as a 
basis in disentangling outsider and insider commissioners. Outsider commissioners refer 
to individuals without any relation with management where the only relation is their 
commissionership. On the other hand, insider commissioners are individuals who have 
any relation with management. This might include commissioners who are former 
employee, who have current business relation, who are nominated and appointed by 
management. However, as the agency problem in Indonesia is related to the conflict 
between controlling owners and minority shareholders, the affiliation of the 
commissioners might refers to the controlling owners instead of management55
                                              
55 In 2007, the House of Representative ratifies Company Law 2007 and therefore Company Law 1995 
became ineffective. However, CL 2007 and CL 1995 are quite similar in defining the controlling family 
although CL 2007 provides a more detailed explanation as compared to CL 1995. The different between 
these laws is in regard with the procedure of registration, the responsibility of corporate secretary, the 
procedure of bankruptcy arrangement, the minimum amount of paid-in-capital, the form of private 
company, the eligibility requirement to bid for government contract, and the detail of explanation. 
Accordingly, it is acceptable to rely also on CL1995 in defining controlling family. Indeed, the study uses 
data as of 31/12/2002 where Company Law 1995 is still effective. 
. 
Accordingly, affiliated commissioners refer to individuals who are the family members 
of controlling owners, are former and current employee of business group owned by 
controlling shareholders, have business relationship with business group owned by 
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controlling shareholders, and are nominated and appointed by controlling owners56
 
. 
Within Indonesian context, outsider commissioners are individuals without any 
affiliation with controlling owners other than their commissionerships. 
In 2001, the JSX agency officially required that listed firms’ board of commissioners 
comprise at least 30% independent commissioners, or that the number of independent 
commissioners be proportional to the shareholding by minority investors, whichever is 
higher57. The agency specifies that an independent commissioner is an individual 
without any affiliation with management, commissioner, or controlling owner, and do 
not serve as commissioner in other affiliated firm (interlocking commissioner)58
 
.  
Although the JSX highlights the affiliation with management and commissioners, such 
requirement is based on the presumption that the existing management and 
commissioners are nominated and appointed by controlling owners. Hence, the 
requirement underlines the importance of affiliation with controlling owners in defining 
independent commissioners. Indeed, the requirement confirms the framework where the 
family, instead of individuals serve as the unit of analysis. Accordingly, the concept of 
independent commissioners is relevant to Indonesian context although that country 
adopts a two-tier model. 
 
                                              
56 This definition is consistent with the decree of CMSA (SE-03/PM/2000) and the decree of JSX (Kep-
315/BEJ/062000, and Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001). The concept of independent directors is not stipulated in 
either Company Law 1995 or CL2007. Independent directors might be found in specific regulations which 
are endorsed by Capital Market Supervisory Agency and Jakarta Stock Exchange Agency. However, those 
agencies are officially established under Capital Market Law that grants them authority to regulate capital 
market in Indonesia (see the hierarchy of Indonesian legal system in Appendix 3). Accordingly, the 
decrees might be viewed as official regulation in the context of Indonesia. The CL 1995 and CL2007 use 
the term “controlling shareholders” where such a term and its detailed explanation serve as a legal basis of 
specific regulations endorsed by lower agencies such as CMSA and JSX in defining independent 
commissioners. The term implies that the affiliation of commissioners (or the member of supervisory 
board in one-tier system and directors in one-tier system) should refer to controlling family. Therefore, it 
is justifiable to rely on the decree of CMSA and of JSX in defining independent commissioners. The term 
also implies that corporate governance in Indonesia already hinges upon the family as the unit of analysis.  
57 In accordance with the Indonesian context, the term “board” or “the board of directors” refers to the 
board of commissioners for the rest of this dissertation unless stated otherwise. 
58 SE-03/PM/2000, Kep-315/BEJ/062000, and Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001 art C.2. 
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The agency believes that the effectiveness of the board in conducting their fiduciary 
duties might be enhanced through mandating an appropriate board composition59
 
. The 
JSX asserts that the appointment of independent directors is necessarily needed in order 
to promote sound governance practice. This assertion is consistent with those of other 
countries mandating the inclusion of independent directors on the board (Dahya & 
McConnel, 2005). Therefore, the requirement provides supportive evidence that 
Indonesia follows the global convergence toward a more prominent role of independent 
directors. Such convergence assumes that the boards with more independent directors 
will lead to better decisions  
The requirement of appointing independent directors is intended to promote the sound 
corporate governance that might provide minority shareholders with a channel to 
challenge majority shareholders control. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that governance 
improvement, to some extent, will reduce the private benefit of control by majority 
shareholders. Accordingly, majority owners have a strong incentive to protect their 
private benefit of control and to prevent the improvement of corporate governance that 
might invite a threat to their control (Nam, 2001). This view implies that it is infeasible 
to expect controlling shareholders to adopt governance improvement voluntarily as poor 
corporate governance enables them to secure arms-length transactions, rent seeking, and 
lower costs of expropriation (La Porta et al., 2000). Consequently, it might be argued 
that the inclusion of independent directors in Indonesia are contingent upon the 
requirement and that such directors are absent in the Indonesian listed firms prior to the 
requirement60
 
. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The Indonesian environmental setting is typified by weak investor protection provided 
by the legal system, an inactive market for corporate control and ownership 
concentration. Although unrelated large shareholders might serve as a governance 
mechanism, the existence of interlocking families in Indonesia might prevent this 
                                              
59 Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001 art C.1 
60 Nowland (2008) support this notion claiming that, traditionally, corporate governance is not a priority in 
Asia until the crisis hit that region. 
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mechanism from working effectively. Accordingly, the control of the firms rests in the 
hands of majority owners and the agency conflicts stem from the conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders. At the firm level, family control is further enhanced 
through the appointment of family members to serve in management and on the boards. 
The board of directors adopt a two-tier system that diverges from its original model. The 
next chapter will incorporate the feature of the institutional setting of Indonesia in the 
hypothesis development.  
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Chapter 5: Hypothesis Development 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the theoretical and empirical issues are discussed. It is 
documented that corporate governance, in general, and board composition in particular, 
potentially determine the outcome of the firm. However, the impact of board 
composition on firm performance is potentially affected by the presence of other 
governance mechanisms. In the case of Indonesia, such mechanisms consist of large 
shareholders and the controlling family involvement on the board and in management.  
 
This chapter discusses the hypothesis development that serves as the basis for the 
empirical test of the underlying theory. This chapter starts by developing hypotheses 
predicting the relationship between the proportion of independent directors, leadership 
structure and firm performance. The next section incorporates the impact of other 
governance mechanisms, specific to the Indonesian context, on the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance. The last section summarizes the discussions. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses  
5.2.1. Leadership Structure 
One major problem in implementing sound governance practice in Indonesia is an 
ineffective board of directors in conducting their fiduciary duties (ADB, 2000). 
Literature suggests that leadership structure determines the effectiveness of board 
monitoring role as such a structure dictates the board independence necessary for 
conducting control decisions (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 
2000). The proponents of combined leadership argue that such a structure enhances the 
information flow, between the board and management that reduces information 
asymmetry. This will enable the boards to provide management with better advice. 
However, Jensen (1993) posits that separated leadership delivers a better position to the 
board in monitoring management as this structure encourages the separation between 
management decisions and control decisions. Although the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular leadership structure might be disputed, some studies find 
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that firms that adopt combined leadership exhibit different decisions and firm 
performance as compared to the firm with separated leadership (Carapeto, Lasfer & 
Machera, 2005; Desai, Kroll & Wright, 2003; Pi & Timme, 1993). 
 
Research investigating board composition in one-tier countries categorizes the directors 
as either being insider, grey or independent where such classification refers to the 
directors affiliation with management (Millstein & MacAvoy, 1998; Clarke, 2007). This 
view relies on the dispersed ownership model where the agency problem stems from the 
conflict between managers and shareholders. However, Lukviarman (2004) argues that 
the categorization in one-tier studies is applicable to Indonesia although this economy 
adopts a two-tier board system. Nevertheless, he suggests that the definition of director 
affiliation should refer to the controlling family, rather than the management, as the 
ownership of Indonesian firm is concentrated in the hand of a few wealthy controlling 
owners.  
 
An important issue pertinent to the ownership concentration by controlling family in 
Asia is the prevalence of family-based governance where all strategic positions in the 
firm reserved for family members (Menkhoff & Gerke, 2002). In Indonesia, the 
controlling owners typically appoint their family members to serve in management 
(Claessens et al., 2002) and on the board (Tabalujan, 2002). Following the approach 
using the family as the unit of analysis, the directors who are controlling-family 
members could be argued as representing the interest of their family and therefore the 
interests of such directors are assumed to be necessarily similar to those of management. 
This line of reasoning implies that the directors who are the family members of 
controlling owners have identical properties with the insider directors. This argument 
offers a rationale to justify that the substance of combined leadership to some extent is 
also prevalent empirically in a two-tier regime whenever the family member of 
controlling owner serves as a board chairperson. 
 
In the context of Indonesia, the agency problem stems from the conflict between 
controlling owners and the minority shareholders, where the weak legal enforcement and 
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the absence of the market for corporate control have been claimed as facilitating 
controlling-owners ability to divert firm resources (Krishnamurti, Sevic & Sevic, 2005). 
In such an environment, Scott (1999) argues that strengthening of internal governance 
mechanisms will create immediate benefit, while the benefit from development of 
markets for corporate control is expected to emerge in the long-term. In the context of 
Indonesia, this view implies that it would be beneficial to enhance the board 
independence in order to compensate for the absence of external governance 
mechanisms. This argument suggests that that a controlling-family member serving as 
the board chairperson will discourage board independence which facilitates the 
controlling-owners to retain their private benefit of control. In contrast, the presence of 
an independent director serving as board chairperson might promote board 
independence. Accordingly, such leadership might enhance board monitoring 
effectiveness that might lead to better firm performance. This leads to the testable 
hypothesis:  
 
H1a: The board’s independent leadership is positively related to firm performance. 
 
5.2.2. The Proportion of Independent Directors  
The agency literature investigating the board of directors focuses on the extent to which 
the level of independence of management determines the board effectiveness in making 
the firm’s management accountable. Agency theory posits that the independence of 
management is best represented by outside directors and therefore the board would be in 
a better position to exercise a monitoring role whenever it consists of sufficient 
independent directors. However, the existing empirical literature investigating the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance produces inconclusive 
findings. Moreover, the empirical work has been limited to the developed economies 
such as the European countries, US, and UK. There is a lack of studies addressing this 
issue with regard to developing countries where a different institutional setting may 
exist. 
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The global convergence toward greater outside director representation relies on the 
assumption that boards with more independent directors tend to make better decisions 
(Dahya and McConnel, 2005). This assumption implies that the advantages and the 
disadvantages of independent directors are relevant to the developing countries such as 
Indonesia. However, there exist the differences across countries in terms of the legal 
system, economic environment, and the strength of capital markets that constitute the 
uniqueness of the institutional setting of a particular economy. According to La Porta et 
al. (1998), the institutional setting may lead to different needs of the governance 
configuration and its effectiveness, suggesting that the governance mechanism that 
works well in one country may produce a different outcome in another environment with 
different institutional factors. 
 
Within the agency framework, an effective board monitoring is the epicentre of firm-
level governance as it provides the first-line defence against opportunistic behaviour of 
management. As such, the independent director is the standard indicator of the 
governance mechanism exercised by the firms. A study by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
offers supportive evidence that adding independent directors to the board is perceived as 
encouraging more effective monitoring of manager. This study is consistent with the 
standard view of agency theory predicting that the interests of non-owner managers tend 
to diverge from those of shareholders if left unattended. In this circumstance, 
independent directors could be seen as an important mechanism as they have the 
incentive to better monitor management.  
 
Rediker and Seth (1995) argue that there exist interdependence relationships among 
governance mechanisms. Consequently, different portfolios of governance mechanisms 
may produce equal outcomes (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998; Heinrich, 1999) and 
therefore the firms may choose a certain governance configuration across the mechanism 
or within the mechanism that most effectively meets their organizational and 
environmental context (Du & Dei, 2002). This argument implies that the importance of 
the board as a monitoring device depends on the presence of other strong monitoring 
mechanisms. In support of this notion, a study by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) confirms 
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that board monitoring is less important in the presence of multiplicity of control 
mechanisms in the US that have a strong institutional environment. This setting has been 
argued as enhancing the simultaneous working of internal and external governance 
mechanisms in reducing the self-interest behaviour of agents (Brunello, Graziano & 
Parigi, 2003). In contrast, Indonesia has been documented as being characterized by a 
weak institutional setting (Patrick, 2001), less developed and an illiquid market, weak 
legal and economic environment, and highly family-based ownership concentration 
(Zhuang, 1999). Accordingly, it might be argued that the board monitoring is of 
considerable important in Indonesia, where the absence of multiplicity of control 
mechanisms has been proven. As the monitoring role is assumed to be best performed by 
independent directors, it is predicted that a higher outside director’s representation will 
reduce agency costs and consequently improve firm performance.  This leads to the 
testable hypothesis:  
 
H1b: The proportion of independent directors is positively related to firm 
performance. 
 
5.2.3. Interdependence between Board of Directors and Other Governance 
Mechanisms 
Although the board composition might have a relationship with firm performance, such 
a relationship is potentially affected by the presence of other governance mechanisms 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). This view is based on the presumption of the 
interdependence among governance mechanisms where different configurations of 
corporate governance might produce equal outcomes (Heinrich, 1999). Interdependence 
refers to the substitutability and complementary relationships implying that the 
importance of a board monitoring depends and is contingent to the presence of 
multiplicity of control mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995). However, the exact form of 
interdependence as the wether the form is being complementary or substitute is far from 
obvious. Nevertheless, literature suggests that studies investigating the association 
between board composition and firm performance should control for the effect of other 
governance mechanisms.  Methodologically, such a study is required to bring other 
governance mechanism available within specific institutional setting into the model. In 
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Indonesia, other governance mechanisms available are ownership structure and the 
controlling family involvement in management and in the board (see section 2.4.4 and 
4.4 for detailed discussion). Accordingly, this dissertation controls for the effect of such 
mechanisms on the relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
 
5.2.3.1. Controlling-Family Ownership 
Agency theory posits that the board is an internal institution representing shareholders 
interests and is primarily assigned to monitor management (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The 
theory suggests that the effectiveness of the monitoring role is determined by the 
negotiation between directors and manager, where the outcome of such negotiation is 
affected by the power of the negotiating parties (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). This 
implies that boards would effectively monitor management whenever they have 
sufficient power to exercise their role. Eventually, this power will enable the board to 
influence management decision and leave the operational course of strategic policy to 
management (Bunting & Mizruchi, 1982). According to Erickson et al. (2005), the 
directors represent the power of the contracting parties they represent. 
 
Within the nexus of the contract view, corporate shares have been quoted as a property 
arrangement that grants shareholders the power (through voting rights) and incentive 
(through cash flow rights) to negotiate and enforce contracts with various parties (Fan & 
Wong, 2002). Lannoo (1999) argues that the structure of corporate share ownership 
serves as a basis for the distribution of control and the power of contracting parties 
within an organization. This suggests that an ownership concentration provides majority 
shareholders with more power to control the firm’s operation in accordance with their 
interests. In such ownership, the agency problems stem from the conflict between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders as the management acts solely for the 
majority shareholder’s interest. Consequently, the power of the board is determined by 
ownership structure as they represent the power of contracting parties. In the case of 
Indonesia, the JSX posits that the inclusion of independent directors is intended to 
represent minority shareholder in governing the firm. This implies that boards are less 
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likely to have significant power in challenging management that represents the interest 
of controlling owners. 
 
The viability of separation between ownership and control hinges upon the model where 
the primary mechanism of disciplining managers relies on the market for corporate 
control, with the assistance of a monitoring device (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 1983). This 
view suggests that the effectiveness of the board monitoring role is contingent upon the 
presence of a market for corporate control. Put differently, the importance of the board 
monitoring role is complementarily related to the external governance mechanism, in 
which the market for corporate control is the necessary condition for effective internal 
governance within the firm (Fama, 1980). Consequently, the board monitoring role 
would be effective in alleviating the agency problem whenever an efficient market for 
corporate control exists. Although Maug (1998) casts a doubt on the existence of the 
trade-off between liquidity and control associated with large shareholding, there is a 
high incidence of governance research claiming that ownership concentration 
necessarily leads to an illiquid capital market (Brunello, Graziano & Parigi, 2003; 
Dehaene, De Vuyst & Ooghe, 2001; Erickson et al., 2005; Park & Shin, 2004). This line 
of reasoning implies that the efficient capital market is more likely to be absent in 
Indonesia as this country exhibits ownership concentration in the hands of a few wealthy 
families (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000).  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that effective monitoring by the board requires this 
institution to be independent of management, which might be achieved through a higher 
proportion of independent directors and a separated leadership. However, the previous 
discussion reveals that the distribution of power of contracting parties and the presence 
of a strong market for corporate control have been argued as determining the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring role, where such power and market depend on the 
ownership structure. In this circumstance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) posit that the 
ownership structure is a moderating factor in the association between board composition 
and organizational outcome and accordingly, such association is moderated by the 
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presence of ownership concentration. Given that ownership concentration has been 
argued as moderating the effectiveness of the board monitoring role, it is predicted that  
 
H2a: The presence of ownership concentration will affect the association between the 
board’s independent leadership and firm performance. 
H2b: The presence of ownership concentration will affect the association between the 
fraction of independent directors and firm performance.  
 
5.2.3.2. Blockholders 
Agency theory predicts that firm performance is inversely related to the opportunistic 
behaviour of agents where the agents have been assumed as having a tendency to pursue 
their own interests if left unattended (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Gillan (2006) suggests 
that corporate governance that potentially affects the behaviour of contracting parties 
and the outcomes of the firms could be categorised as either being internal or external 
mechanisms. External mechanism relies on the market for corporate control (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) while internal mechanisms refer to the large shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), leverage (Gul, 2001) and board of directors (Wagner III, Stimpert & 
Fubara, 1998).  
 
The large shareholder has appeared in the finance literature as a governance mechanism 
that might reduce the agency problem and increase firm performance. However, large 
shareholders might benefit the firm only when the management and ownership are 
separated (Nam, 2003). This view implies that the separation between management 
decisions and control decisions might be promoted by the presence of external 
blockholders. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) posit that significant shareholding by 
external blockholders provides them with the incentive to monitor management and 
sufficient voting power to remove poor performing management. Empirical work find 
that the existence of external large shareholders positively related to corporate 
performance (Jones, Lee & Tompkins, 1997), increases the likelihood of the takeover of 
poor performing firms (Clyde, 1997) and lowers the level of earnings management 
(Jiambalvo, Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2002).  
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An important issue pertinent to the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance is the interdependence between governance mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 
1995). Although theoretical and empirical work demonstrates the absence of consensus 
as to whether the relationship between governance mechanisms complement or 
substitute each other, the failure to control for this issue has been quoted as producing 
inconsistent estimators and spurious findings (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Börsch-
Supan and Köke (2002) suggest that the presence of other governance mechanisms 
available within a specific institutional context should be addressed adequately in 
examining the relationship between board composition and firm performance. In the 
context of Indonesia, the governance mechanisms available are the presence of external 
large shareholders, either domestic or foreign institutional investors, and the board of 
directors, while lender monitoring and the market for corporate control have been 
proven as being insignificant mechanisms. As the interdependence implies that the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring role is contingent upon the presence of other 
strong governance mechanisms, it is predicted that  
 
H2c: The presence of external large shareholders will affect the association between 
the board’s independent leadership and firm performance. 
H2d: The presence of external large shareholders will affect the association between 
the fraction of independent directors and firm performance. 
 
5.2.3.3. Controlling-Family Involvement in Management and on the Boards 
Controlling owners of Indonesian firms typically appoint their family members to serve 
in management (ADB, 2002). Using the family as the unit of analysis, this study 
suggests that such appointments might have important implications on corporate control. 
Within this framework, the individual shareholding of one controlling-family members 
serving in management is assumed to be identical to the aggregate shareholding of all 
family members. Consequently, such appointments might raise insider ownership 
concerns as the controlling family accounts for substantial ownership of the firm. Such 
ownership has been quoted as having two competing effects where its beneficial effect is 
contingent upon the level of shareholding. At the lower level, managerial ownership 
creates an incentive alignment effect that discourages managers from pursuing 
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opportunistic behaviour while, at a higher level, the entrenchment effect dominates the 
incentive alignment effect (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). 
 
The literature investigating managerial ownership focuses on the impact of such 
ownership on management behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
managerial shareholding might serve as a governance mechanism as it promotes the 
convergence of interests of agents and principals. This view hinges upon the argument 
that such ownership raises the sensitivity of agents’ wealth to firm performance. 
However, higher managerial ownership has been claimed as granting management 
sufficient power to outvote any undesired proposal in a voting contest. In the absence of 
strong investor protection provided by the legal system, this power necessarily enables 
management to secure their position and helps them pursue self-interest actions as they 
have the power to protect their job. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) find that 
managerial ownership is negatively related to firm performance in the US and the UK 
although the effect of managerial ownership might depend on the legal system and other 
governance mechanisms specific to a particular economy. Eventually, such power might 
lessen the sensitivity of managerial performance to the manager market for corporate 
control (Volpin, 2002).  The work of Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2003) reveals that 
higher insider-shareholding firms exhibit lower sensitivity of management turnover to 
firm performance as a consequence of managerial entrenchment.  
 
As documented by Claessens et al. (2000), the average shareholding by controlling 
owners in Indonesia is 25.6%. This finding suggests that the family members of 
controlling owners serving in management have higher corporate ownership that 
provides them with sufficient power to entrench themselves. Eventually, such power 
might lead to the absence of the threat of dismissal, as a necessary condition for 
corporate control, and negate the link between CEO turnover and performance (Gibson, 
2003). According to Mizruchi (1983), monitoring by the board would be ineffective 
whenever the board loses the bottom line of control as they are unable to remove poor 
performing managers. This view implies that managerial entrenchment leads to less 
governance by the board, suggesting that boards are less likely to be able to deliver 
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better firm performance provided by their independent monitoring. Accordingly, the 
association between board independence and firm performance will be lower in the firm 
with a higher number of family members serving in management. This lead to the 
testable hypothesis:  
 
H3a: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving in management 
will affect the association between the board’s independent leadership and firm 
performance. 
H3b: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving in management 
will affect the association between the fraction of independent directors and firm 
performance. 
 
Complementary to the involvement in management, the work of Tabalujan (2002) 
reveals that the prevalence of family members of controlling owners serving on the 
board is a salient feature of Indonesian listed firms. The convergence of interest 
hypothesis suggests that higher shareholding provides such family members with the 
incentive to improve firm performance as their wealth is significantly related to the firm 
performance and its sustainability (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover, the implicit 
contract among family members might reduce information asymmetry among family 
members of controlling owners serving on the board and in management 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001). This view implies that the controlling family involvement on 
the board might benefit the firm as it reduces monitoring costs and alleviates agency 
problems. Accordingly such involvement might substitute for the importance of board 
independence in performing monitoring role.  
 
However, Urtiaga and Tribo (2004) argue that the family members of controlling owners 
share the same interest among them and accordingly, they act collectively. This 
proposition implies that the family members of controlling owners would pursue 
collective action with management in preserving the interests of their family. 
Consequently, the controlling family involvement on the board might serve as a channel 
for controlling owners to influence control decisions and combine these two decisions in 
their hand. Therefore, such involvement might reflect what Fama and Jensen (1983) 
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claim as signalling the absence of separation between management decisions and control 
decisions.  
 
Despite their conflicting prediction, empirical studies support the notion that controlling 
owner’s involvement on the board is negatively related to firm performance. Yeh, Ko 
and Su (2003) find that such involvement is negatively related to firm performance 
while the work of Ho and Wong (2001) reveals that the fraction of family members on 
the board has an adverse association with the level of disclosure. These findings are 
consistent with the view claiming that such involvement serves as an entrenchment 
device of controlling owners in order to insulate them from disciplinary action provided 
by an effective internal monitoring device (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005).  
 
Indonesia faces serious ineffective corporate governance (Nam, 2004) that results in a 
problem of expropriation by controlling owners (Claessens et al., 2002). Nam and Nam 
(2004) argue that such a problem might be alleviated by an effective board monitoring 
device, implying the importance of establishing an independent board that potentially 
prevents the controlling family from diverting firm resources. Such independence might 
be achieved through simultaneously adopting separated leadership and appointing a 
higher fraction of independent directors. In this circumstance, the higher fraction of 
independent directors is a complementary condition to the independent leadership in 
order to construct a higher level of board independence. Consequently, the involvement 
of a controlling family on the board would negate the link between the effectiveness of 
board monitoring and firm performance given that such involvement would lessen the 
board’s independence from the controlling family. In other words, the association 
between board independence and firm performance will be lower in the firm with a 
higher number of family members of controlling owner serving on the board. Therefore 
it is predicted that 
 
H3c: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving on the board will 
affect the association between the board’s independent leadership and firm 
performance. 
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H3d: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving on the board will 
affect the association between the fraction of independent directors and firm 
performance. 
 
5.3. Summary 
This chapter presents hypotheses development derived from agency theory that serve as 
a basis for empirical testing (see Table 2 for summary of hypotheses). It is argued that 
board composition (leadership structure and the representation of outsider directors) 
potentially affects firm performance. However, the benefit of board monitoring might be 
affected by the presence of other governance mechanisms. The next chapter discusses 
the methodology of empirical hypothesis testing. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Hypothesis 
Number Hypothesis 
H1a: The board’s independent leadership is positively related to firm 
performance. 
H1b: The proportion of independent directors is positively related to firm 
performance. 
H2a: The presence of ownership concentration will affect the association between 
the board’s independent leadership and firm performance. 
H2b: The presence of ownership concentration will affect the association between 
the fraction of independent directors and firm performance.  
H2c: The presence of external large shareholders will affect the association 
between the board’s independent leadership and firm performance. 
H2d: The presence of external large shareholders will affect the association 
between the fraction of independent directors and firm performance. 
H3a: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving in 
management will affect the association between the board’s independent 
leadership and firm performance. 
H3b: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving in 
management will affect the association between the fraction of independent 
directors and firm performance. 
H3c: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving on the board 
will affect the association between the board’s independent leadership and 
firm performance. 
H3d: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving on the board 
will affect the association between the fraction of independent directors and 
firm performance. 
 
 
 95 
Chapter 6: Research Method 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the theoretical and empirical issues, as well as proposed 
hypotheses development, were discussed. It was proposed that corporate governance, in 
general, and board structure in particular, determine the outcome of the firm. This 
chapter discusses the research methodology which serves as the basis for empirically 
examining the advanced hypotheses. The concept of methodology is derived from the 
research paradigm (Jupp, 2006). Accordingly, this chapter starts with the research 
paradigm in order to provide a justification for the methodological choice used in this 
study. The next sections discuss the research model, data and sampling, definition and 
measurement of variables, and statistical tools. The last section summarizes the 
discussions. 
  
6.2. Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm refers to the particular rules and standards for the scientific 
practice of the researchers in analysing and modelling the problems and their solutions 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The particular choice of paradigm hinges upon a set of 
assumptions that relate to the underlying ontology and epistemology (Jupp, 2006). 
According to Peile (1994), the matrix of philosophical assumptions and paradigms forms 
the basic framework in developing research methodology.  
 
Ontology pertains to the nature of reality and the way individuals recognize such reality 
that must underlie all investigation (Williams, 2003). Positivism relies on the 
deterministic assumption of the real world where reality could be broken down into 
particular segments (Peile, 1994). This assumption hinges upon the existence of order 
and regularity in the real world that formulates the deterministic approach and 
accordingly views reality as a redundant event (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This 
paradigm’s view is that an historical reality exists that is understandable, measurable and 
therefore predictable in a particular isolated context (Williams, 2003). The objective of 
the positivist is to describe and predict the nature of human behaviour that composes 
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certain social phenomena. By contrast, the interpretative or phenomenology paradigm 
posits that knowledge is contextual and reflects symbolic social construction and thus 
only partial reality is understandable in the isolated context (Jupp, 2006). The objective 
of such a school of thought is to promote the new construct beyond the previous 
understanding within social theory.  
 
This study is intended to investigate the association between a board of directors’ 
composition and firm performance that relies on the existing proposition regarding such 
association. Therefore the objective of the study is to obtain empirical confirmation of 
the existing underlying theory. Such proposition predicts that monitoring by the board of 
directors potentially affects the behaviour of contracting parties within the firm. This 
proposition hinges on the deterministic view of the positivism school of thought. 
Accordingly, this study starts out with the assumption that there exists the causal 
relationship between board composition and firm performance. Further, such a 
relationship could be isolated from other factors that might confound the empirical 
confirmation. 
 
Epistemology refers to the issue of the way knowledge is acquired and communicated to 
others. Crotty (1998) argues that the positivist focuses on explaining the regularities of 
social phenomena that is irrespective to the certain value. Positivism utilizes an objective 
approach, where knowledge is obtained through objective observation and interpretation 
of phenomena. By contrast, the interpretative paradigm emphasizes the personal 
meaning of certain phenomena that leads to the interpretation specific to an individual 
(Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2006). Accordingly, knowledge could only be acquired from 
intensive interaction between the researcher and the subject (Kalof, Dan & Dietz, 2008). 
The objective of this study is to investigate the regularities of phenomena being 
researched. As this places less emphasis on the personal interpretation of researched 
phenomena, the objective approach is considered the appropriate paradigm, where the 
construct used is assumed to be observable and measurable (Jupp, 2006). The objective 
approach requires proper construct definition and research method in order to facilitate 
the objective observation and interpretation of findings. The objective aspect is of the 
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prime importance in quantitative research, where the method is replicable and therefore 
the findings could be confirmed or refuted by other studies. According to Crotty (1998), 
the objective approach focuses on the generalisation of universally applied statements of 
particular propositions. This approach is consistent with the objective of this study in 
that it focuses on verifying or falsifying the existing theory. This focus implies that the 
hypotheses derived from underlying theory are subject to empirical test. Accordingly, 
this study starts with the existing model derived from existing theory concerning the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
 
6.3. Research Model 
The basic model is derived from the monitoring hypothesis advanced by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972). They argue that monitoring potentially induces the agent to pursue 
actions that are consistent with the interest of the principals. Within an agency 
framework, a board of directors serves as a primary monitoring mechanism where its 
independence of management determines the effectiveness of such a role (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The literature suggests that outsider directors represent independence of 
management implying that a better monitoring role might be achieved whenever the 
board is comprised of a sufficient proportion of outside directors (Dalton et al., 1998).  
As the firm performance is inversely related to self-interest action of agents, then 
effective monitoring by outside directors will be reflected in a better firm performance.  
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that there exists interdependence among governance 
mechanisms suggesting that the importance and effectiveness of the board monitoring 
role are conditional on the presence of other governance mechanisms. Empirically, this 
view implies that the association between board composition and firm performance 
would be affected by the multiplicity of other control mechanisms. In the case of 
Indonesia, this study argues that the other governance mechanisms available are 
ownership by a controlling family, external large shareholders and controlling family 
involvement in management and on the boards. Accordingly, as presented in Figure 2, 
this study will control for the effect of such mechanisms in the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance. 
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Figure 2: Research Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 reveals that board composition determines firm performance, where such effect 
is moderated by the presence of other governance mechanisms. Based on the model, this 
study derives an empirical specification as presented in the following equation:  
 
PERFit = α + ß1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit+ ß4 FMLYit+ß5 FRGNit + ß6 DOMit 
+ ß7 FMGTit +ß8 FMBDit +ß9 LEVit + ß10 ASSTit + ß11 INDit + εit 
where: 
PERFit: performance of firm i in year t.  
LEADit: board leadership structure of firm i in year t.  
IDPFRit: the representation of independent directors of firm i in year t. 
BDSZit: size of board of firm i in year t.  
FMLYit: controlling family ownership of firm i in year t.  
FRGNit: foreign blockholder ownership of firm i in year t. 
DOMit: domestic blockholder ownership of firm i in year t. 
FMGTit: controlling family involvement in management of firm i in year t.  
FMBDit: controlling family involvement on the board of firm i in year t.  
LEVit: leverage of debt of firm i in year t.  
ASSTit: size of firm i in year t.  
INDit: industry group of firm i in year t.  
 
The model includes several control variables such as leverage, firm size and industry. 
The agency literature suggests that leverage represents an external governance 
Board composition 
• Independent directors representation 
• Leadership structure 
• Board Size 
Blockholders (Foreign and 
Domestic) 
Controlling family ownership 
Control variables 
Firm 
performance 
Controlling family involvement 
in management 
Controlling family involvement 
in management 
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mechanism, which is related to agency cost. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the 
debtholder is more likely to monitor the firm’s operation in order to secure their 
investment. They contend that the evidence consistently supports the view, noting the 
importance of debt in mitigating agency conflict. In support of this view, the debt 
covenant hypothesis suggests that debt could be used as a bonding device, which 
reduces management control over free-cash flow and the incentive to commit job 
consumption (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Firm size has been quoted as having important implication on firm’s performance and 
control. Lehman and Weigand (2000) find that firm size negatively relates to firm 
performance which may result from organizational inefficiency. Dehaene, De Vuyst and 
Ooghe (2001) suggest that firm size relates to the importance of outside directors while 
the work of Klein (1998) reveals that the boards of larger US firms have more outside 
directors with business relations. A firm’s industry reflects the nature of business that 
potentially affects the pattern of performance. For example, the financial industry is 
subject to more regulation and therefore exhibits a different business operation to a 
manufacturing firm. Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) argue that firm performance 
might vary across industry systematically, while O’Dwyer (2003) suggests that the type 
of industry demonstrates a significant relationship with disclosure practices. 
 
6.4. Sample Construction 
This study focuses on the board role of monitoring Indonesian firms listed on the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange. This choice is premised on the argument that listed firms are subject to 
the disclosure regulation (see section 4.2) and therefore the data on listed firm are 
presumably available to the public. Moreover, the existence of the auditing requirement 
is expected to improve data validity as the information disclosed by the firms has been 
verified by an independent party. Thus, it is expected that the choice of publicly listed 
companies will minimize the problem of data availability and validity.  
 
The common problem of governance research in East Asian countries mostly arises from 
data constraints (Claessens & Fan, 2002). In the case of Indonesia, Morris et al. (2004) 
Chapter 6.4 
Sample Construction 
has been removed due 
to copyright restrictions 
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The population frame is the companies listed on the JSX at 31 December 2002 when the 
requirement of appointing independent directors becomes mandatory. The firms are 
included in the sample if they meet the following criteria: 
1) Firm engages in a business other than banking or financial services as these 
industries might have specific characteristics. Lemmon and Lins (2003) suggest that 
financial institutions might be constrained by specific accounting standards and 
therefore accounting information of this industry is not comparable with other 
industries. As this study will use accounting information as a proxy for firm 
performance, the financial industry is excluded 
2) Firm is present in all data sources in order to promote consistency across data 
sources. 
 
6.5. Definition of Terms and Measurement 
6.5.1. Performance 
Firm performance is of prime importance to corporate governance research as it serves 
as an indicator of the effectiveness of a governance mechanism. Within the agency 
relationship, performance measurement provides the contracting parties with a basis for 
designing a mutually agreed contract that allows them to govern the firms (Ghalayani & 
Noble, 1996). Therefore, a performance measure might drive the behaviour of agents in 
the contracting environment that determines the organizational outcome (Otley, 2007). 
However, firm performance is a complex construct that reflects the multidimensional 
value creation of a firm’s operation (Carton & Hofer, 2006).  
 
Although firms might employ various alternative performance measures, Neely (2007) 
believes that the widely used performance indicator still relies on a financial-based 
concept that could be differentiated as either being a market-based or an accounting-
based measure69
                                                                                                                                       
law (2nd degree, vertical); a brother- or sister-in-law (2nd degree, horizontal); and a husband or wife of a 
brother- or sister-in-law (2nd degree, horizontal), and (b) family relationship by descent: a parent or child 
(1st degree, vertical); a grandparent or grand child (2nd degree, vertical); a sibling (2nd degree, horizontal) 
. Market-based performance relies on an efficient capital market in 
valuing the firm’s share price and that directly reflects shareholder’s wealth. Market 
69 See, for example, Dalton et al. (1998), Dalton et al. (1999), Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy 
(2000). 
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measures could be seen as a response to the shortcomings of accounting-based measures 
that has been argued as being incapable of fully reflecting the agency cost associated 
with the contracting environment (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Carton & Hofer, 2006). 
However, a market-based measure might be a noisy indicator as it contains an investor’s 
perception of performance.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that such a measure 
refers to the future expectation that might significantly diverge from actual firm 
performance. In other words, market perception merely reflects “…what investors say 
they would do, not what they actually do” (Heracleous, 2001, p.166).  
 
An accounting-based measure refers to the accounting information disclosed by the firm 
that has been verified by an external auditor in order to asses its accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. However, several studies indicate that the 
accuracy of accounting information might be endogenously driven by various factors. 
Fan and Wong (2002) conclude that the pattern of ownership determines the magnitude 
of the earning response coefficient, a proxy for accounting earning informativeness, 
while Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) find a significant relationship between 
managerial ownership of US firms and the informativeness of accounting earnings. The 
work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) reveals a positive relationship between accounting 
earnings and economic performance, suggesting that accounting numbers might properly 
reflect the actual performance of the firm. However, the emerging markets face a serious 
problem of transparency and disclosure as a consequences of ownership structure and 
ineffective board monitoring (Patel, Balic & Bwakira, 2002) that leads to the prevalence 
of earnings management (Fan & Wong, 2002; Bhattacharya, Daouk & Welker, 2003). 
 
Studies investigating the relationship between board composition and firm performance 
might utilize six financial-based indicators such as Return on Asset (ROA), Return on 
Equity (ROE), Earning per Share (EPS), profit margin, market value of share and market 
to book value. The significance of the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance has been claimed as being sensitive to the performance definition that leads 
to the lack of consensus regarding the most suitable indicators of firm performance 
within the accounting-based measures domain (Dalton et al., 1998). This view implies 
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the importance of using various accounting-based measures of firm performance in 
investigating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.  
 
A meta-analysis by Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) find that market to 
book value70 and accounting return are consistent measures of firm performance. 
However, their work reveals that the interaction effect between outsider directors and 
accounting measures shows that accounting measures produce a more consistent 
relationship between board composition and firm performance as compared to those of 
market-based performance indicators. Therefore, this study will use ROA as the main 
performance indicator and ROE as an alternative performance indicator. ROA is defined 
as the ratio of earnings before interest, extraordinary items and taxes, to total assets. 
ROE is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, extraordinary items, and taxes, to 
common equity. In addition, the work of Joh (2003) prevents this study from using 
market return and market-to-book value as performance indicators although such 
indicators have been quoted as robust measures71
 
. Specifically, it is argued that using 
market-based indicators is inappropriate in emerging countries, where illiquid and thin 
trading activities result in the absence of an efficient form of capital market.  
6.5.2. Outside Director and Leadership Structure 
In the earlier literature, the operational definition of independent directors varies across 
studies. Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000, p.79) suggest that “…there are 
four definitions of inside directors (and by exclusion, outside director)”. The first 
definition refers to the employee, while the second definition adds former employees to 
the list. The third definition refers to ‘other business relationship’ such as a firm’s 
lawyer or consultant, while the fourth definition includes a director who is appointed by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The latest studies consistently refer to the affiliation 
                                              
70 Although using market-based theoretically justifiable, however, In Indonesia there is a problem with 
the substantial absent day of trading of approximately 40% of total listed company in December 2002.The 
market to book value has been widely adopted as performance measures particularly in emerging market 
(Goyal & Yamada, 2004; Arslan & Karan, 2006), where such a measure relies on the market value of 
assets, debt, and equity. However, a discussion with official of JSX reveals that the data of such market 
value is unavailable in Indonesia that prevents the study to use market to book value as performance 
measure.  
71 See for example Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990). 
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of directors to management in defining the independent director that covers the 
employment and other forms of business relationship.  
 
In a related distinction, Bhagat and Black (2002) present three types of directors: insider, 
affiliated, and independent director. Insider directors are persons who are currently 
officers of the company. Affiliated directors are persons who are the relative of officers, 
persons who are likely to have a business relationship with the company such as 
investment bankers and lawyers, or persons who were officers in the recent past. 
Independent directors are outside directors without such affiliation aside from their 
directorship. However, Lukviarman (2004) argue that the concept of “directors’ 
affiliation” in Indonesia should refer to the controlling owners as this country is 
characterized by ownership concentration and a controlling owner versus minority 
shareholders agency conflict. Consistent with this view, the JSX officially defines 
independent directors as”…individuals without any affiliation with management, 
directors, controlling owners and do not serve as commissioners in other affiliated firms 
(interlocking director)72
 
. Therefore, it is plausible to rely on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
regulation in defining independent directors. 
Following previous work, this study starts out with the assumption that the level of 
board independence is related to the observable board characteristics such as the 
representation of outside directors and the leadership structure (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1998; 2003). The representation of outside directors is measured using their proportion 
of the total number of directors, treated as a continuous variable. An alternative measure 
is proposed by dividing the sample into a dichotomous scale based on the above and 
below average which captures the sharp differences in staffing philosophies (Baysinger 
& Butler, 1985). Using family as the unit of analysis, a family member of controlling 
owners serving as board chairperson has been argued as creating a combined leadership 
                                              
72 See SE-03/PM/2000, Kep-315/BEJ/062000, and Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001 art C.2. An interview with a 
JSX officer reveals that an independent director is a director without any affiliation with controlling 
owners. Persons who have a business relationship with a company such as bankers, lawyers, and person 
who were officers in the recent past considered as non-independent directors since they are likely to be 
affected by management decisions. He noted that JSX has a discretion regarding any dispute of 
interpretation of these regulations. 
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board. Accordingly, leadership structure is measured using a nominal scale that takes 
one if the board chairperson is an independent director, two if the board chairperson is 
an affiliated director and three if the board chairperson is a family member of controlling 
owners.  
 
6.5.3. Controlling Owners 
In most economies, corporate ownership is concentrated in a group of individuals who 
are related by blood or marriage (La Porta et al., 1999). Such a characteristic has been 
quoted as offering the rationale for using the family, instead of individuals, as the unit of 
analysis. This framework relies on the assumption that family members of controlling 
owners share the same interest and therefore will pursue collective actions in the 
contracting environment. Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2003) argue that this 
framework portrays the real control of the firm by family through the shareholdings of 
family members. Accordingly, this view treats indifferently the individual shareholding 
of one family member and the aggregate shareholding of all of family members. For 
example, Claessens et al. (2002, p.2746) note that “We do not consider ownership by 
individual family members to be separate, and we use total ownership by each family 
group—defined as a group of people related by blood or marriage—as the unit of 
analysis”. In other words, the aggregate shareholdings of members of a controlling 
family are treated identically to a single person in the framework where individuals 
serve as the unit of analysis. This view suggests that, in most economies outside the US 
and the UK, controlling owners refers to the family, rather than of individuals. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) use a 20% shareholding as a cut-off for differentiating between 
family-controlled firms and non family-controlled firms as such level carries sufficient 
voting rights that enables the holders to influence management decisions. Although, 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) have stressed the importance of disentangling cash-flow and 
voting rights associated with substantial shareholdings, there is a high incidence of 
governance research relying on cash-flow rights in defining ownership concentration by 
the largest shareholders. Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005), Krivogorsky (2006) and 
Cho and Kim (2007) suggest that control distribution might refer to the cash-flow right 
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whenever such distribution does not serve as the main variable of interest. Following 
previous work, this study relies on cash flow rights in defining the controlling 
shareholder ownership as such ownership is treated as a moderating variable. 
Specifically, this study defines controlling owners as the largest shareholder with at least 
20% shareholding of corporate common shares. The controlling shareholder ownership 
is defined as the proportion of shares owned by the controlling family to total 
outstanding shares. 
 
6.5.4. Blockholders 
In the governance literature, blockholder refers to external shareholders with, at least, 
5% corporate ownership although such a cut-off point might vary across studies73
 
. Such 
a level of ownership has been claimed as granting shareholders the incentive to monitor 
management and sufficient voting power to influence management decisions (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Accordingly, the presence of blockholders might serve as a governance 
mechanism that helps to alleviate the agency problems. However, Dherment-Ferere, 
Köke and Renneboog (2001) suggest that the type of blockholders might have an 
important impact on their monitoring effectiveness as different types of blockholders 
might have different power and incentive to monitor management. They distinguish the 
blockholders into specific groups such as financial institutions, family, company and 
state.  
Complementary to the type, the role of blockholders as a governance mechanism 
depends on the institutional setting in which the firms operate. In Asian economies, 
blockholders are more likely to collude with controlling owners which exacerbates the 
agency problem (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001). Consistent with this view, the OECD 
(2003) argues that the prevalence of the interlocking family is a salient feature of East 
Asian firms. This suggests that the family blockholders are less likely to play a 
significant monitoring role and implies that the benefit of blockholder monitoring might 
be expected whenever such blockholders are non-family or financial institutions without 
any affiliation with controlling owners. Accordingly, this study defines blockholder as 
                                              
73 See, for example, Heflin and Shaw (2000), Sangsoo and Song (1995), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990).  
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non-family shareholders, independent financial institutions or the state, with at least 5% 
shareholding. Foreign and domestic blockholder’s ownership is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by blockholders to total outstanding shares. 
 
6.5.5. Controlling-Family Involvement in Management and on the Board 
Controlling owners of Indonesian listed firms commonly appoint their family members 
to serve in management ADB (2000) and on the board (Tabalujan, 2002). Using the 
family as the unit of analysis, the individual shareholding of one family member has 
been argued as identical to the aggregate shareholding by all family members. This 
approach implies that the family members of controlling owners serving in management 
and on the board have identical interests as their family. Accordingly, such appointments 
might create an entrenchment effect as the higher aggregate shareholding by the 
controlling family provides their family members with sufficient voting power to 
insulate them from any disciplinary mechanisms. The entrenched management (Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1988) and board (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007) have been 
claimed as negating the effectiveness of governance systems although such 
entrenchment might be achieved through various arrangements.  
 
Studies elaborating the entrenchment effect refer to the aggregate shareholding of the 
insiders in defining the level of entrenchment. This view hinges upon a specific setting 
where the management and the board consist of hired professionals without sufficient 
individual corporate ownership. However, as previously mentioned, the management 
and the directors who are family members of controlling-owners have been argued as 
having identical shareholding to their family ownership, implying that aggregating such 
ownership might overstate the figure. Moreover, Lukviarman (2004) argues that it is 
extremely rare to observe remuneration packages with stock options in Indonesia, 
suggesting that hired-professional insiders are less likely to have corporate ownership. 
This view indicates the importance of using the alternative proxy of insider 
entrenchment. Accordingly, this study relies on the ratio of family members of 
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controlling owner serving in management and on the board to the total number of 
management team and directors74
 
. 
6.6. Statistical Method 
This study mainly uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions for hypothesis testing. 
The regression analysis is constrained by several assumptions such as normality, 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and linearity. Normality distribution is determined 
using the coefficient of its skewness and kurtosis. The data are normally distributed if 
the standard skewness and kurtosis are within ±1.96 and ±3 respectively. 
Multicollinearity refers to the existence of a high correlation between particular 
independent variables that may exist whenever the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.80 
(Gujarati, 1995). Homocedasticity refers to the statistical model with “…a series of 
uncorrelated, purely random errors, ε, which are assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean zero and constant variance, σ2“(Aczel, 2005, p.461). According to Gozali (2007), 
the Park test might detect the presence of heteroscedasticity whenever the coefficient of 
estimates is significant at conventional level. 
 
Linearity is an inherent issue that plagues studies investigating the relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors and firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). However, empirical work arrives at an inconclusive approach about what best 
addresses this issue and accordingly offers various approaches. Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) divide independent director representation into three discrete categories that 
reflect the sharp differences in board staffing philosophies. Block (1999) decomposes 
the sample into deciles, while Postma et al. (1999) adopts quadratic terms in order to 
overcome such problems. In a related issue, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) prefer 
to use a piece-wise approach in their study investigating the association between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Following previous work, linearity issues 
will be addressed by using a quadratic term, piece-wise, and discrete groupings of the 
proportion of independent directors. 
 
                                              
74 The same measurement approach is also used by Yeh (2005).  
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Another important issue within governance studies is the endogeneity problem that 
complicates the interpretation of the results (Börsch-Supan & Köke, 2002; Drobetz, 
2003). To address this issue, some studies employ lagged data (Dherment-Ferere & 
Renneboog, 2000; Durnev & Kim, 2005) and two stages least squares (Lehman & 
Weigand, 2000; Black, Jang & Kim, 2006). Following previous work, this study will use 
lagged data and two stages least squares to address the endogeneity issue. However, 
empirical studies have proposed different models concerning the main and instrumental 
variables75
 
. This finding implies that researcher discretion is more likely to apply in this 
circumstance.  
6.7. Summary 
This study relies on the proposition that monitoring by the board of directors potentially 
determines the behaviour of contracting parties within the firm. This proposition is 
consistent with the deterministic view of the positivist paradigm. Accordingly, this study 
chooses positivism as its ontological choice and relies on the deterministic assumption 
of the real world where reality could be broken down into particular segments. The 
epistemological choice borrows from an objective approach implying that the 
hypotheses derived from underlying theory are subject to empirical test.  
 
The sample consists of 190 firms listed on the JSX as of 2002 excluding financial 
institutions. Data of variables of interest are extracted from various sources. A research 
model is derived from agency theory predicting that a board composition is related to 
firm performance. The study addresses the empirical issue within governance research 
namely: the interdependence, linearity and endogeneity issue. As summarised in Table 
4, the dependent variable is firm performance, measured using ROA and ROE. 
Independent variables are board composition (proportion of independent directors, 
leadership structure, and board size), ownership structure, and control variables. The 
next chapter provides descriptive statistics of variables of interest while the following 
chapter presents empirical tests regarding the association between dependent and 
independent variables.  
                                              
75 See for example Mak and Li (2001), Mak and Roush (2000) and Rediker and Seth (1995).  
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Table 4:  Operationalisation of the Research Variables    
Variables  Acronym Measure Source 
Dependent Variable    
 Return on Assets ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, 
extraordinary items and taxes to total 
assets 
ICMD 
 Return on Equity ROE The ratio of earnings before interest, 
extraordinary items, and taxes to 
common equity 
ICMD 
Independent Variables    
 Board leadership structure LEAD Dummy variable that takes 1 if the 
board chairperson is an independent 
director, 2 if the board chairperson is 
an affiliated director and 3 if the 
board chairperson is a family 
member of controlling owners.  
AR, JSX list, 
PPLC, and 
PRO 
 Independent directors IDPFR Independent directors as a proportion 
of total number of directors 
AR, JSX list 
 Controlling family 
ownership 
FMLY Common shares owned by a 
controlling family as a proportion of 
total outstanding common shares. 
AR, PPLC, 
PRO 
 Foreign blockholder 
ownership 
FRGN Common shares owned by foreign 
investors as a proportion of total 
outstanding common shares. 
ICMD, PPLC 
 Domestic blockholder 
ownership 
DOM Common shares owned by domestic 
blockholders as a proportion of total 
outstanding common shares. 
ICMD, PPLC 
 Controlling family 
involvement in 
management 
FMGT The family members of controlling-
owners serving in management as a 
proportion of total number of 
managers 
AR, PPLC, 
and PRO 
 Controlling family 
involvement on the board 
FMBD The family members of controlling-
owners serving on the board as a 
proportion of total number of 
directors 
AR, PPLC, 
and PRO 
Control variables    
 Leverage LEV The ratio of leverage to total assets ICMD 
 Size ASST Natural log of total assets ICMD 
 Industry INDT The two-digit JSX industry 
classification  
ICMD 
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Chapter 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the research design and hypotheses development were 
discussed. It was proposed that corporate governance, in general, and board structure in 
particular, determine the outcome of the firm. However, the association between board 
composition and organizational outcome might be contingent upon firm characteristics. 
As such, this chapter discusses the sample characteristics in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of Indonesian listed firms and the justification as to whether the 
association between board composition and firm value is applicable to the sample. This 
chapter starts with the comparison between population and sample characteristics. The 
next sections discuss the firm and governance characteristics. The last section 
summarizes the discussion. 
 
7.2. Population and Sample  
As presented in Table 5, the initial sample comprises 330 firms which fall into 35 
industries. Financial institutions and non-financial institution consist of 56 and 274 firms 
respectively. There are 21 exit-entry firms during 2000 and 2002 while 40 firm’s data 
are missing from the databases. This last figure confirms the difficulties experienced by 
other research in gathering publicly available information about Indonesian listed firms. 
The standardized residual values of 23 firms are beyond the range of ± 3.3 and therefore 
these firms are treated as outliers and deleted from the sample. The final sample consists 
of 30 industries comprising 190 firms, which represents 58% of total listed firms.  
 
Table 6 presents the industry distribution of the final sample and its comparison to the 
initial sample. The financial institution category (banking, credit agencies, securities, 
and insurance) is the highest contributor to the initial sample (17%) while construction, 
fabricated metal products, machinery, communication, and holding companies are the 
lowest. The final sample consists mostly of manufacturing industries (72%) and the 
remaining 28% are engaged in wholesale and trade, property, transportation service, 
communication, hotel and service, holding and investment companies, and others. Fifty 
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percent of the final sample consists of the top seven industries (property, food and 
beverages, automotive, plastics and glass, chemicals, metals, and transportation). 
 
Table 5: Sample Construction 
Initial sample:   
Firms listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange as of 31/12/2002  330 
Less:   
Financial institutions:   
 Bank 22  
 Credit agencies 12  
 Securities 12  
 Insurance 10  
  56  
Non-financial institutions  274 
   
Less:   
Entry and exit firms during 2000 – 2004 21  
Surviving firms during 2000-2004  253 
Less:   
Missing data firms   
 Missing ICMD database 8  
 Missing annual report 19  
 Missing PPLC and PRO database 13  
  40  
Available sample  213 
Less:   
Outliers 23  
Final sample  190 
 
Bottom ten industries provide 15% of the final sample. Although the machinery industry 
is absent from the final sample, this industry only consists of two firms (0.3% of the 
total population and 0.4% of non-financial institutions) and therefore it is reasonably 
expected that the exclusion affects the sample representation insignificantly. The table 
shows that the distribution of firms by industry demonstrates a relatively similar pattern 
between initial and final samples, offering assurance that the final sample represents 
population characteristics. 
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Table 6: Comparison between Initial Sample and Final Sample 
N
o  Industry 
Initial Sample Final Sample 
N % N % 
1 property 37 11.21 21 14.29 
2 food and beverages 21 6.36 16 10.88 
3 automotive and allied product 18 5.45 14 9.52 
4 plastic and glass 15 4.55 8 5.44 
5 chemical and allied  8 2.42 7 4.76 
6 metal and allied 12 3.64 7 4.76 
7 transportation service 8 2.42 7 4.76 
8 wholesale, retail, trade 14 4.24 7 4.76 
9 pharmaceutical 11 3.33 6 4.08 
10 apparel and other textile 16 4.85 5 3.40 
11 agriculture 6 1.82 4 2.72 
12 animal 8 2.42 4 2.72 
13 mining 11 3.33 4 2.72 
14 paper and allied 5 1.52 4 2.72 
15 tobacco 3 0.91 3 2.04 
16 lumber food 5 1.52 3 2.04 
17 adhesive 4 1.21 3 2.04 
18 cable 6 1.82 3 2.04 
19 electronic and office equipment 4 1.21 3 2.04 
20 consumer good 4 1.21 3 2.04 
21 construction 2 0.61 2 1.36 
22 cement 3 0.91 2 1.36 
23 stone, clay, glass, and concrete product 5 1.52 2 1.36 
24 communication 2 0.61 2 1.36 
25 holding and investment companies 2 0.61 2 1.36 
26 textile mill 10 3.03 1 0.68 
27 fabricated metal product 2 0.61 1 0.68 
28 photographic equipment 3 0.91 1 0.68 
29 hotel and service 7 2.12 1 0.68 
30 other 20 6.06 1 0.68 
31 machinery 2 0.61  0.00 
32 banking 22 6.67  0.00 
33 credit agencies 12 3.64  0.00 
34 securities 12 3.64  0.00 
35 insurance 10 3.03  0.00 
  330 100 147 100.00 
 
7.3. Sample Characteristics 
The descriptive statistics of all independent variables are presented in Table 7, 
displaying firms’ characteristics (age, asset, and leverage), board characteristics 
(independent director, leadership and board size) as well as ownership characteristics 
 115 
(controlling family ownership, foreign and domestic blockholders and controlling family 
involvement in the board and management). The table reveals that Indonesian listed 
companies are characterized by having lower assets, higher levels of leverage, and being 
younger firms. The statistics also exhibit a large disparity between the minimum and 
maximum value for all firm characteristics variables. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Listed Firms in Indonesia* 
 Mean min max Std 
Firms characteristics 
 ASST a 2,269 34. 85  49,311 5,513 
 LEV 0.713 0.024 5.109 0.561 
 INDT 16.813 1 35 8.912 
      
Ownership and control characteristics 
 FMLY 57.739 0.000 99.380 25.371 
 FRGN 11.357 0.000 96.600 24.076 
 DOM 2.534 0.000 49.380 9.883 
 FMBD 0.302 0.000 1.000 0.237 
 FMGT 0.300 0.000 1.000 0.270 
      
Board characteristics 
 LEAD 2.142 1.000 3.000 0.912 
 IDPFR 0.378 0.000 0.750 0.111 
 BDSZ 4.337 2.000 10.000 1.794 
*Refer to Section 6.3 and Table 4 for abbreviations.  
a in billion Rupiah (IDR 10,000 = 0.9681 USD as of 31 December 2002) 
 
 
7.3.1. Firms Characteristics 
Mean and median values of total assets, as a proxy for firm size, are IDR76
                                              
76 IDR = Indonesian Rupiah, the local currency of Indonesia 
 2,658.23 
billion and 956.61 billion respectively which indicate the disparity between the mean 
and median values. Moreover, the maximum and minimum values display a substantial 
range. The asset of the largest firm (PT. Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper, Tbk) is IDR 49,310 
billion and the smallest company (PT Lion Mesh Prima, Tbk) is IDR 34.85 billion. As 
presented in Table 8, the assets of 153 firms (80% of the sample) are below the mean 
value and only 37 firms (20% of final sample) are higher than the average value.  The 
smallest size group (assets less than IDR 1,000 billion) consists of 76 firms representing 
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39% of total sample while 9 firms (5% of final sample) exhibit assets of more than IDR 
10,000 billion, which is much higher than the mean and median values. These figures 
indicate that the size of Indonesian listed firms is relatively small. 
 
Table 8: Distribution of Firm by Size 
No Firm Sizea N % 
1 Assets  ≤  500 74 38.95 
2 500     < Assets   ≤ 1,500 54 28.42 
3 1,500  < Assets   ≤ 2,500 29 15.26 
4 2,500  < Assets   ≤ 3,500 9 4.74 
5 3,500  < Assets   ≤ 4,500 6 3.16 
6 4,500  < Assets  18 9.47 
  190 100.00 
a in billion Rupiah (IDR 10,000 = 0.9681 USD, as of 31 December 2002) 
 
The mean and median of leverage are 67.40% and 59.53% respectively, which are 
slightly higher than Lukviarman (2004) found. The minimum leverage is 2.21% (PT. 
Cipto Jaya Kontrindoreksa) and the highest is 510.65% (PT Prasidha Aneka Niaga) 
suggesting that some listed firms exhibit negative equity. These figures indicate that the 
financing patterns of Indonesian listed firms rely heavily on leverage rather than equity, 
and thus support the findings of Claessens, Djankov and Xu (2000) noting the 
prevalence of highly leveraged firms in East Asian countries. Table 9 further confirms 
the excessive reliance on external financing by Indonesian listed firms.  
 
Table 9: Distribution of Firm by Leverage 
No Leverage a N % 
1 Leverage ≤ 30% 28 14.74 
2 30%    < Leverage ≤ 50% 42 22.11 
3 50%    < Leverage ≤ 70% 47 24.74 
4 70%    < Leverage ≤ 100% 44 23.16 
5 100%  < Leverage  29 15.26 
  190 100.00 
a leverage is defined as total liabilities/total asset 
 
Firms with leverage of less than 50% number 70 representing 37% of the sample. The 
remaining 62% of the sample fall into a category with leverage of more than 50%, where 
29 firms (15% of the sample) are technically insolvent as these firms demonstrate 
leverage which is more than 100%. These figures suggest that insolvency problems, 
associated with higher leverage, are faced by most Indonesian listed companies. The 
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ADB (2001) claims that, prior to the economic crisis in late 1998, Indonesian listed 
firms were engaged in excessive borrowing of foreign currency without sufficient 
hedging. This leads to the significant increase of leverage subsequent to the IDR 
depreciation resulting from the crisis. 
 
Table 10 presents a comparison of firm characteristics between listed firms in Indonesia 
and other economies reported in selected previous research. A comparison by country of 
firm size shows this to be the smallest in Indonesia, followed by Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan and New Zealand, while UK and the US exhibit the largest firm size. 
 
Table 10:  Comparison of Firm’s Characteristic between Indonesia and Other 
  Countries  
Study  Period  Country  Assetsa  Levb 
Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori (1989) 1986 US 1,361 -e 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) 1994-
2000 
US-larger firm 9,510 - 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) 1991-
1996 
Germany  736       
(7.041)f  
- 
Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001) 1991-
1997 
New Zealand  372        
(638) 
0.41 
 
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) 1998 
 
Taiwan 510  
(16,394) 
0.42 
 
Daily and Dalton (1994)  US - 0.47 
Vafeas and Theodorou, (1998) 1994 UK - 0.17 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) 1999 Singapore 431 0.45 
  Malaysia  305 0.44 
Cho and Kim (2007) 1999 Korea      893 
(1,064,262)  
- 
this study (2009) 2002-
2004 
Indonesia  276 
(2,658,229) 
0.71 
a average value. Figure is in US$ million or its equivalent. The original amount in local currency is presented in the 
bracket.  
b average value. Leverage is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets 
e not reported 
f the original figure is stated in natural log form 
 
The average size in Indonesia is one fifth of that for US small firms and one fiftieth of 
larger US firms (Fortune 500). The proportion of debt to asset of Indonesian firms 
displays the highest percentage; as much as one and a half times that of the US and 
Taiwan and three times larger than UK firms. Given that leverage almost entirely 
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comprises bank borrowing, this figure supports the notion that the financing pattern 
could be classified into a bank-oriented system.  
 
7.3.2. Ownership and Control Characteristics 
7.3.2.1. Ownership Characteristics 
Indonesian listed firms are typified by a high ownership concentration, lower fraction of 
unrelated blockholders, and higher involvement of controlling family in management 
and on the board of directors. As presented in Table 7, the mean shareholding by 
domestic controlling owners is 57% ranging from 0% (minimum) to 98% (maximum)77
 
. 
The prevalence of ownership concentration by controlling owners is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.  
Figure 3:  Frequency Distribution of Firms by 
  Controlling Shareholders Ownership 
3%
6%
7%
16%
12%
57%
Own ≤ 20% 20%  ≤ Own < 30% 30%  ≤ Own < 40%
40%  ≤ Own < 50% 50%  ≤ Own< 60% 60%  ≤ Own  
 
Local controlling owners hold more than 50% of corporate shares in 103 firms (70% of 
the sample). Controlling owners are absent in only 21 firms, representing 12% of total 
                                              
77 In all sample, the immediate owner of the firm is another company of particular business groups owned 
by the same controlling owners. This ownership structure, so-called pyramidal ownership, is consistent 
with the finding of Claessens et al (2000, 2002). In some cases, the firm is jointly owned by several 
families who form a partnership to control the firm. However, this joint ownership is a floating coalition, 
instead of a permanent coalition, where the partnership changes in other firms.  
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sample. This description is consistent with Lukviarman (2004) documenting the 
ownership concentration by controlling family in 70% of Indonesian listed firms during 
1994 to 2000. The presence of controlling shareholders is evident in 88% of the sample 
(167 firms). Diffused ownership, where minority investors cumulatively own more than 
80% of corporate shares, is found in only 5 firms representing 3% of the total sample. 
This figure confirms the work of Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) revealing the 
prevalence of concentrated ownership firms and that only small numbers of Indonesian 
firms have dispersed ownership structure.  
 
The average foreign investor’s shareholding is 11 % ranging from 0% (minimum) to 
96% (maximum). However, as presented in Figure 4, only one third of firms exhibit the 
presence of foreign shareholders while such shareholders are absent in most listed firms 
(135 firms representing 71% of the sample).  
 
Figure 4:  Frequency Distribution of Firms by Foreign 
  Ownership 
71%
12%
5%
1%
11%
own <  5% 5%  ≤  own <  20% 20%  ≤  own < 35%
35%  ≤ own < 50% 50%     ≤  own  
 
Foreign investors own 50% or more of the corporate shareholding in 20 firms 
representing 11% of the sample. Further analysis reveals that 5% of the listed firms are 
jointly owned by foreign and domestic-investors with 50% shareholding or higher. 
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According to ADB (2001), such coalition provides foreign investors with access to the 
local market and political connections.  
 
As presented in Table 7, the mean shareholding by domestic blockholders is 2.5% 
ranging from 0% (minimum) to 49% (maximum). However, Figure 5 shows that 
domestic blockholders are found in only 11% of the sample (22 firms). Of these firms, 
the highest frequency falls into the 5% to 20% ownership category.  
 
Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of Firms by Domestic 
  Blockholder 
7%
3% 2%
88%
own <  5% 5%  ≤  own <  20% 20%  ≤  own < 35% 35%  ≤ own < 50%
 
 
Eighty-eight percent of the sample (168 firms) displays an absence of domestic 
blockholders suggesting that the absence of external large shareholders, who are 
independent of controlling shareholders, is the salient feature of listed firms in 
Indonesia.  
 
The previous descriptions reveal that Indonesian listed firms exhibit a higher degree of 
ownership concentration by a controlling family. From a legal perspective, La Porta et 
al. (1999) note that concentrated ownership is more likely to be observed in economies 
where property right protection is ineffective. Given that the investor protection 
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provided by the Indonesian legal system is among the lowest around the world (see 
section 4.2), ownership concentration in Indonesia could be seen as a means for majority 
shareholders to facilitate contract enforcement as the shareholders are forced to rely less 
on the state for such enforcement. Another plausible explanation is advanced by 
Claessens et al. (2002). According to these authors, concentrated ownership could be 
seen as an entrenchment device to secure the ability of controlling owners to expropriate 
minority shareholders who are unable to effectively challenge majority control.  
 
7.3.2.2. Controlling-Family Involvement in Management and on the Boards 
Another important feature of corporate control of Indonesian listed firms is the 
involvement of a controlling family in management and on the board. The level of 
owners’ involvement in management, as measured by the proportion of family members 
on the management team to overall management size, varies across firms. On average, 
management consists of 36% of controlling-family members and this number ranges 
from 0% as the lowest to 100% as the highest.  The distribution of firms by owner’s 
involvement in management is presented in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Frequency Distribution of Firms by the  
  Fraction of the Family Member of Controlling  
  Owners in Management 
30%
25%
21%
24%
fract ≤ 10% 10% < fract ≤ 30%
30% < fract ≤ 50% 50% < fract  
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The figure shows that owners’ involvement in management is observed in 133 firms 
representing 70% of the sample. The family members of controlling owners occupy 10% 
to 50% of management teams in 93 firms (49% of the sample). Family-dominated 
management exists in 40 firms or one fifth of the sample as the management teams 
comprise more than 50% of controlling family members. These descriptions are 
consistent with ADB (2002) claiming that controlling owners’ involvement in 
management is prevalent in Indonesian listed firms. 
 
On average, the board of directors comprise 30% of controlling family members. 
However, the proportion of family members serving as directors varies across firms, 
ranging from 0% as the minimum and 75% as the maximum fraction.  These figures 
indicate that family members dominate the boards of directors in several companies, 
whereas, on the other side, family members are absent from the boards of some firms. 
The distribution of firms by owners’ involvement on the board is presented in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Frequency Distribution of Firms by the Fraction  
  Of the Family Member of Controlling Owners on 
  The Board 
18%
17%
25%
39%
fract ≤ 10% 10%  < fract ≤ 30% 30%  < fract ≤ 50% 50%  < fract 
  
 
The absence of family members on the board is found in 48 firms (25% of the sample) 
while the remaining 142 firms (75% of the sample) have family members of controlling 
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owners on the board. Figure 7 reveals that the fraction of family members on boards 
mostly falls in the 30%-50% range. Family dominated boards exist in 32 firms (17% of 
the sample) as the family members occupy more than 50% of board seats. These figures 
confirm the work of Lukviarman (2004) regarding the prevalence of owners’ 
involvement in the boards of Indonesian listed firms. 
 
Table 11 shows firm distribution by controlling family involvement in either top 
management or the in board of directors or both. On most occasions, controlling-family 
members are involved in both the board of directors and in the top management team. 
The absence of controlling owners on either the board or in the management team is 
found in only 39 firms (21% of the sample) while the remaining sample displays the 
presence of owner’s involvement on either the board or in the management team or both.  
 
Table 11:  Frequency Distribution of Firms by Family  
  Involvement in Management and in the Board 
 Board of Directors 
  Not Involved Involved Total  
Management 
Not Involved 39 17 56 
 21% 9% 29% 
    
Involved 9 125 134 
 5% 66% 71% 
     
  48 142 190 
  25% 75% 100% 
 
Controlling owners serve in either the management or on the board in 9 firms (5% of the 
sample) and 17 firms (9% of the sample) respectively. Although owners’ involvement in 
the board of directors is higher than in management, this difference is statistically 
insignificant. The family members of controlling owners actively participate on both the 
board of directors and in management in 125 firms representing 66% of the sample. 
Overall, these descriptions confirm the notion that Indonesian listed firms exhibit a 
higher degree of owners’ involvement in corporate control (ADB, 2000). 
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7.3.2.3. Board Characteristics 
The average proportion of independent directors to total number of directors is 38% 
ranging from 0% as the minimum to 75% as the maximum proportion. This indicates 
that the boards of several companies comprises insider directors entirely while, on the 
other hand, some firms have outsider dominated boards. Figure 8 presents the 
distribution of firm by the proportion of independent directors to board size.  
 
Figure 8: Frequency Distribution of Firms by the  
  Fraction of Independent Directors 
6% 4% 7%
20%
62%
fract ≤ 20% 20% < fract ≤ 30% 30% < fract ≤ 40%
40% < fract ≤ 50% 50% < fract
 
 
The proportion of outsider directors serving on the board falls mostly in the 30% to 40% 
range. Insider dominated boards (where the fraction of independent directors is less than 
50%) is observed in 145 firms representing 76% of the sample. The boards of 45 firms 
(24% of the sample) comprise at least 50% of outsider directors. Of this group, outsider 
majority boards (where the proportion of independent directors is 50% or more) are 
found in 12 firms (6% of the sample) and one firm has outsider supermajority board 
(where the board consists of 75% or more of independent directors). In 168 firms (88% 
of the sample) the fraction of outside directors is 33% or higher suggesting that most of 
Indonesian listed firms have complied with the JSX regulation which state that the 
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proportion of independent directors of listed firms should be at least one third of total 
number of directors. 
 
Indonesian listed firms exhibit the existence of family members of the controlling 
owners serving as a board chairperson. As presented in Figure 9, the board’s chairperson 
of 94 firms, representing 49% of the sample, is held by a family member of the 
controlling owners. This figure is much higher than independent and affiliated board 
chairpersons. An independent board chairperson is found in 67 firms (35% of the 
sample) and the remaining 29 firms (16% of the sample) have an affiliated chairperson. 
 
Figure 9: Frequency Distribution of Firms by the Board  
  Leadership 
35%
49%
15%
independent affiliated family  
 
On average, the boards of Indonesian listed firms consist of 4.3 directors. As presented 
in Figure 10, the smallest size group (3 directors or less) comprises 87 firms representing 
46% of the sample, where most of them (77 firms or 41% of the sample) have 3 
directors on their board. The largest size group (more than 7 directors) comprises 21 
firms representing 12% of the sample. Board size of 76 firms (40% of the sample) is 
higher than the average number of directors. The boards of 5 firms (4% of the sample) 
comprise 10 directors, the maximum board size of Indonesian listed firms. The 
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minimum board size consists of 2 directors suggesting that listed firms in Indonesia have 
met the requirement stating that publicly listed corporations should have at least 2 
directors serving on the board78
 
. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Frequency Distribution of Firms by Board Size 
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Table 12 presents comparisons by country of board size and composition. The 
descriptions show that board structure varies across countries with the US firms 
demonstrating the largest board size and outsiders’ representation. Developed countries 
have larger boards than those in developing economies. Two-tier countries (Indonesia 
and Taiwan) have fewer directors than their one-tier counterparts. The boards of firms in 
developed economies consist of a larger proportion of independent directors than those 
in developing countries. The number of directors in Indonesian firms is lower than 
developed economies (European and US countries). The board size in Indonesia is one 
third that of US firms, two thirds for Belgium and UK, and half that of Canadian firms. 
 
                                              
78 Company Law 1995 art 94 (2) and articles 79 (2) 
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Table 12:  Comparison of Board Characteristics between Indonesia and Other 
  Countries  
Study  Country Size  The Average 
Proportion of Outside 
Directors (%) 
The Average 
Proportion of Inside 
Directors (%) 
   -  52  
Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk 
(1991) 
US 
- -  41  
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) Taiwan 2.1 -  47  
Schellenger, Wood and 
Tashakori (1989) 
US 9.5 65  
-  
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) UK 8.1 33  -  
Erickson et al. (2005) Canada 10.7 69  -  
Block (1999) US 12.3 40  -  
Hossain, Prevost and Rao 
(2001) 
New Zealand 6.6 57  
-  
Rosenstein and Wyat (1997)a  US 12.1 52  39  
Bhagat and Black (2002) US 11.5 60  -  
Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright 
(2004) 
Australia 6.6 67  
-  
Dehaene, De Vuyst and 
Ooghe (2001) 
Belgium 8.4 67  
-  
Barnhart, Marr and 
Rosenstein (1994)  
US 12.4 61  
-  
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) Singapore 7.3 36  -  
 Malaysia 7.4 34  -  
Heaney (2007) Hong Kong 10.1 -  -  
 Malaysia 8.6 -  -  
 Philippines 9.5 -  -  
 Singapore 7.5 -  -  
 Thailand 12.6 -  -  
Nowland (2008) Hong Kong - 30  -  
 Indonesia - 37  -  
 Malaysia - 38  -  
 Singapore - 52  -  
 Thailand - 32  -  
Hanifa and Hudaib (2006) Malaysia 7.9 59  -  
This study (2009) Indonesia 4.4 38  -  
a the remaining proportion is treated as the grey directors 
 
The proportion of independent directors in Indonesia is also among the smallest as 
compared to the developed countries. Outsider representation in Indonesia is two thirds 
that of US, half that of Belgium and Canada, and two thirds that of Taiwan. Surprisingly, 
the fraction of outsider directors in Indonesia is higher than in the UK. However UK 
firms seem to adopt a separated board leadership in order to compensate for the lower 
outsider directors’ representation79
                                              
79 See, for example, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) and Dahya and McConnell (2005). 
. This structure enables the firms to maintain board 
independence with fewer outsider directors. Compared to UK firms, Indonesia is more 
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likely to have controlling owners serving as a board chairperson while at the same time 
appoints fewer outsider directors. Accordingly, the board structure of an Indonesian firm 
is less likely to be independent of the majority owners which enable them to completely 
control the firm’s operation through their domination of the board structure. 
 
Compared to developing countries in East Asian, where similar institutional settings 
may exist; the board size in Indonesia and Taiwan is among the smallest with Thailand 
and Hong Kong exhibiting the largest number. East Asian countries show an equal 
fraction of independent directors except in Singapore. However, when board size is 
taken into account, the figures tell a completely different story. On average, the boards 
consist of 3 independent directors in Hong Kong, 3 in Malaysia, 4 in Singapore, 4 in 
Thailand, and only 1 in Indonesia. These figures indicate that the absolute number of 
outside directors in Indonesian firms is the smallest among Asian countries. The low 
number arguably make it difficult for independent directors to influence board’s decision 
because of their inability to overcome board specific tasks through actively participating 
in board committees such as audit, investment, and finance. 
 
7.4. Summary  
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of variables of interest. It was documented 
that Indonesian firms are characterized by relatively small firm size as measured by total 
assets and highly leveraged. The governance characteristics are typified by small board 
size, lower outsider representation, and the prevalence of controlling family involvement 
in management and on the board. Such involvement leads to a combined leadership, 
although Indonesia adopts a two-tier board system. The concentrated ownership by 
controlling shareholder and the smaller number of institutional investors are the common 
features of ownership structure in Indonesian listed firms. The next chapter presents 
empirical testing linking the board composition, ownership structure and firm 
performance.  
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Chapter 8: Empirical Analysis 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the theoretical and empirical issues, hypotheses, and 
descriptive statistics of variables of interest were discussed. The previous chapter reveals 
that Indonesian listed firms are characterized by a lower proportion of independent 
directors, a smaller board size, and the prevalence of family member of the controlling-
owner sitting as a board chairperson, ownership concentration in the hand of controlling 
families, the smaller number of independent large shareholders, and the controlling-
family involvement in management and on the board. This chapter discusses the 
empirical testing undertaken to investigate the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance. This chapter begins by discussing the classical assumption of 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The next sections discuss univariate and 
multivariate tests, as well as the robustness checks and the limitations of the study. The 
last section summarizes the discussions. 
 
8.2. Assumptions 
In the main, this study uses OLS multivariate regressions for hypothesis testing. The 
regression analysis is constrained by several assumptions such as normality, 
multicollinearity, linearity and homoscedasticity. Normality of the distribution is 
determined using the coefficients of skewness and kurtosis. The data is normally 
distributed if the standard skewness and kurtosis are within ±1.96 and ±3 respectively. 
Table 12 presents the normality test of variables of interest based on skewness and 
kurtosis values. As the outliers have been deleted, all variables of interest show a normal 
distribution except for foreign and domestic blockholders. Multicollinearity exists 
whenever the independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Aczel (2005) 
suggests that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the Pearson correlation matrix are 
the common methods to detect the presence of multicollinearity. According to Gujarati 
(1995), multicollinearity may exist whenever the correlation coefficient among 
particular independent variables exceeds 0.80. The Pearson correlation matrix, presented 
in Table 13, reveals that the correlations coefficient between independent variables are 
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relatively low, indicating that there is no presence of multicollinearity problem. In all 
models, the VIF value is far below 6. The VIF and Pearson correlation scores thus 
confirm that the multicollinearity assumption is not violated.  
 
Table 13:  Skewness and Kurtosis Coefficients of  
 Variables of Interest 
 
Skewness 
 Statistic 
Std.  
Error 
Kurtosis  
Statistic 
Std.  
Error 
LEAD -0.335 0.194 -1.705 0.385 
IDPFR 0.034 0.194 2.266 0.385 
BDSZ 1.318 0.194 1.611 0.385 
FMLY -0.949 0.194 0.226 0.385 
FRGN 1.877 0.198 2.177 0.394 
DOM 1.916 0.204 1.696 0.406 
FMBD 0.344 0.194 -0.539 0.385 
FMGT 0.682 0.194 -0.302 0.385 
LEV -0.625 0.194 2.904 0.385 
ASST 0.496 0.194 0.269 0.385 
INDT 0.200 0.194 -1.267 0.385 
ROA02 1.003 0.194 2.081 0.385 
 
Homocedasticity refers to the statistical model with a series of uncorrelated, purely 
random errors, ε, which are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
constant variance, σ2 (Aczel, 2005). According to Gozali (2007), Park tests might detect 
the presence of heteroscedasticity whenever the coefficient of estimates is significant at 
conventional levels. The results of Park tests reveal that none of the coefficients of the 
estimates reaches such significance levels and thus the Homocedasticity assumption is 
not violated. Homocedasticity is further confirmed by residual plots presented in 
Appendix 4.  
 
8.3. Correlations 
Table 14 presents the correlation of variables of interest. The correlation coefficients 
between independent variables are relatively low indicating that there is no presence of 
multicollinearity problem. However, controlling-family shareholding (FMLY) and 
foreign ownership are highly correlated and therefore this study avoids taking these 
variables simultaneously in one specification. 
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Table 14: Pearson Correlation Coefficient of Variables of Interest 
This table presents pairwise correlations of variables. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for independent directors serving as board chairperson, 2 for affiliated director, and 
3 for a family member of controlling owners. IDPFR is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. BDSZ is the total number of directors. FRGN is the 
proportion of common share held by foreign investor. FMLY is the proportion of common share held by controlling family. FMBD is the proportion of family members of 
controlling owners serving on the board to total number of directors on the board. FMGT is the proportion of family members of controlling owners serving in top management to 
total number of managers. LEV is natural log of total liabilities to total assets. ASST is the natural log of total assets. INDT is the 2-digit code of JSX industry classification. 
ROA02 is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and extraordinary items to book value of assets as of 31 December 2002. ROA03 is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes 
and extraordinary items to book value of assets as of 31 December 2003. 
  1  2   3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  
1 LEAD 1.000                      
2 IDPFR -0.166 ** 1.000                    
3 BDSZ -0.120  0.016  1.000                  
4 FMLY 0.449 *** -0.099  -0.019  1.000                
5 FRGN -0.420 *** 0.005  0.079  -0.749 *** 1.000              
6 DOM -0.062  0.193 * -0.009  0.017  -0.043  1.000            
7 FMBD 0.517 *** -0.035  -0.273 *** 0.433 *** -0.463 *** -0.131 * 1.000          
8 FMGT 0.362 *** 0.076  -0.201 *** 0.278 *** -0.390 *** -0.071  0.631 *** 1.000        
9 LEV 0.117  -0.022  0.069  0.130 * -0.220 *** -0.135 * 0.247  0.162 ** 1.000      
10 ASST -0.099  0.017  0.449 *** -0.091  0.029  -0.071  -0.164 ** -0.112  0.243 *** 1.000    
11 INDT -0.024  0.007  0.002  0.095  -0.125 * 0.007  0.022  -0.015  -0.047  -0.013  1.000  
12 ROA02 -0.219 *** -0.077  0.081  -0.269 *** 0.323 *** -0.052  -0.310 *** -0.298 *** -0.284 *** 0.134 * -0.079  
* significant at 0.1 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
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The correlation coefficient between leadership structures (LEAD) and the proportion of 
outside directors (IDPFR) is significantly negative, suggesting that affiliated leadership 
boards have smaller numbers of independent directors. This finding is in contrast with 
UK firms that adopt independent leadership to compensate for higher numbers of insider 
directors in order to maintain board independence.  Thus, Indonesian listed firms are less 
likely to compensate for the presence of a higher number of insider directors with 
independent board leadership. Consequently, such a composition enables the controlling 
family to effectively control the board as insider directors dominate the board and at the 
same time hold the board chairperson position. 
 
Leadership structure is found to have a significant negative correlation with firm 
performance (ROA02), suggesting that independent leadership is related to superior firm 
performance. Figure 11 presents firm performance for different leadership structures. 
The figure shows that firms with an independent board chairperson exhibit superior 
performance as compared with those of family or affiliated. The performance 
differences between independent, affiliated and family are significant at the 1% level.  
 
Figure 11:  Average Return on Asset by Leadership 
 Structure 
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Leadership structure is negatively correlated with foreign shareholding (FRGN) and is 
positively correlated with controlling-family ownership. These suggest that a higher 
foreign ownership is associated with independent leadership while a higher controlling-
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family shareholding is related to affiliated leadership. Leadership structure is also found 
to have a positively significant correlation with family involvement in the management 
team (FMGT) and involvement on the board of directors (FMBD). These indicate that 
affiliated leadership is associated with higher numbers of controlling-family members 
serving in top management teams and on the board of directors.  
 
The correlation coefficient between the proportion of independent directors and firm 
performance is insignificant. Figure 12 presents the means of ROA for different levels of 
the fraction of independent directors serving on the board.  
 
Figure 12:  Average Return on Assets by the Fraction of  
 Independent Director 
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The figure reveals a non-monotonic relationship between the fraction of independent 
directors and firm performance. Consistent with this finding, Bhagat and Black (1999; 
2002) argue that the relationship between board composition and firm performance is 
more likely to be non-linear.  The direction of such a pattern is consistent with the 
finding of Block (1999) who documents the inverted-U shaped pattern for US firms. The 
proportion of independent directors is positively correlated with domestic independent 
large shareholders (DOM), suggesting that higher shareholding by domestic blockholder 
is associated with a higher fraction of outside directors. As leadership structure is 
negatively correlated with foreign shareholdings, taken together, these findings imply 
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that domestic and foreign blockholders pursue different strategies in overcoming agency 
problems. While domestic large shareholders rely on the proportion of outside directors, 
foreign blockholders choose to select independent leadership as a monitoring device. 
 
The association between board size and firm performance is insignificant. This finding is 
inconsistent with the work of Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998), 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), documenting a 
significant relationship between board size and firm performance. Figure 13 presents the 
association between different levels of board size and firm performance. The figure 
confirms the inconsistent association between board size and firm performance.  
 
Figure 13:  Average Return on Asset by Board Size  
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Board size (BDSZ) is significantly correlated with firm size (ASST). The direction of 
such an association is positive, suggesting that larger firms have more directors serving 
on the board80
                                              
80 The correlation between assets and management size (not reported here) has a similar pattern. 
. According to Daily and Dalton (1992), more assets are associated with 
more complex decisions and accordingly require more people to deal with them. 
However, the association between firm size and outsider representation is insignificant. 
Given that outsider directors reflect a board monitoring ability, this association indicates 
that the Indonesian firms are more likely to prevent scrutiny from an internal governance 
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mechanism. This supports the work of Fan and Wong (2002) claiming that firms in East 
Asian countries prefer to operate in greater secrecy in order to secure rent-seeking 
activities, irrespective of the firm size. Another plausible explanation is advanced by 
Hutchinson and Gull (2004) claiming that larger assets represent the potential for growth 
opportunity. They argue that growth firms require more informed directors, which are 
represented by insider directors, in order to enable the board to focus on the advisory 
role and to provide management with more discretion to pursue investment 
opportunities.  
 
Foreign shareholders are more likely to invest in older firms as the correlation 
coefficient between these variables is significantly positive. Further, foreign ownership 
has a negative correlation with leverage, indicating that less leveraged firms have higher 
foreign shareholdings. Given that firms in Indonesia face similar financial difficulty (the 
average proportion of debt to total assets is more than 60%), this suggests that foreign 
shareholders invest in better managed companies. One explanation of this association is 
that foreign shareholders induce better corporate governance by actively exercising 
continuous scrutiny, which in turn produces better organizational outcomes. Another 
plausible explanation is that foreign shareholders simply pursue cherry-picking 
strategies.  
 
Foreign ownership is also positively correlated with firm performances, indicating that 
firms with higher foreign shareholding exhibit superior performance. The correlations 
between these two variables are significant at the .01% levels. Foreign ownership has a 
negative correlation with family involvement in the management team and the board of 
directors. Given that such involvement creates a higher level of entrenchment effect, this 
figure indicates that foreign shareholders are more likely to invest in the democratic firm 
where disciplinary action might work81
                                              
81 See Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003) for further discussion of dictatorship-firm and democracy-firm. 
. This figure is consistent with Alpay et al. (2005) 
of the Turkish dataset. They find that firms with foreign investment have more 
independent, more experienced, and less insider dominated boards, suggesting that 
foreign investors actively participate in governance mechanisms.  
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The correlation between controlling-family ownership (FMLY) and leadership structure 
is significantly positive at the 1% level. Family ownership is also positively associated 
with the proportion of controlling-family members serving in the top management team 
(FMGT) and on the board of directors (FMBD). These findings suggest that family-
controlled firms are more likely to have affiliated leadership and higher involvement in 
management and on the board. The positive sign indicates that leadership structure and 
family involvement in either management team or on the board of directors are 
complement to the family ownership and accordingly could be seen as the control-
enhancing mechanisms.  
 
Controlling-family ownership is positively correlated with leverage (LEV), indicating 
that the family-controlled firms are characterized by higher leverage. Controlling-family 
ownership exhibits a negative correlation with firm performance, suggesting that higher 
family ownership is associated with lower firm performance. Further, the family 
involvement in the top management team and on the board of directors also displays 
negative association with firm performance. This finding offers supportive evidence that 
excessive control-enhancing mechanisms are more likely to create entrenchment effects, 
rather than alignment effects, and thus enable a controlling family to commit 
expropriation, which is detrimental to minority investor wealth.  
 
8.4. Multivariate Data Analysis  
8.4.1. The Effect of Board Composition on Return on Assets 
Agency theory posits that board independence would be positively related to firm 
performance, where the board independence is determined by the leadership structure 
and the proportion of independent directors serving on the board (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Therefore, agency theory predicts that an independent leadership and a higher 
fraction of independent directors would have a positive association with firm 
performance. To test these propositions, Table 15 reports the results from OLS 
regressions linking board composition and firm performance measured by return on 
assets. The F-values for all specifications are significant at the 1% level. In the absence 
of control variables, the R2 ranges between 0.069 and 0.108.  
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Table 15: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA on Board Composition, 
Controlling-Family Shareholding, Controlling-Family Involvement in 
Management and on the Board, Blockholders Ownership and Control 
Variables (N=190) 
 
The equation is PERFit = α + ß1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit+ ß4 FMLYit+ß5 FRGNit + ß6 DOMit + ß7 FMGTit +ß8 
FMBDit +ß9 LEVit + ß10 ASSTit + ß11 INDit + εit. The dependent variable is ROA 2002, defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to book value of assets as of 31 December 2002. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to one 
for board chairperson being held by independent directors, two affiliated directors and three the family member of 
controlling owners. IDPFR is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. BDSZ is the total 
number of directors. FMLY is the proportion of the immediate shareholding of controlling-family to total outstanding 
common shares.  FMGT is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving in management to total 
number of managers. FMBD is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving on the board to 
total number of directors. FRGN is the proportion of foreign shareholding to total outstanding common shares. DOM 
is the proportion of shareholding by unrelated domestic block holders to total outstanding common shares. 
FMGTxFMBD is the interaction term of FMGT and FMBD. LEV is natural log of total liabilities to total assets. 
ASST is the natural log of total assets. INDT is the 2-digit code of JSX industry classification. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
(Constant)  0.132 *** 0.176 *** 0.155 *** 0.140 *** -0.013  0.094 *** -0.071  
  3.699  4.218  3.756  3.983  -0.161  2.587 -0.878  
LEAD beta -0.025 *** -0.027 * -0.030 * -0.009  -0.004  -0.089 -0.007  
 t-value -3.343  -1.681  -1.915  -1.004  -0.414  -1.450 -0.775  
IDPFR beta -0.094  -0.107 * -0.073  -0.085  -0.071  -0.014 * -0.077  
 t-value -1.505  -1.725  -1.176  -1.381  -1.198  -1.704 -1.294  
BDSZ beta 0.003  0.003  0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.003 -0.002  
 t-value 0.898  0.901  0.257  0.071  -0.277  -  -0.419  
FMLY beta -  -0.001 *** -  -  0.131  -  -  
 t-value -  -2.816  -  -  1.276  -  -  
FMGT beta -  -  -0.084 *** -  -0.103 ** -  -0.045  
 t-value -  -  -3.074  -  -2.085  -  -1.447  
FMBD beta -  -  -  -0.106 *** -0.061  -  -0.011  
 t-value -  -  -  -2.873  -1.071  -  -0.266  
FRGN beta -  -  -  -  -  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
 t-value -  -  -  -  -  3.563  2.137  
DOM beta -  -  -  -  -  0.015  0.006  
 t-value -  -  -  -  -  0.736  0.294  
FMGTxFMBD beta -  -  -  -  0.000    -  
 t-value -  -  -  -  -1.484    -  
LEV beta -  -  -  -  -0.036 ***   -0.036 *** 
 t-value -  -  -  -  -3.683    -3.581  
ASST beta -  -  -  -  0.012 **   0.013 ** 
 t-value -  -  -  -  2.120    2.383  
INDT beta -  -  -  -  -0.001    -0.001  
 t-value -  -  -  -  -1.122    -1.037  
                
R2  0.069  0.103  0.110  0.108  0.225  0.131  0.224  
R2-Adj  0.054  0.083  0.090  0.089  0.181  0.107  0.180  
F  4.574  5.296  5.701  5.628  5.190  5.540  5.153  
Sig.  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Equation 1 reveals that leadership structure (LEAD) demonstrates a significant 
relationship with firm performance at the 1% significance level. The negative sign 
suggests that a separated leadership firm (independent directors serving as board 
chairpersons) outperforms a combined leadership firm (where the board chairperson is 
an affiliated director or family member of the controlling-owner) and therefore allows 
this study to accept Hypothesis 1a. This indicates that the independent leadership is 
more likely to mitigate agency problems as such leadership encourages a board 
monitoring role. According to Jensen (2000), the chairperson possesses the power and 
greater influence to organize board activities, which includes setting board meeting 
agenda, and independent leadership enhances the ability of the board to monitor 
management effectively. Another plausible explanation for this result is that higher 
performing firms might appoint outside directors as their board chairperson since this 
firm has more resources to adopt better governance (Heaney, 2007). The proportion of 
independent directors (IDPFR) is significantly related to firm performance in one of 
seven specifications, indicating that such a governance mechanism is an insignificant 
predictor of firm performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is rejected. This result implies 
that an empirical test for Hypotheses 2b, 2d, 3b, 3d becomes irrelevant. 
 
In all specifications, board size (BDSZ) is insignificantly related to the firm’s 
performance across the years of observation, irrespective of the presence of control 
variables. However, the relationship is positive suggesting that a larger board size is 
favourable with regard to the firm performance. Although insignificant, this finding 
supports the view of Boone et al. (2007) who argue that a larger board size is related to 
organizational performance in the firm with an advisory need from the board. Moreover, 
it is inconsistent with the work of Yermack (1996) who documents that a smaller board 
size is associated with a higher firm value.  
 
An important issue pertinent to the association between board composition and firm 
value is the interdependence among governance mechanisms, implying that the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring role is contingent upon the presence of other 
strong governance mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Coles & Hesterly, 2000). 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that large 
shareholders might serve as governance mechanisms as they have both incentive and 
economic rationale to monitor management. Accordingly, the presence of large 
shareholders potentially affects the association between board composition and firm 
performance. To test this proposition, the study includes controlling owner’s 
shareholding in the model. Column 2 displays the results of estimating the OLS 
regression of ROA on board composition, adding controlling-family ownership as an 
independent variable. The governance variables explain approximately 10% of cross-
sectional variations in ROA.  
 
Controlling-family shareholding (FMLY) is found to have a negative relationship with 
accounting performance at the 1% level of confidence. The negative sign suggests that 
firm performance is better with more diffused share ownership. This finding is 
inconsistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who documented a higher accounting 
performance in concentrated ownership of Malaysian listed firms. However, their work 
did not differentiate between controlling family and unrelated large shareholders’ 
ownerships, which might confound their results. Leadership structure demonstrates 
significant relationship with firm performance at 10% significance level. The negative 
sign indicates that independent leadership remains beneficial in the presence of 
ownership concentration by a controlling family. However, as compared with the result 
of column 1, the level of significance of the relationship between leadership structure 
and firm performance decreases in the presence of a controlling-family shareholding. 
Therefore Hypothesis 2a is confirmed.  
 
The fraction of independent directors becomes a significant predictor of firm 
performance at 10% significance level. Contrary to the prediction, the significance of 
outside directors is negative, suggesting that a higher fraction of independent directors is 
associated with lower firm performance. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998; 
2003) the negative association might be driven by an endogenous effect of board 
appointment. Particularly, poor performing firms tend to appoint more independent 
directors to convince market participants that the company is aware of poor performance 
associated with higher agency problems. This pattern might also be driven by non-
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linearity associations between the fraction of independent directors and firm 
performance (Baysinger & Butler, 1985), where the marginal cost of information 
property of additional outside directors severely outweighs its marginal benefit beyond a 
particular point.  
 
However, the negative relationship between the representations of independent directors 
is found in two of seven equations indicating that the representation of independent 
directors on the board is an inconsistent predictor of firm performance. In specification 
2, such a relationship is significant in the presence of controlling family ownership. In 
specification 6, the significance of such a relationship occurs when the corporate 
ownership by foreign blockholders is taken into account. The results suggest that the 
importance of the representation of independent directors in Indonesia is contingent 
upon the structure of corporate ownership. Although it might be disputed, the findings 
provide supportive evidence to the existence of interdependence among governance 
mechanisms. Another plausible explanation is related to the simultaneous effect of 
ownership structure and the nomination and appointment process of independent 
directors. Particularly, in the Indonesian context, the absence of regulation concerning 
the nomination and appointment process facilitates controlling owners to appoint 
independent directors that are less likely to challenge their control of the firm and 
thereby risk their private benefit of control. In other words, the absence of such a 
regulation enables controlling owners to appoint individual, who has a relationship with 
the controlling owners, to serve as independent director. Such an appointment might 
hinder the firm to appoint “truly” independent directors that prevents independent 
director to fulfil their monitoring responsibility. Therefore, independent directors might 
fail to deliver value improvement from monitoring action and leave the ex-ante poor 
performance of the firm unimproved. This argument suggests that in the Indonesian 
context, the representation of independent directors in Indonesia is more likely to be 
related to the ex-post poor firm performance.     
 
Controlling owners of Indonesian listed firms typically appoint their family members to 
serve in management and on the board. Higher shareholding by the controlling family 
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implies that such involvement potentially creates managerial entrenchment problems 
advanced by Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988). Accordingly, such involvement might 
affect the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring role and empirically negate the 
association between board composition and firm performance. To test this proposition, 
the study includes the proportion of controlling-family members serving in management 
and on the board into the equations. 
 
Column 3 provides OLS regression results for firm performance on board composition 
and controlling-family involvement in management. In the absence of control variables, 
the governance mechanisms explain about 11% of the cross sectional variation in ROA. 
Family involvement in the management team (FMGT) is negatively related to firm 
performance at the 1% significance level, suggesting that better accounting performance 
is more likely to be found in the firms with lower numbers of controlling-family 
members serving in management. Given that shareholding by management of 
controlling-family is relatively high82
 
, this result suggests that accounting performance 
would be lower whenever disciplinary action provided by the market for corporate 
control is ineffective in disciplining the larger fraction of the management team. The 
relationship between leadership structure and firm performance remains significant at 
the 10% level of confidence.  However, as compared to the previous result (Column 1), 
the level of significance of the relationship between leadership structure and firm 
performance decreases in the presence of the controlling family in management. 
Therefore Hypothesis 3a is confirmed. The proportion of independent directors and 
board size remain insignificant predictors of firm performance. Thus, board size and the 
proportion of independent directors are confirmed as insignificant governance 
mechanisms, regardless of the family involvement in the management team.  
Column 4 reports the results of multivariate OLS regressions of board composition on 
firm performance, adding family involvement on the board into the models. The 
governance variables explain about 11% of the cross sectional variation in firm 
                                              
82 The average shareholding by controlling family is approximately 58% (see section 7.1), which is much 
higher than insider ownership reported by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). 
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performance. The presence of controlling-family involvement in the board (FMBD) is 
negatively related to firm performance. This relationship is significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that such an involvement reduces firm performance. This pattern indicates 
that controlling-family involvement on the board is more likely to create an 
entrenchment effect, rather than an alignment effect, which can exacerbate agency 
problems. In the presence of controlling-family involvement in the board, leadership 
structures become insignificant. This finding indicates that the effect of leadership 
structure on firm performance disappears with the greater number of family members of 
the controlling owner serving on the board and therefore Hypothesis 3c is upheld. The 
result suggests that the power and greater influence of the board chairperson in 
organizing board activity becomes less significant whenever family members, who share 
the same personal interest with management, dominate the board. Board size and outside 
directors remain insignificantly related to firm performance. 
 
Column 5 displays the results of estimating the OLS of firm performance on board 
composition, controlling-family ownership and controlling-family involvements in 
management and on the board, adding the interaction between controlling-family 
involvement in management and on the board of directors as an independent variable. 
The presence of family members of the controlling owner serving in management and on 
the board is negatively related to the firm performance, suggesting that such 
involvements discourage organizational outcomes. The interaction effect of both is 
insignificant. However, the positive sign suggests that family involvement in 
management is a complementary control device to such involvement on the board. This 
indicates that majority owners engage in excessive control-enhancing mechanisms that 
provide them with uncontested control. As compared to column 1, the significant 
association between leadership structures and firm performance disappears with the 
inclusion of the controlling-family involvement in management and on the board, 
suggesting that such involvements are more likely to affect the relationship between 
leadership structure and firm performance. Board size and the proportion of outside 
directors remain insignificant predictors of firm performance. 
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Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that unrelated large shareholders might serve as 
governance mechanisms that mitigate the agency problem associated with the presence 
of controlling owners. To test this proposition, column 6 presents OLS regression results 
linking board composition and independent large shareholders on firm performance. 
Board composition and independent large shareholders explain approximately 13% of 
the variation in firm performance. Foreign shareholding (FRGN) is positively related to 
firm performance at the 1% significance level. The positive sign suggests that higher 
foreign shareholding is associated with better firm performance. As the foreign investors 
tend to have substantial fractions of corporate ownership (see Section 7.3.2), this finding 
confirms the claim that such ownership provides them with the economic rationale to 
actively participate in monitoring management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In a similar 
vein, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that such investors will demand a high standard of 
corporate governance in order to secure their investment, and consequently corporate 
governance of the host firms will be improved. This will reduce agency cost and 
enhance firm performance. Consistent with this result, Chibber and Majumdar (1999) 
find that substantial foreign ownership improves firm performance in Indian firms.  
 
As compared to the previous result (Column 1), the inclusion of independent large 
shareholders into the specification lessens the significance of the association between 
leadership structure and firm performance. Accordingly, this result provides evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 2c. This effect is partly because of the significant correlation 
between foreign shareholding and independent leadership. This indicates that foreign 
investors are more likely to actively participate in the decision making process through 
choosing independent leadership as a governance mechanism. 
 
8.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
8.4.2.1. Measure of Firm Performance 
According to Dalton, et al. (1998), the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance is sensitive to the measurement of firm performance. To address this issue, 
the study re-ran OLS regression analyses using return on equity (ROE) as the 
performance indicator. Table 16 presents OLS regression results linking board 
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composition on Return on Equity (ROE) as the proxy for firm performance. F-values of 
all specifications are significant at the 5 % level or lower except for equation 2.  
 
Overall, Table 16 confirms the results of Table 15. In three of six specifications, 
leadership structure (LEAD) demonstrates a significant relationship with firm 
performance indicating that such a relationship is consistent across the measures of firm 
performance. The negative sign suggests that firm performance will be lower in the 
combined leadership firm (where the board chairperson’s position is held by an affiliated 
director or a family member of the controlling owners), thus allowing this study to 
accept Hypothesis 1a. This result therefore provides supportive evidence that 
independent leadership is more likely to mitigate agency problems as such a leadership 
encourages board independence necessary for effective monitoring.  The fraction of 
independent directors (IDPFR) demonstrates an insignificant relationship with firm 
performance and thus this result is unable to support Hypothesis 1b. Using ROE as the 
dependent variable, board size (BDSZ) remains an insignificant predictor of firm 
performance.  However, the positive sign suggests that a larger board size is beneficial 
to firm performance. 
 
Column 3 displays the OLS regression results of ROE on the board composition and 
family involvement in management. Board composition and family involvement in 
management explain 9% of the variation in firm performance. Family involvement in 
management is negatively related to firm performance at the 5% significance level, 
suggesting that higher numbers of controlling-family members serving on the 
management team is associated with lower firm performance. Leadership structure 
displays a negative and significant relationship with firm performance, suggesting that 
independent leadership might still be able to benefit the firms, regardless of the presence 
of family involvement in the management team. However, similar to Table 15, the level 
of significance of the relationship between the leadership structure and firm performance 
decreases with the presence of family involvement in management and therefore 
Hypothesis 3a is confirmed. The fraction of independent directors and board size 
demonstrates an insignificant association with firm performance.  
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Table 16: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROE on Board Composition, 
Controlling-Family Shareholding, Controlling-Family Involvement in 
Management and on the Board, Blockholders Ownership and Control 
Variables (N=172) 
The equation is PERFit = α + ß1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit+ ß4 FMLYit+ß5 FRGNit + ß6 DOMit + ß7 FMGTit +ß8 
FMBDit +ß9 LEVit + ß10 ASSTit + ß11 INDit + εit. The dependent variable is ROE 2002, defined as the ratio of 
shareholder’s equity to book value of assets as of 31 December 2002. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for 
board chairperson being held by independent directors, 2 affiliated directors and 3 the family member of controlling 
owners. IDPFR is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. BDSZ is the total number of 
directors. FMLY is the proportion of the immediate shareholding of controlling family to total outstanding common 
shares.  FMGT is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving in management to total number 
of managers. FMBD is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving on the board to total 
number of directors. FRGN is the proportion of foreign shareholding to total outstanding common shares. DOM is the 
proportion of shareholding by unrelated domestic blockholders to total outstanding common shares. FMGTxFMBD is 
the interaction term of FMGT and FMBD. LEV is natural log of total liabilities to total assets. ASST is the natural log 
of total assets. INDT is the 2-digit code of JSX industry classification. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
(Constant)  0.496 *** 0.493 *** 0.482 *** 0.486 *** 0.035  0.401 ** 0.091  
  2.874  2.815  2.831  2.878  0.102  2.174  0.256  
LEAD beta -0.171 *** -0.175 ** -0.111 * -0.069  -0.044  -0.127 * -0.031  
 t-value -2.787  -2.529  -1.711  -0.989  -1.079  -1.861  -0.768  
IDPFR beta -0.248  -0.246  -0.159  -0.201  -0.042  -0.248  -0.096  
 t-value -0.914  -0.901  -0.591  -0.755  -0.156  -0.905  -0.355  
BDSZ beta 0.009  0.009  0.001  -0.003  -0.020  0.008  -0.018  
 t-value 0.555  0.548  0.088  -0.196  -1.102    -0.970  
FMLY beta -  0.000  -  -  0.002      
 t-value -  0.135  -  -  1.447      
FMGT beta -  -  -0.287 ** -  -0.440 **   -0.378 * 
 t-value -  -  -2.504  -  -2.079    -1.684  
FMBD beta -  -  -  -0.421 *** -0.615 **   -0.506 * 
 t-value -  -  -  -2.940  -2.440    -1.941  
FMGTxFMBD beta -  -  -  -  0.756 *   0.606  
 t-value -  -  -  -  1.715    1.309  
FRGN beta -  -  -  -    0.002  0.000  
 t-value -  -  -  -    1.466  0.133  
DOM beta -  -  -  -    0.027  0.008  
 t-value -  -  -  -    0.302  0.097  
LEV beta -  -  -  -  0.027    0.031  
 t-value -  -  -  -  0.654    0.732  
ASST beta -  -  -  -  0.035    0.035  
 t-value -  -  -  -  1.460    1.433  
IND beta -  -  -  -  -0.002    -0.002  
 t-value -  -  -  -  -0.734    -0.571  
                
R2  0.051  0.052  0.086  0.098  0.154  0.064  0.143  
R2-Adj  0.035  0.029  0.064  0.076  0.102  0.036  0.084  
F  3.054  2.281  3.930  4.555  2.944  2.281  2.442  
Sig.  0.030  0.063  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.049  0.008  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Column 4 displays the results of estimating OLS regression linking firm performance to 
board composition and controlling-family involvement on the board. In the absence of 
control variables, the governance variables explain approximately 10% of cross-
sectional variation in ROE.  Family involvement on the boards exhibits a significant 
negative relationship with firm performance at the 1% significance level.  This result 
suggests that the family members of controlling owners serving on the boards 
discourage firm performance. In the presence of family involvement on the board, the 
relationship between leadership structure and firm performance becomes insignificant. 
As such, these results confirm Hypothesis 3c predicting that the association between 
leadership structure and firm performance is moderated by the presence of controlling-
family members serving on the board. Consistent with the previous results of Table 15, 
board size and the fraction of independent directors remain insignificant predictors of 
firm performance.  
 
Column 5 presents OLS regression results linking the board composition, controlling-
family ownership, controlling-family involvement in management and on the board and 
its interaction term, control variables and ROE as the proxy for firm performance. The 
family involvement in management is negatively related to firm performance at the 5% 
significance level. Family involvement on the board also exhibits a negative relationship 
with firm performance at the 5% significance level. The interaction effect of both is 
significantly related to the firm performance at the 10% significance level. The positive 
sign of the interaction effect suggests that family involvement in management (on the 
board of directors) is a complementary control device to the involvement on the board of 
directors (in management). As the correlation between those variables is significant (see 
Section 8.3), this finding indicates the involvements in management and on the board 
could be seen as control-enhancing mechanisms of controlling owners.  
 
Column 6 reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regression of ROE on board 
composition and blockholder ownership. Leadership structure demonstrates a significant 
relationship with firm performance while foreign and domestic blockholders are found 
to have an insignificant relationship with firm performance. However, in the presence of 
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unrelated large shareholders, the significance relationship between leadership structure 
and firm performance decreases, providing empirical support to upholding Hypothesis 
2c. This result indicates that the importance of leadership structure as a governance 
mechanism is contingent to the presence of other governance mechanisms. Board size 
and the proportion of independent directors remain insignificantly related to firm 
performance.  
 
8.4.2.2. Measures of Board Composition  
The measures of board composition have been argued as affecting the empirical tests 
investigating the association between board composition and firm performance 
(Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). To address such issues, this study re-ran 
the OLS regressions using the different measures of leadership structure and 
independent directors’ representation.  A nominal scale is used where 1 represents an 
independent director serving as the board chairperson and 2 otherwise. An alternative 
measure of the proportion of independent directors is proposed by dividing the 
proportion into three ranks using an ordinal scale based on the above and below average 
in order to better depict the differences in staffing philosophies (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985). The value of independent directors is ‘0’ if the boards consists of less than 30% 
independent directors, ‘1’ if the proportion of independent directors ranges from 30% to 
40%, and ‘2’ if the board comprises more than 40% independent directors. Table 17 
presents OLS regressions of ROA on the different measures of leadership structure and 
the representation of independent directors. In all specifications, F-values are significant 
at the 1% level except for equation 2. As compared with the previous related tests, the 
tables show insignificant differences in R2. Using different measures, leadership 
structure exhibits consistent and significant association with firm performance across 
equations. The negative sign suggests that an independent board chairperson 
outperforms family and affiliated leadership.  
 
The representation of independent directors is found to have an insignificant relationship 
with firm performance, suggesting that the insignificant relationship is robust with 
different measures of the representation of independent directors. In all specifications, 
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board size demonstrates an insignificant relationship to firm performance. These results 
indicate that such relationships are robust with alternative measures of board 
composition.  
 
Table 17: Cross-sectional OLS Regressions of ROA on Board Composition- 
Sensitivity Analysis of Board Composition Measures (N=190)  
The equation is PERFit = α + ß1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit + εit. The dependent variable is ROE 2002, defined 
as the ratio of This table presents cross-sectional OLS regression of ROA on board composition. The dependent 
variable is ROA 2002, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book value of assets as of 31 
December 2002. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for board chairperson being held by an independent 
director, 2 for affiliated directors and 3 if a family member of controlling owners. LEAD1 is a categorical variable 
equal to 1 for board chairperson being held by independent directors and 2 otherwise. IDPFR is the proportion of 
independent directors to total number of directors. IDPRANK is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the proportion of 
independent directors is lower than 30%, 2 if the proportion of independent directors ranges from 30% to 40% and 3 if 
the proportion of independent directors is higher than 40%. BDSZ is the total number of directors.  
    1  2  3  4  
(Constant)  0.160 *** 0.146 *** 0.150 *** 0.150 *** 
 t-value 3.806  3.523  3.590  3.654  
LEAD beta -0.047 *** -0.045 ***     
 t-value -3.200  -3.083      
LEAD1      -0.051 *** -0.050 *** 
      -3.498  -3.463  
IDPFR beta -0.102    -0.094    
 t-value -1.617    -1.496    
IDRANK beta   -0.012    -0.016  
 t-value   -1.155    -1.557  
BDSZ beta 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  
 t-value 0.778  0.797  0.781  0.807  
          
R2  0.064  0.058  0.072  0.073  
Adj-R2  0.049  0.043  0.057  0.058  
F  4.259  3.809  4.838  4.904  
Sig   0.006   0.011   0.003   0.003   
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
 
8.4.2.3. Non-linearity 
This study adopts two techniques in order to capture the possibility of non-linear 
relationships between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance. The 
first is piece-wise linear regressions, which allow for two changes in the slope 
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coefficient on board composition83
 
. This study uses the following variables to estimate 
and report piece-wise linear regressions: 
BD30 =  proportion of outside directors if  the proportion of independent    
directors <30% 
=  30% if the proportion of independent directors ≥ 30%    
BD30-50 =  0 if proportion of independent directors <30 
=  proportion of independent directors minus 30% if 30% ≤ proportion of 
independent directors <50% 
=  20% if proportion of independent directors ≥ 50%     
BD50 =  0 if proportion of independent directors <50% 
=  proportion of independent directors minus 50% if proportion of 
independent directors ≥ 50%  
  
For example, when the proportion of independent directors is equal to 45%, it would 
have BD30=30, BD30-50=15, and BD50=0. The 30% to 50% independent directors’ 
level is used, for example, by Block (1999). Secondly, following Postma (1999), this 
study employs a quadratic term for board composition.  
 
Table 18 reports the OLS regressions linking the board composition to firm performance 
using the piece-wise method (columns 1, 2 and 3) and a quadratic term for the 
proportion of independent directors (columns 4, 5 and 6). F-values of the models range 
from 2.93 to 3.212 and are significant at the 5% level. Leadership structure remains 
negatively related to firm performance at the 1% significance level. In all specifications, 
independent director are insignificantly related to firm performance. This result provides 
empirical support that the insignificant relationship between outsider director 
representations to the firm performance is not driven by non-linearity association. The 
failure to support the non-linearity hypothesis is consistent with the work of Postma 
(1999) and inconsistent with the US finding of Block (1999). 
 
                                              
83 Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) also use this technique in order to capture the non-linear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. 
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Table 18: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA on Board Composition - 
Sensitivity Analysis of Non-linearity Issue (N=190)  
The equation is PERFit = α + ß 1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit + εit. The dependent variable is ROA 2002, defined 
as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book value of assets as of 31 December 2002 (specifications 1 and 
2), ROA 2003 (specifications 3 and 4) and ROA 2004 (specifications 5 and 6). LEAD is a categorical variable equal 
to one for board chairperson being held by independent directors, two being held by affiliated director, and three being 
held by the family member of controlling owners. IDPFR is the proportion of independent directors to total number of 
directors. BD30 is equal to proportion of outside directors if the proportion of independent directors <30% and equal 
to 30% if the proportion of independent directors ≥ 30%. BD3050 is equal to 0 if proportion of independent directors 
<30, equal to the proportion of the proportion independent directors minus 30% if 30% ≤ proportion of independent 
director <50% and equal to 20% if proportion of independent directors ≥ 50%. BD50 is equal to 0 if proportion of 
independent directors <50% and equal to the proportion of independent directors minus 50% if the proportion of 
independent director ≥ 50%. IDPQUAD is the quadratic term of IDPFR. BDSZ is the total number of directors. 
    1   2   
(Constant)  0.138 *** 0.147 *** 
 t-value 2.813  2.682  
LEAD beta -0.049 *** -0.048 *** 
 t-value -3.329  -3.213  
IDPFR beta   -0.021  
 t-value   -0.090  
BD30 beta 0.000    
 t-value -0.007    
BD3050 beta -0.014    
 t-value -0.073    
D50 beta -0.025    
 t-value -1.015    
IDPQUAD beta   -0.104  
 t-value   -0.363  
BDSZ beta 0.002  0.003  
 t-value 0.491  0.732  
      
R2  0.074  0.065  
Adj-R2  0.049  0.045  
F  2.935  3.212  
Sig.   0.014   0.014   
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
 
8.4.2.4. Endogeneity Issue 
The previous discussion has revealed that board composition, particularly leadership 
structure, is significantly related to firm performance. However, literature suggests that 
the board is an endogenous institution determined by prior firm performance (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; 2003). For example, Börsch-Supan and 
Köke (2002) argue that firms might improve particular governance mechanisms in 
response to poor prior firm performance, suggesting that poor prior performance is 
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related to higher proportions of independent directors. By contrast, Nowland (2008) 
argues that particular governance improvements depend on the resources available to the 
firm. This argument implies that better prior firm performance is associated with higher 
representations of outsider directors. Nevertheless, those studies suggest that prior 
performance is an important predictor of the existing governance mechanisms adopted 
by the firms.  
 
Although a theoretical ground is unavailable, there exists a consensus among empirical 
studies investigating the determinants of the board composition. Ownership structure, 
leverage and firm size might determine the proportion of outsider directors, while 
leadership structure has been argued as endogenously determined by ownership 
structure, leverage, firm size, and the proportion of outsider directors (Bathala & Rao, 
1995; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Mak & Li, 2001). This is consistent with the Indonesian 
legal perspective stipulating that a director is nominated and directly appointed by 
shareholders at the annual general meeting with a simple majority and one-share one-
vote rule84
 
. Therefore, the proportion of independent directors is expected to be related 
to the ownership structure, leverage, firm size and prior performance, while leadership 
structure is predicted to be determined by the proportion of outside directors, ownership 
structure, leverage, firm size and prior performance.  
Table 19 presents the results of OLS regressions linking the fraction of independent 
directors to the ownership structure, leverage, firm size and prior performance. The F-
values for all specifications are insignificant at the 5 % level. This indicates that prior 
firm performance and other independent variables are insignificant predictors of the 
proportion of independent directors.  
 
                                              
84 Indonesian Company Act, article 37. 
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Table 19: Cross-sectional OLS Regressions of the Proportion of Outside Directors 
on Board Size, Ownership Structure and Prior Firm Performance 
(N=190) 
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regressions of the proportion of outside directors on the board size, controlling 
family shareholding, foreign and domestic blockholder shareholding and prior firm performance. The equation is 
IDPFRit = α + ß 1 BDSZit +ß2 FRGNit + ß3 DOMit + ß4 FMLYit + ß5 LEVit + ß6 ASSTit + ß7 ROA00it + ß8 ROA01it +εit. 
The dependent variable is the representation of independent directors as of 31 December 2002 measured by 
categorical variable equal to 1 if the proportion of independent directors is lower than 30%, 2 if the proportion of 
independent directors ranges from 30% to 40% and three if the proportion of independent directors is higher than 
40%. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for board chairperson being held by an independent director and 2 
otherwise. BDSZ is the total number of directors. FMLY is the proportion of the immediate shareholding of 
controlling family to total outstanding common shares. FRGN is the proportion of foreign shareholding to total 
outstanding common shares. DOM is the proportion of shareholding by unrelated domestic blockholders to total 
outstanding common shares. ROA 2000 is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book value of assets as of 
31 December 2000. ROA 2001 is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book value of assets as of 31 
December 2001 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) beta 0.427 0.430 0.425 0.427 0.422 0.413 
 t-value 11.166 11.277 11.032 11.129 4.262 4.180 
BDSZ beta 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 t-value 0.386 0.428 0.445 0.501 0.383 0.377 
FRGN beta -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-value -1.181 -1.031 -1.245 -1.121 -1.234 -1.099 
DOM beta 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.036 
 t-value 1.408 1.492 1.329 1.418 1.326 1.416 
FMLY beta -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-value -1.786 -1.792 -1.820 -1.836 -1.794 -1.793 
LEV beta   -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 
 t-value   -0.534 -0.673 -0.524 -0.689 
ASST      0.000 0.001 
      0.033 0.157 
ROA00 beta -0.050  -0.064  -0.065  
 t-value -0.645  -0.785  -0.783  
ROA01 beta  -0.122  -0.138  -0.140 
 t-value  -1.343  -1.472  -1.476 
        
R2  0.034 0.042 0.036 0.044 0.036 0.044 
Adj_R2  0.008 0.016 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.007 
F  1.315 1.601 1.139 1.406 0.971 1.202 
Sig.  0.260 0.162 0.342 0.214 0.454 0.304 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
 
Table 20 displays the results of OLS regressions of leadership structure on the 
proportion of independent directors, board size, family control, blockholder, and prior 
performance measures. The F-values for all specifications are significant at the 1% level. 
The models show prior firm performance is insignificantly related to leadership 
structure, suggesting that an independent leadership is less likely to be a response of 
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poor prior performance. The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to 
leadership structure across specifications, suggesting that boards with a higher 
proportion of independent directors are more likely to have independent leadership. 
 
Table 20: Cross-sectional OLS Regressions of Leadership Structure on the 
Proportion of Outside Directors, Board Size, Ownership Structure and 
Prior Firm Performance (N=190) 
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regressions of leadership structure on the proportion of independent directors, 
board size, family involvement on the board, controlling family shareholding, foreign and domestic blockholder 
ownership and prior firm performance. The equation is LEADit = α + ß 1 IDPFRit + ß2 BDSZit + ß3 FMBDit + ß4 
FMLYit+ß5 FRGNit + ß6 DOMit + ß7 ROA00i + ß8 ROA01i + εit. The dependent variable is leadership structure defined 
as a categorical variable equal to 1 for board chairperson being held by an independent director, 2 otherwise. IDPFR is 
the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. BDSZ is the total number of directors. FMLY is 
the proportion of the immediate shareholding of controlling family to total outstanding common shares. FMBD is the 
proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving on the board to total number of directors. FRGN is the 
proportion of foreign shareholding to total outstanding common shares. DOM is the proportion of shareholding by 
unrelated domestic blockholders to total outstanding common shares. ROA 2000 is the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to book value of assets as of 31 December 2000. ROA 2001 is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
to book value of assets as of 31 December 2001. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
(Constant) beta 1.591 *** 1.605 *** 1.362 *** 1.371 *** 1.442 *** 1.448 *** 
 t-value 11.027  11.027  8.961  8.898  7.778  7.783  
IDPFR beta -0.663 ** -0.682 ** -0.560 ** -0.572 ** -0.589 ** -0.601 ** 
 t-value -2.482  -2.549  -2.161  -2.197  -2.243  -2.279  
BDSZ beta 0.007  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 t-value 0.413  0.422  -0.028  -0.020  0.008  0.019  
FMBD beta 1.012 *** 1.009 *** 0.790 *** 0.791 *** 0.772 *** 0.774 *** 
 t-value 7.659  7.653  5.622  5.640  5.308  5.334  
FMLY beta     0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 
 t-value     3.773  3.725  2.196  2.191  
FRGN beta         -0.002  -0.001  
 t-value         -0.814  -0.787  
DOM beta         0.026  0.032  
 t-value         0.282  0.344  
ROA00 beta -0.395    -0.235    -0.191    
 t-value -1.423    -0.866    -0.692    
ROA01 beta   -0.512    -0.296    -0.254  
 t-value   -1.576    -0.928    -0.778  
              
R2  0.298  0.299  0.348  0.348  0.351  0.351  
Adj_R2  0.282  0.284  0.330  0.331  0.326  0.326  
F  19.596  19.757  19.646  19.680  14.056  14.084  
Sig.  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Controlling-family ownership and controlling-family involvement on the board are 
positively related to the leadership structure at the 1% and 5% significance levels 
respectively, indicating that a family-controlled firm prefers to choose affiliated 
leadership regardless of prior firm performance. 
 
The work of Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) implies that if governance variables are 
endogenously determined, the OLS estimation will produce biased results. According to 
Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005), the two stages least squares (2SLS) technique will 
result in better estimates of the relationship between a governance variable and 
performance. Following this argument, Table 21 reports the results of 2SLS regressions 
linking the board composition and firm performance. The sample consists of 173 firms 
as 17 firms is absent from 2001 database. The dependent variable is ROA 2002 and the 
instrumental variables are the fraction of family directors, family management, family 
shareholdings, foreign ownership, domestic independent large shareholders and firm 
performance in 2001 (lag-1). The F-values for all specifications are significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
Specification 1 reveals that leadership structure demonstrates a negative relationship 
with firm performance at the 1% significance levels, indicating that independent 
leadership board might drive better firm performance. Therefore Hypothesis 1a is 
supported. The proportion of independent directors and board size remain insignificantly 
related to firm performance, suggesting that the insignificant relationships are not driven 
by prior firm performance.  
 
Specification 2 shows that leadership structure remains negatively related to firm 
performance with the inclusion of controlling family ownership into the model. 
However, as compared to specification 1, the significance level of such a relationship 
decreases, revealing that the presence of controlling family ownership affects the 
relationship between leadership structure and firm performance. The result, accordingly, 
provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2a. The proportion of independent directors 
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and board size remain insignificantly related to firm performance with the inclusion of 
such an ownership.  
Table 21: Cross-sectional 2SLS Regressions of ROA on Board Composition, 
Controlling-family Shareholding, Controlling-family Involvement in 
Management and on the Board and Blockholder Ownership (N=173) 
This table presents cross-sectional 2SLS regressions of ROA on board composition, family involvement on the board, 
family involvement in management, controlling family shareholding, blockholder ownership and control variables. 
The equation is PERFit = α + ß1LEADit + ß2 IDPFRit + ß3 BDSZit+ ß4 FMLYit+ß5 FMGTit + ß6 FMBDit + ß7 FRGNit 
+ß8 DOMit + εit. The dependent variable is ROA, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book 
value of assets as of 31 December 2002. LEAD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for board chairperson being held by 
an independent director, 2 being held by an affiliated director, and 3 being held by a family member of controlling 
owners. IDPFR is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. BDSZ is the total number of 
directors. FMLY is the proportion of the immediate shareholding of controlling family to total outstanding common 
shares. FMBD is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving on the board to total number of 
directors. FMGT is the proportion of the family members of controlling owner serving in management to total number 
of managers. FRGN is the proportion of foreign shareholding to total outstanding common shares. DOM is the 
proportion of shareholding by unrelated domestic blockholders to total outstanding common shares. The instrumental 
variables are FMBD, FMGT, FMLY, FRGN, DOM, and ROA as of December 2001 (lag-1). 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
(Constant) beta 0.418 * 0.419 0.453 * 0.433 * 0.012 0.461 * 
 t-value 1.840 1.592 1.710 1.748 0.044 1.907 
LEAD beta -0.084 *** -0.084 * -0.102 * 0.024 -0.017 -0.089 *** 
 t-value -2.948 -1.822 -1.770 0.105 -0.423 -2.935 
IDPFR beta -0.222 -0.224 -0.204 -0.415 0.043 -0.578 
 t-value -0.683 -0.592 -0.570 -0.777 0.145 -1.342 
BDSZ beta -0.022 -0.022 -0.026 -0.035 0.012 0.003 
 t-value -0.656 -0.639 -0.679 -0.773 0.357 0.080 
FMLY beta   0.000         
 t-value   0.009         
FMGT beta     0.047       
 t-value     0.369       
FMBD beta       -0.385     
 t-value       -0.479     
FRGN beta         0.001 **   
 t-value         2.041   
DOM beta           -0.002 
 t-value           -1.367 
              
R2  0.085 0.085 0.074 0.075 0.139 0.086 
Adj-R2  0.070 0.065 0.053 0.055 0.120 0.066 
F  5.594 4.160 3.566 3.647 7.213 4.237 
Sig  0.001 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.003 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
 
In specification 3, the negative relationship between leadership structures and firm 
performance persists with the presence of controlling family involvement in 
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management. However, the inclusion of such an involvement into the model lessens the 
significant relationship between leadership structure and firm performance as compared 
to specification 1. The result suggests that controlling family involvement in 
management affects the relationship between leadership structure and firm performance, 
and accordingly, Hypothesis 3a is confirmed. Other board’s properties (independent 
director’s representation and board size) remain insignificantly related to firm 
performance. 
 
Specification 4 shows that leadership structure remains negatively related to firm 
performance with the inclusion of controlling family involvement on the board of 
directors in the model. However, as compared to specification 1, the significance level 
of such a relationship decreases. This result suggests that the presence of controlling 
family involvement on the board affects the relationship between leadership structure 
and firm performance, and accordingly, provides empirical support for Hypothesis 3c. 
The proportion of independent directors and board size remain insignificantly related to 
firm performance with the inclusion of such an involvement. 
 
Specification 5 shows foreign ownership is found to have significant relationship with 
firm performance. The significant relationship between leadership structure and firm 
performance disappears with the inclusion of foreign ownership in the model. These 
results indicate that the presence of foreign ownership affects the relationship between 
leadership structure and firm performance. Therefore, hypothesis 2c is supported. This 
implies that foreign ownership brings a strong governance mechanism through adopting 
board independent leadership and this strategy seems to work well as independent 
leadership consistently demonstrates a positive association with firm performance. 
Specification 6 reveals that domestic unrelated blockholder is insignificantly related to 
firm performance. Leadership structure remains negatively related to firm performance 
with the inclusion of domestic unrelated blockholder in the model. The proportion of 
independent directors and board size remain insignificantly related to firm performance 
with the inclusion of such an ownership.  
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Overall, the results of 2SLS regressions are consistent with those of OLS analyses. 
Leadership structures demonstrate a stable relationship with firm performance at the 1% 
(specifications 1 and 6) and 10% (specifications 2 and 3) significance levels, suggesting 
that leadership structures affect firm performance, and not vice versa. Put differently, the 
results provide evidence supportive to the claim that an independent leadership is more 
likely to mitigate agency problems and a particular leadership structure is less likely to 
be a response of specific agency problems. However, the significant relationship 
between leadership structure and firm performance disappears with the inclusion of 
foreign ownership in the model (specification 5) and decreases with the presence of 
controlling family ownership (specification 2), controlling family involvement in 
management (specification 3) and controlling family involvement on the board 
(specification 4). The results provide empirical support to allow this study accepting 
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2c, 3a and 3c. 
 
The proportion of independent directors is insignificantly related to firm performance in 
all specifications. This finding indicates that such an insignificant relationship is robust 
after control for an endogeneity problem, suggesting that the proportion of outside 
directors is neither endogenously determined by prior poor performance, nor by the 
presence of other governance mechanisms. Therefore, Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 2d and 3b and 
3d are refuted.  
 
Although structured models have been widely adopted, the determinants of particular 
governance mechanisms lack empirical consensus and theoretical support (Fahlenbrach, 
2003). This raises difficulties in identifying independent and instrument variables. 
Moreover, the interdependence among governance instruments implies that all of the 
governance variables are related to organizational outcome. Given the shortcoming of 
the structured model, following Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Nowland (2008), this 
study proposes to relate the changes in board governance measures to the changes in 
firm performance.  
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Table 22 presents the results of multivariate OLS regressions linking the changes in firm 
performance to changes in the governance variables. The sample consists of 173 firms as 
17 firms is absent from 2001 database. The dependent variable is the changes in ROA 
from 2000 to 2002. The F–value for each model is significant at the 5% level except for 
models 3 and 5. In the absence of control variables, the adjusted R2 ranges from 0.051 to 
0.104.  
 
Table 22: Cross-sectional OLS Regressions of ROA on Changes in Board 
Composition, Controlling-family Involvement in Management and on 
the Board (N=183) 
This table present the results of cross-sectional OLS regression of changes in ROA on changes in board 
composition, ownership structure, family involvement on the board of directors, family involvement in 
management, and control variables. The equation is PERFit = α + ß 1 CHLEAD0002it + ß2 CHIDPFR0002it + ß3 
CHBDSZ0002it+ ß4 CHFMD0002it+ß5 CHFMGT0002it + ß6 CHFMLY0002it + ß7 CHFRGN0002it +ß8 CHDOM0002it 
+ εit. The dependent variable is the change in ROA during 2000 and 2002. CHLEAD0002 is the change in 
leadership during 2000 and 2002. CHIDPFR0002 is the change in the proportion of independent directors 
during 2000 and 2002. CHBDSZ0002 is the change in board size during 2000 and 2002. CHFMLY0002 is 
the change in the proportion of common shares held by a controlling family during 2000 and 2002. 
CHFRGN0002 is the change in the proportion of common shares held by foreign investors during 2000 
and 2002. CHBDFLY0002 is the change in the proportion of family members of controlling owners 
serving on the board to total number of directors during 2000 and 2002.  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
Constant beta 0.375  0.515  0.518  0.803  0.798  0.677  
 t-value 0.372  0.505  0.506  0.780  0.767  0.667  
CHLEAD0002 beta -1.045 *** -1.147 *** -1.140 *** -1.058 *** -1.059 *** -1.312 *** 
 t-value -3.107  -3.213  -3.178  -2.944  -2.936  -3.649  
CHIDPFR0002 beta -1.616  -2.021  -1.981  -2.680  -2.671  -2.865  
 t-value -0.622  -0.764  -0.747  -1.005  -0.996  -1.085  
CHBDSZ0002 beta 0.374  0.455  0.442  0.577  0.580  0.528  
 t-value 0.482  0.582  0.563  0.736  0.734  0.678  
CHFMD0002 beta   0.437  0.477  0.574  0.573  0.596  
 t-value   0.857  0.908  1.092  1.088  1.146  
CHFMGT0002 beta     -0.142  -0.078  -0.078  -0.234  
 t-value     -0.332  -0.183  -0.181  -0.551  
CHFMLY0002 beta       -0.647 *     
 t-value       -1.773      
CHFRGN0002 beta         0.017  0.266  
 t-value         0.040  0.676  
CHDOM0002 beta           2.171 *** 
 t-value           2.634  
              
R2  0.051  0.055  0.056  0.072  0.072  0.104  
Adj-R2  0.036  0.034  0.029  0.041  0.035  0.063  
F  3.250  2.617  2.105  2.299  1.960  2.545  
Sig  0.023  0.037  0.067  0.037  0.063  0.012  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Independent directors and board size remain insignificantly related to firm performance. 
The leadership variable demonstrates a stable effect on firm performance at the 1% 
significance level (specifications 1 to 6). The negative sign suggests that firms that 
changed from combined to independent leadership experienced performance 
improvement. The result confirms that independent leadership is an effective governance 
mechanism in Indonesia. 
 
8.5. Limitations of the Study 
Although the present study investigates the board of directors of Indonesian listed firms, 
it does not control for the effect of the backgrounds of the independent directors serving 
on the boards under observation. This might create a bias in the results as some boards 
might have certain advantages over the others due to the directors’ backgrounds. 
Literature suggests that specific backgrounds of the directors rendered the outside (or 
outsider) directors effective in curbing the agency problems of the management. For 
example, the directors with an accounting or finance background have been found as 
having a positive association with firm performance (Erickson et al., 2005). This finding 
suggests that such backgrounds provide the directors with better competence to perform 
their roles. 
 
The board of directors has appeared in the literature as an internal institution that is 
assigned to perform advisory and control roles. Technically, these roles are reflected in 
the board committees as a proxy for a specific duty of the board and “...represent a 
mechanism for companies to organise their boards” in promoting the overall 
effectiveness of the boards (Cotter & Silvester, 2003, p.211). Accordingly, a more 
rigorous approach to investigating the association between independent directors and 
firm performance would be to focus on the presence of such directors in the monitoring 
committee (Klein, 1998; 2002). By relating a particular committee with a specific 
outcome, it is believed would deliver a clearer test of the association between the 
effectiveness of independent directors’ monitoring and organizational outcomes. 
However, this study does not separate the representation of independent directors on the 
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board into a more specific category based on whether such directors are assigned to the 
monitoring or to other committees. This issue is important in identifying the differential 
impact of independent directors in specifically performing their monitoring role.  
 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) have stressed the importance of disentangling between an 
outsider director who is nominated by management and one which is nominated and 
appointed by major shareholders. This view is derived from the premise claiming that 
the nomination of outside directors by management provides them with conditions to 
control the board and that these nominations invite skepticism about the effectiveness of 
independent directors in performing their role as a “good referee” (Vance, 1983). This 
view implies that the nominating parties have an important impact on the outside 
director’s ability to make independent judgments on firm performance. However, this 
study treats the independent directors equally, irrespective to their nomination and 
appointment process. This procedure might create bias in the result, since the 
independent directors nominated by management or controlling owners could have a 
different effect as compared with the independent directors who are nominated by 
minority shareholders.  
 
Another shortcoming is in regard to the variable measurement of controlling-family 
ownership. This study measures such a variable by aggregating their immediate 
shareholdings via their intermediate companies. This procedure leads to the absence of 
separation between voting rights and cash flow rights, and accordingly this study does 
not further disentangle between the entrenchment effect and the alignment incentive 
effect. Although there is significant incidence of governance research aggregating such 
effects,85
                                              
85 See for example Guriev et al., (2003), Welch (2003) and Klasa (2002). 
 it might have different impacts on the relationship between internal governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Zhang (2003) argues that the expropriation is more 
pervasive in firms with a divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, and 
firms that are a part of business groups. Accordingly, relying on their immediate 
shareholding might understate the incentive of controlling owners in committing 
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expropriation as Indonesian listed firms exhibit a higher wedge between cash flow and 
voting rights (Claessens et al., 2002).  
 
This study uses accounting numbers to define the performance indicator as they have 
been independently verified by external auditors. According to Chung, Firth and Kim 
(2005), accounting-based indicators might suffer from earnings management that distort 
financial statements and therefore could be considered as opportunistic behavior by 
management. Although it is not necessarily illegal, earning restatement might benefit 
one contracting party at the expense of others. Fan and Wong (2002) and Bhattacharya, 
Daouk, and Welkerp (2002) believe that Indonesian listed firms inflate their earning 
statement generously which is partly attributable to the ownership structure. This finding 
implies that a study investigating the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
accounting performance in Indonesia should control for the likelihood of the presence of 
earnings management. However, this study leaves this issue unattended which might 
lead to the failure to capture the true firm performance as a consequence of the presence 
of higher earnings restatement. Eventually, the absence of a proper procedure to control 
for this problem might create a bias in investigating the association between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. 
 
Another issue of concern may come from the procedure that treats identically the level 
of investor protection provided by the country of origin of a foreign investor. The 
importance of foreign investors in governance mechanisms hinges upon the presumption 
that their countries of origin, particularly those with developed economies like the US, 
provide investors with a strong protection through various regulations and market 
mechanisms (Mitton, 2004). The greater scrutiny and monitoring by the market will 
eventually force the firms to ensure that they monitor their foreign investments 
(Boardman, Shapiro & Vining, 1997). According to Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2005), the 
level of investor protection differs across countries implying that the pressure of 
effective monitoring will vary across foreign investors. However, this study did not 
differentiate between foreign investors based on their country of origin which might lead 
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to the failure to reflecting the true performance effect of the differences of monitoring 
activities by such investors. 
 
Although this study have accounted for the effect of firm size and leverage, literature 
suggests that other firm specific variables, such as region, number of employee, and 
industry might have an impact on the association between the board of directors and 
organizational outcome. The importance of region hinges upon the presumption that 
local regulation system potentially affects the effectiveness of internal governance 
mechanisms (Heron & Lewellen, 1998). The number of employee has been claimed as 
being related to the complexity of decision making and communication and coordination 
problems that reduce the ability of any given individual to initiate change, to affect the 
direction of the firm, and to influence the organizational outcome (Daily & Dalton, 
1993; Yermack, 1996). This implies the number of employee is more likely to affect the 
relationship between the board composition and organizational outcome. The type of 
industry has been claimed as having a systematic performance variation indicating that 
industry characteristics may confound the association between board composition and 
firm performance in a cross-sectional analysis (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein, 1994). 
However, this study leaves such firm-specific variables leaves uncontrolled that reduce 
the generalisation of the results. Accordingly, further research that incorporates such 
variables would be worth of governance literature. 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presents empirical testing of hypotheses using univariate and multivariate 
approaches. As summarized in Table 23, it has been documented that leadership 
structure is positively related to firm performance, while the proportion of independent 
directors and board size demonstrate an insignificant relationship to firm performance. 
Ownership structure and the family members of controlling owners serving in 
management and on the boards are more likely to negate the link between independent 
leadership and firm performance. The next chapter discusses the empirical finding in 
detail. 
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Table 23: Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Number  Hypothesis Result 
H1a: The board’s independent leadership is positively related to firm 
performance. 
Confirmed 
H1b: The proportion of independent directors is positively related to 
firm performance. 
Rejected 
H2a: The presence of ownership concentration will moderate the 
association between the board’s independent leadership and 
firm performance. 
Confirmed 
H2b: The presence of ownership concentration will moderate the 
association between the fraction of independent directors and 
firm performance.  
Rejected 
H2c: The presence of external large shareholders will moderate the 
association between the board’s independent leadership and 
firm performance. 
Confirmed 
H2d: The presence of external large shareholders will moderate the 
association between the fraction of independent directors and 
firm performance. 
Rejected 
H3a: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving 
in management will moderate the association between the 
board’s independent leadership and firm performance. 
Confirmed 
H3b: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving 
in management will moderate the association between the 
fraction of independent directors and firm performance. 
Rejected 
H3c: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving 
on the board will moderate the association between the board’s 
independent leadership and firm performance. 
Confirmed 
H3d: The presence of family members of controlling owners serving 
on the board will moderate the association between the fraction 
of independent directors and firm performance. 
Rejected 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion, Discussion, and Implications 
 
9.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapters, the descriptive statistics and hypotheses testing were presented. 
Five of the ten hypotheses are confirmed while the remaining five hypotheses are 
rejected. It is documented that firm performance is potentially affected by independent 
leadership while the proportion of independent directors is found to have an insignificant 
relationship with firm performance. This chapter presents a discussion of empirical 
testing and the policy implications. This chapter begins with a summary of empirical 
findings followed by discussions of the findings. The last section provides the policy 
implications. 
 
9.2. Summary of Empirical Findings 
The first proposition states that the separation of ownership and control creates the 
divergence of interests of the principals and the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Such divergence might be mitigated by internal governance mechanisms responsible for 
control decisions whenever such mechanisms are independent of management (Jensen, 
1993; Fama, 1983). The independent property will enable this mechanism conducting 
objective assessments of management performance (Jensen, 1993). Eventually, an 
objective assessment might increase the sensitivity of management performance to the 
disciplinary action provided by the market for corporate control and thereby promote the 
assurance that the interests of shareholders, rather than those of management, are 
represented (Fama, 1980). Accordingly, an independent internal control mechanism is 
more likely to better align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. As 
control reduces the opportunistic behaviour of the agent, all else being equal, the 
resultant lower potential agency cost will lead to better firm performance.  
 
Univariate analysis reveals that leadership structure is correlated with firm performance 
at a conservative level (Section 8.3). Multivariate data analysis shows that independent 
leadership is positively related to firm performance. The relationship is stable in the 
presence of ownership structure, control-enhancing mechanisms and control variables. 
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Instrumental variable analyses produce a consistent result, suggesting that leadership 
structures are more likely to affect firm performance and not vice versa. Accordingly, 
the result allows the study to accept Hypothesis 1a.  
 
Descriptive statistics (Section 7.3.2) suggests that most Indonesian listed firms have 
insider dominated boards and have complied with the regulation requiring the firms to 
appoint at least 30% independent directors serving on the boards. Univariate analysis 
reveals that the fraction of independent directors is insignificantly associated with firm 
performance (Section 8.3). Multivariate data analysis shows that the proportion of 
independent directors is insignificantly related to firm performance. The result is robust 
after controlling for the measurement of variables of interest, linearity, and endogeneity 
issues and therefore Hypothesis 1b is rejected. The result implies that the empirical tests 
for Hypotheses 2b, 2d and 3b become irrelevant.  
 
Proposition 2 states that corporate governance consists of several devices or mechanisms 
that could be broadly categorised as being either internal or external (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003). Such mechanisms might construct various configurations, which 
may possibly produce similar outcomes, indicating that governance mechanisms might 
complement and substitute for each other (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998). The substitution 
argument implies that the board monitoring would be assume considerable importance in 
the absence of other governance mechanisms, while the complementary argument 
suggests that the board monitoring role would be effective whenever other strong 
governance mechanisms exist (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Accordingly, all else being 
equal, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is affected by 
the presence of alternative governance mechanisms. 
 
Although the creditors might serve as the alternative governance mechanisms of the 
board in monitoring management, the lending banks in Indonesia typically belong to the 
business group, which is owned by the same controlling family (Patrick, 2001). This 
group-affiliated financing pattern leaves the bank with less independence to monitor 
management and consequently, the available alternative monitoring mechanism is the 
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presence of the large shareholders. Descriptive statistics reveals that the average 
immediate ownership by the largest shareholders is 55 %, indicating the prevalence of 
ownership concentration of Indonesian listed firms. Ownership by controlling 
shareholders is negatively correlated with firm performance, suggesting that better firm 
performance is more likely to be observed with diffused ownership. OLS regression 
analysis shows that ownership by a controlling family is consistently negatively related 
to firm performance. Although 2SLS analysis produces an inconsistent result, the 
positive relationship between independent leadership and firm performance decreases in 
the presence of controlling owners. This result is robust after controlling for 
measurement, non-linearity and endogeneity issues, and therefore Hypothesis 2a is 
confirmed. 
 
The absence of unrelated large shareholders is the salient feature of Indonesian listed 
firms. Unrelated foreign and domestic shareholders are found in 29% and 12% of the 
dataset respectively. Unrelated domestic large shareholders exhibit an insignificant 
relationship with firm performance while OLS regression analysis reveals that foreign 
shareholding is an inconsistent predictor of firm performance. However, 2SLS analysis 
shows a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. This 
indicates that foreign ownership is more likely to enhance firm performance. In the 
presence of foreign ownership, the significance of the relationship between board 
leadership and firm performance decreases. This finding indicates that foreign 
ownership moderates such association and therefore allows the study to accept 
Hypothesis 2c. 
 
Proposition 3 posits that the optimal control system might be achieved whenever there is 
a balance of power between the agent and the principals (Jensen, 2000). If the power is 
concentrated in the agent, it might prevent the manager market for corporate control to 
discipline management (Fama, 1980). The absence of the threat of dismissal as a 
necessary condition for corporate control discourages managers from pursuing such 
action that would maximize the interests of principals. Under this circumstance, the 
manager might prefer to choose the optimal self-interest behaviour that is detrimental to 
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firm performance and outside shareholders’ wealth (Fama, 1980). Given that the higher 
power insulates the agent from disciplinary action, all else being equal, the effectiveness 
of the board in improving firm performance through their monitoring role would be 
reduced. 
 
Section 7.3.2 reveals that controlling owners appoint their family members to serve in 
management and on the boards in 71% and 75% of Indonesian listed firms respectively. 
Given their higher shareholding, such appointments provide the management and 
directors of the controlling family with the power to outvote the opposing proposals. The 
univariate analysis shows that such involvements are negatively correlated with firm 
performance. Multivariate data analysis reveals that the effect of board leadership on 
firm performance decreases in the presence of family involvement in management and 
therefore Hypothesis 3a is confirmed. The relationship between board leadership and 
firm performance disappears when the model includes the family involvement on the 
board. Therefore Hypothesis 3c is accepted. 
 
Proposition 4 states that ownership structure determines the distribution of power and 
control associated with the shareholding that leads to the specific nature of agency 
conflict (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ownership concentration delivers the control of the 
firm to the majority shareholders who have the incentive and power to deprive minority 
shareholders of their rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Eventually, an ownership 
concentration will create an uncontested control, which facilitates majority owners to 
commit expropriation (Sheilfer and Vishny, 1997). Under this circumstance, majority 
owners will prefer to maintain the private benefit of control that is consistent with their 
interests (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Accordingly, such owners are more likely to 
oppose the governance reform that might threaten their private benefit of control. All 
else being equal, the majority shareholder will seek to prevent distribution of control to 
the minority shareholders. 
 
Board composition has been quoted as having an important impact on corporate control 
(Jensen, 1983). Agency theory claims that outsider directors have the incentive to 
 168 
develop a reputation as a “good referee” and therefore will better monitor management 
(Fama, 1980). In the case of Indonesia, the requirement of appointing independent 
directors to serve on the board and the presence of an independent board chairperson 
might deliver a particular level of corporate control to the minority shareholders. 
Therefore it is expected that majority shareholders will oppose the requirement and 
prefer to adopt affiliated leadership. Empirically, the study predicts that the proportion 
of independent directors and independent leadership is negatively related to the level of 
ownership by majority shareholders. 
 
Descriptive statistics reveal that Indonesian listed firms are typified by ownership 
concentration in the hand of controlling families. Most of the firms exhibit insider-
dominated board and affiliated board chairpersons. Correlation analysis reveals that the 
proportion of independent directors is insignificantly associated with family ownership. 
Independent leadership is negatively associated with family ownership. Foreign 
ownership is found to have a significant association with the independent leadership, 
while domestic large shareholders are positively related to the fraction of independent 
directors. Board independent leadership is negatively related to controlling-family 
ownership and family involvement on the board. This allows the study to accept 
Hypothesis 5a. Multivariate data analysis shows that family ownership is an 
insignificant predictor of the proportion of independent directors, and therefore 
Hypothesis 5b is rejected.  
 
9.3. Discussion 
9.3.1. Board Composition 
The study finds that independent leadership is positively related to firm performance. 
The finding is consistent with those of Coles et al., (2001) of large US corporations, Pi 
and Timme (1993) of US commercial bank holding companies, and Faccio and Lasfer 
(2000) of a large dataset of London Stock Exchange firms. As argued by Fama and 
Jensen (1983), separated leadership enhances the separation of management decisions 
from control decisions that promotes board independence. Accordingly, independent 
leadership provides the board with a better position to monitor management. 
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The importance of board leadership hinges on the view claiming that the chairperson 
possesses the authority to organize board activity and hence has the greatest influence 
over the board (Jensen, 1993). The influence of the board chairperson could be greater in 
the Indonesian setting due to the specific culture. According to Hofstede (1980), 
Indonesia is characterized by higher power distance that grants the leader a considerable 
privilege. This view is consistent with the work of Adnan, Chatterjee & Nankervis 
(2003) claiming that Indonesian collectivism culture emphasizes the role of the entity’s 
leader. The members of the entity are expected to demonstrate a loyalty by supporting 
the leader’s decisions without questioning them. As the board chairperson possesses 
greater influence in Indonesia, consequently the effectiveness of the board monitoring 
role would be enhanced more with a separated leadership.  
 
This study finds that the fraction of independent directors falls mostly in the range of 
30% to 40%. Further analysis reveals that the fraction of independent directors is 
insignificantly determined by prior firm performance and other governance mechanisms. 
This suggests that the level of outsider directors’ representation is exogenously 
determined by the level of the agency problem. Given that the average board size 
consists of three directors, the finding indicates that firms tend to appoint a particular 
fraction of independent directors in order to meet the minimum requirement.  
 
The global convergence toward a more prominent role for independent directors is based 
on the presumption that the boards with more independent directors will lead to better 
decisions (Dahya & McConnel, 2005). This presumption is derived from the premise 
that a monitoring role is more likely to be better performed by independent directors. 
However, this study found that the proportion of independent directors is insignificantly 
related to firm performance. According to Palepu, Khanna and Kogan (2002), there 
exists a gap between de jure and de facto convergence86
                                              
86 Gilson (2001) suggests that one should differentiate between convergence in form and in function. The 
former is similar to de jure while the latter refers to the de facto convergence. 
. That work suggests that de jure 
convergence does not necessarily lead to actual convergence in practice. This implies 
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that the adoption of de jure principles in board reform in Indonesia potentially does not 
adopt the de facto spirit of the principles. 
 
Complementary to the convergence issue, a study by the World Bank (2005) finds a lack 
of institutional reform that might prevent the firm from appointing ‘truly’ independent 
directors. Specifically, that work finds an absence of nominating committees that would 
enable management, which represent the interest of the controlling family, to nominate 
the directors. Further, the same study also reports that the common voting method of 
directors’ appointments follows the slate system. The inappropriate nomination and 
voting systems leave minority shareholders with “…no alternative other than to approve 
the whole package” proposed by majority shareholders (World Bank, 2005, p.7). This 
will provide majority shareholders with the condition to control the board and facilitate 
them in nominating individuals who are less likely to challenge their private benefit of 
control, to serve as an independent director. Accordingly, such procedures enable the 
controlling owners to establish the board in favour of their interests which potentially 
reduces the directors’ independence in scrutinizing management action. 
 
Mak and Li (2001) raise an issue of cultural framework in analysing the pattern of 
corporate governance in Asian countries. It is argued that the way of doing business by 
Asian firms is different from that of their Western countries counterparts. According to 
Hofstede (1980), Indonesia is characterised by a collectivism culture, where the 
harmony and solidarity are the most important values in the society. Within this culture, 
individuals are expected to promote personal relationships by avoiding a confrontation. 
This culture implies that the independent directors will face difficulties in creating a 
dissenting opinion from the other board members affiliated to the controlling family. 
Consequently, the actual control of the firm still rests in the hands of management, 
which represents the interests of controlling owners. Under these circumstances, the 
independent director is less likely to be able to deliver any performance improvement.  
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9.3.2. Ownership Structure  
The study finds that most Indonesian listed firms have majority owners with 20% 
shareholding or higher, suggesting that ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
majority shareholders. According to Gul and Tsui (2004), a dispersed ownership is an 
exception in Asian economies, although the level of ownership concentration varies 
across firms and countries. Literature suggests that large shareholdings might serve as a 
governance mechanism that benefits the firm. Higher shareholding by insiders has been 
quoted as enhancing the convergence of interests of principals and agents (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) while higher ownership by outside shareholders will provide the 
holders with the incentive to better monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Eventually, the continuous scrutiny by large shareholders will encourage firm 
performance and this benefit of large shareholders will be enjoyed by other corporate 
shareholders. Therefore, the shared-benefit of control associated with the presence of 
large shareholders might benefit the firms and minority shareholders. 
 
However, the study reveals that ownership concentration by family is negatively related 
to firm performance. Consistent with the finding, previous studies have documented that 
ownership concentration negatively affects firm performance whenever such 
concentration is held by family (Gadhoum, 2000; Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003). Morck and 
Yeung (2003) suggest that control by family serves as a device in pursuing the family 
interest that is not shared with the other shareholders. The private benefit of control 
associated with ownership concentration facilitates the family to divert firm resources in 
order to maximize their wealth and thereby deprive minority shareholders of their rights. 
Accordingly, the finding supports the view that ownership concentration by family is 
more likely to be related to the expropriation hypothesis that is detrimental to firm 
performance. 
 
This study shows that the positive relationship between independent leadership and firm 
performance is moderated by the presence of foreign shareholding. Foreign investors 
commonly form a joint venture with local business groups in Indonesia that provides 
them with access and connections to the political elite and government officials (ADB, 
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2000). According to Boardman, Shapiro and Vining (1997), foreign investors face 
performance pressure and continuous scrutiny from their country of origin. This 
provides foreign investors with the incentive to adopt better corporate governance. In 
relation to the board independence, the study finds that foreign investors are associated 
with independent leadership. This indicates that foreign investors prefer to adopt 
independent leadership in order to enhance the effectiveness of board monitoring than to 
appoint greater numbers of outsider directors. This strategy appears to work well as the 
study finds that independent leadership firms demonstrate superior firm performance. 
 
9.3.3. Controlling-Family Involvement in Management and on the Board  
The study finds that the members of controlling families serving in management, on the 
board and in both are found in 68%, 71% and 63% of Indonesian listed firms 
respectively. These figures suggest that the involvement of controlling families in 
management and on the board is the salient feature of Indonesian listed firms. Consistent 
with the findings, some studies have documented the prevalence of such involvements in 
management (Khanthavit, Polsiri & Wiwattanakantang, 2002; Brunello, Graziano & 
Parigi, 2003; Nam, 2004) and on the boards (Tabalujan, 2002; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). 
According to Nam (2003, p.2), in most Asian countries “…controlling owners are 
typically preoccupied with conducting the managerial function themselves”. 
 
Urtiaga and Tribo (2004) suggest that family members share the same interests amongst 
themselves, and they act collectively. This framework implies that the interest of 
controlling-family members serving on the board is assumed to be necessarily similar to 
those of management that has been claimed as representing solely the interest of the 
controlling family (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Therefore, such involvements could be seen 
as combining management decisions and control decisions in the hands of family. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), a proper check and balance system requires that 
such decisions, almost by definition, be separated. Consequently, the findings provide 
the undeniable fact that a proper check and balance system is absent in most Indonesian 
listed firms. 
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Investor protection provided by the legal system in Indonesia is relatively weak. La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that contracts enforcement relies on the shareholders whenever 
such enforcement by the State is weak. Given the family members serving in 
management and on the board share the same interests, such involvements might 
promote the convergence of interests of agents and principals and consequently reduce 
the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. Under this view, such involvements could be 
seen as a strategy to mitigate contract enforcement problems. This will lead to the lower 
monitoring cost and consequently to better firm performance. Accordingly, such 
involvement might benefit the firm and minority shareholders (Nam, 2002). 
 
Aside from the legal perspective, the prevalence of family involvement in management 
and on the boards could be analysed within a cultural framework. Adnan, Chatterjee and 
Nankervis (2003) suggest that Indonesian culture is constructed from Chinese, Indian, 
Islam, and Dutch cultures. They note that Indonesia is inhabited by various tribes and 
characterized by the existence of its multilingual nature that “…has created a unique 
amalgam in Asian context” and might lead to the “…complexity in understanding some 
of the latent belief systems that guide Indonesian work culture and institutional 
frameworks” (p.199)87
 
. In addition, Berglöf and Claessens (2004) posit that enforcement 
is typically weaker with the existence of social and cultural heterogeneity. 
The Asian culture emphasizes collectivism and harmony values that are designed to 
achieve the interest of a particular group (Nam, 2001). Within this culture, a family 
heads is responsible for fulfilling family obligation by them providing job opportunities 
to their family members88
                                              
87 For example, Indonesians would simply show a certain “body language” in order to deliver a 
disagreement opinion. Native Indonesians commonly understand such indirect communications, as the 
direct communication might “…cause loss of face” (Adnan and Nankervis, 2003, p.208). According to 
Morrison and Conaway (2007), Indonesians rarely say “no” as they believe that it is impolite to openly 
disagree with someone. Further, they suggest that “...the listener is expected to be perceptive enough to 
discern a polite “yes (but I really mean no)” from an actual “yes.” (p. 36-37). 
 (Nam, 2001). Accordingly, appointing family members to 
serve in management and on the board could be seen as a device by controlling owners 
88 This view is consistent with expropriation hypothesis advanced by La Porta et al. (2000), who suggest 
that expropriation takes the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the firm and appointing 
possibly unqualified family members to managerial positions. 
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to fulfil their family responsibility and at the same time facilitate them to rely on the 
interpersonal relationship between family members rather than formal contracts89
 
. 
However, the study finds that such involvements are negatively related to firm 
performance. This indicates that the findings are consistent with an entrenchment 
hypothesis associated with family involvement in management and control decisions 
(Brunello, Graziano & Parigi, 2003; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005; Yeh, 2005). The work of 
Morck and Yeung (2003) suggests that higher insider ownership by management and 
directors, who are family members of controlling owners, provides them with sufficient 
voting power to secure their control of the firms. The entrenchment effect of such 
involvements facilitates the controlling family to divert firm resources that leads to the 
higher residual loss.  
The analysis reveals that the involvement of a controlling family on the board is found to 
negate the link between independent leadership and firm performance. This finding 
suggests that a substantial fraction of family members serving on the board provides 
controlling owners with majority opinion that facilitates their control of board’s 
decisions. Under this circumstance, the independent director who serves as board 
chairperson would be outvoted by majority opinion. Consequently, the finding implies 
that independent leadership potentially benefits the firm whenever the board comprises 
sufficient non-affiliated directors. 
 
The study finds that controlling-family shareholdings and their involvement in 
management and on the board exhibit different impacts on the relationship between 
independent leadership and firm performance. In the presence of controlling-family 
shareholdings and involvement in management, the significance of the relationship 
between independent leadership and firm performance decreases. Such a relationship 
disappears when the involvement on the board is taken into account. The different 
impact indicates that the involvement on the board creates a higher entrenchment 
problem than the involvement in management does. This finding suggests that the 
presence of a controlling family does not necessarily negate the link between 
                                              
89 See Backman (2004) for further discussion. 
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governance mechanisms and firm performance unless they dominate the board of 
directors. Nevertheless, this finding underlines the importance of disentangling the 
impact of family ownership, family involvement in management and family involvement 
on the board on firm performance.  
 
The different effects of such involvements might help to explain why controlling owners 
appoint their family members to serve in management teams and on the board of 
directors simultaneously. Involvement in the management could be seen as a device by 
controlling owners in ensuring that management decisions are consistent with the 
private interests of the owners. On the other hand, involvement on the board of directors 
enables the controlling owners to prevent effective monitoring from internal governance 
mechanisms. The higher family involvement on the board and in management permits 
controlling owners to deprive minority investors of their rights and, at the same time, 
lessens the board’s ability to perform a monitoring role. Consequently, higher family 
involvement in management teams and on the board is more likely to lead to worse 
agency problems that discourage firm performance. 
 
9.4. Policy Implications 
Indonesian listed firms are characterized by higher ownership concentrations by a 
controlling family. Such concentrations provide majority shareholders with sufficient 
voting powers to control a firm’s operation. This excessive control of the firm facilitates 
majority shareholders to pursue their own interests, which diverges from maximizing 
firm performance. This feature indicates that the most important factor of corporate 
governance in Indonesia is the existence of powerful majority shareholders that have an 
almost entire control of the firm. According to Jensen (2000), an optimal control system 
might be achieved whenever there is a balance of power between the contracting parties. 
This argument implies that governance reforms in Indonesia should address the 
excessive control by majority shareholders that has been proven as harming firm 
performance.  
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The discussion reveals that board composition, ownership structure, and control-
enhancing mechanisms are interrelated. Control by majority owners is further 
exacerbated by the appointment of their family members to serve in the management and 
on the boards which enables them to influence management and control decisions 
simultaneously. Although it might reduce monitoring costs, the study finds that such 
involvements are negatively related to firm performance which is consistent with the 
expropriation hypothesis. Agency literature suggests that such opportunistic behaviour 
might be mitigated by proper checks and balances systems that separate management 
decisions and control decisions (Denis, 2001; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006). 
Consequently, the finding suggests that appropriate corporate governance that seeks to 
separate the management decisions from control decisions should be encouraged. 
 
The JSX has endorsed the regulation requiring that listed firms appoint independent 
directors to serve on the Board of Directors. The requirement is intended to enhance the 
board independence which is consistent with promoting the separation between 
management decisions and control decisions. However, the study finds that the 
representation of independent directors is insignificantly related to firm performance. It 
is argued that the insignificant relationship might be attributed to the lack of 
independence of outsider directors due to the particular voting and nomination 
procedure. The existing common procedures enable majority owners to control the 
nomination and facilitate the appointment independent directors who would not threaten 
their private benefit of control. Accordingly, a voting system that properly 
accommodates the interest of non-controlling owners, such as cumulative voting, and 
establishing a nomination committee, is needed in order to reduce the majority control of 
the independent director’s appointment. 
 
The study finds that controlling owners commonly appoint a family member to serve as 
a board chairperson, which facilitates majority shareholders to control the board 
activities in order to ensure that their interests are well respected. Given that the board is 
assigned primarily as monitoring device, such appointment will discourage the 
separation between control and management decisions. Therefore, although Indonesia 
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adopts a two-tier board system, this study argues that a combined leadership might exist 
in Indonesia with the appointment of a controlling-family member serving as board 
chairperson. The study finds that independent leadership is found to have a positive 
relationship to firm performance, suggesting that controlling-family member serving as a 
board chairperson is detrimental to firm performance. This indicates that controlling 
owners actually defeat the check and balance system whenever the board chairperson 
position one of is held by their family member. Based on this finding, corporate 
governance reform in Indonesia should address the issue 
 
Foreign investors are found to have a positive relationship with firm performance. 
Foreign shareholding also demonstrates significant association with independent board 
leadership. Further analysis reveals that foreign investors adopt independent leadership 
as a governance mechanism and this strategy appears to work well as the study finds that 
independent leadership is positively related to firm performance. This finding offers 
supportive evidence that a foreign investor is more likely to improve corporate 
governance so that it enhances firm performance. Accordingly, the finding suggests that 
Indonesia would benefit whenever the country is able to attract foreign investments.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 24:  Empirical Studies Investigating the Association between the Proportions of Insider/Outsider Directors and Firm  
 Performance 
Authors  Period 
of data 
Sample Composition 
measurement 
Measure of Firm 
Performance 
Control for internal 
governance 
mechanisms 
Results 
 
Barnhart et al. 
(1994) 
1990 369 of Standard 
and Poor’s 500 
Outsider Market to book 
value 
Blockholder and 
managerial ownership 
1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
positively related to the firm performance 
(OLS). 
2. The proportion of outsider directors has 
curvilinear relationship with performance in the 
instrumental variable analysis. 
 
Baysinger and 
Butler (1985)  
1970- 
1980 
266 US major 
firms from Forbes 
Outsider  ROE industry- 
adjusted 
None  1. Firm with higher proportion of independent 
directors at the beginning and ending period 
have the best performance in the ending period. 
2. Firm with lower proportion of independent 
directors at the beginning and ending period 
have the lowest performance in the ending 
period. 
 
Baysinger et al. 
(1991) 
 
 
1981- 
1983 
176 Fortune 500 
firms 
Insider  Average R&D 
spending per 
employee 
 
Blockholder 1. The proportion of inside directors positively 
affects the R&D spending. 
 
Berry (2006) 
 
 
 
1979-
1997 
823 firm-years that 
went public 1979-
1986 
Outsider Survive, 
acquired, and 
bankrupt eleven 
years after IPO 
Firm size, 
performance, risk 
(volatility), and asset 
composition 
 
1. The proportion of independent directors in 
survive and acquired firms increases, but not for 
bankrupt firms 
 
Bhagat and 
Black (2002) 
1985- 
1995 
928 US large firms  Insider, Grey, 
Independent 
Q, ROA, ROS, 
Market adjusted 
return 
Board size, CEO 
ownership, outsider 
directors ownership, 
firm size 
1. Board independence has negative association 
with all three performance measures. 
2. Past performance has negative association with 
board independence suggesting that poor 
performance adopt more independent directors 
on the board. 
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Block (1999) 1990-
1994 
1026 of firms 
announcing 
additional one 
outsider directors 
only 
 
Outsider  Cumulative 
abnormal return 
None 1. The impact of the new appointment of outsider 
director is positive with the greatest effect on 
the 30-50 percent range of outsider fraction 
before announcement. 
2. The pattern shows non-monotonic relationship 
  
Dahya and  
McConnell 
(2005) 
1989-
1999 
700 industrial and 
financial firms of 
the LSE    
Outsider and 
insider 
Industry and 
size-adjusted 
stock returns 
None  1. Stock price reaction to outsider directors 
appointments is positive and significantly 
greater than the reaction to inside CEO 
appointments  
 
Daily and Dalton 
(1992)   
1990 100 small firms   Outsider ROA, ROE, P/E 
ratio 
None  1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
marginally associated with higher firm 
performance 
 
Daily and Dalton 
(1993) 
1990 186 listed small 
firms 
Outsider 
directors 
ROE, ROA, 
Return 
None  1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
positively related to the performance measures 
 
Daily and Dalton 
(1994)   
 
 
1972-
1982 
Pair of 57 
bankrupt and 
survivor firms 
Insider  Bankruptcy  None  1. Bankrupt firm have a greater proportion of 
affiliated director than survivor firm 
 
Dehaene, De 
Vuyst and 
Ooghe (2001) 
1995 61 listed and 61 
non listed Belgium 
firms 
Outsider ROA, ROE Leadership structure 
and board size 
1. The proportion of outsider directors has positive 
relationship with ROE with low r square. 
2. The larger outsiders and relative importance of 
outsiders is stronger in listed companies. 
 
Del Guercio,  
Dann and Partch 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 476 closed-end 
funds offered by 
105 investment 
complexes 
Outsider Fund expense 
ratio, Discount   
levels 
Board size 1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
negatively related to fund-expense ratio 
2. The proportion of outsider directors is 
insignificantly related to discount level 
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Erickson et al. 
(2005) 
 
 
 
 
1993-
1997 
679 observations 
(unbalanced) and 
330 (balanced) 
panel of Canadian 
firms 
Outsider Tobin Q –
industry adjusted 
Board size and 
ownership structure 
1. The proportion of outsider directors has 
negative effect on Tobin Q  
2. The proportion of outsider directors from 
financial institution have positive effect on Q 
 
Faccio and 
Lasfer, (2000) 
 
1996-
1997 
1650 firms of 
London Stock 
Exchange firms  
Outsider Q ratio, ROA, 
ROE 
Blockholders 
Managerial ownership 
1. Firm with at least 3 outsider directors displays 
highest performance at low level of managerial 
ownership and displays lowest performance at 
higher level of managerial ownership. 
 
Fosberg (1989) 1979-
1983 
127 pairs of firms 
( 90 pairing 
majority vs. non 
majority outsider 
directors firms 
37 pairing 
majority vs. super 
majority outsider 
directors 
 
Outsider ROE, Sales, 
General & 
Administrative 
expense, Number 
of employee, 
Sales to assets,  
SGA to assets, 
EMP to assets 
None  1. All of performance indicators displays 
insignificant differences between majority and 
non-majority  
2. All of performance indicators displays 
insignificant differences between majority and 
super-majority  
 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) 
 
 
1996-
2000 
347 firms listed in 
Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 
Outsider Q ratio, ROA Board size, leadership 
structure, ownership 
structure 
1. The proportion of outsider directors is  
insignificantly related to Q ratio and ROA 
 
Hermalin and  
Weisbach (1991) 
1971 142 firms of 
NYSE 
Outsider Tobin Q Ownership structure 1. Overall board composition is insignificantly 
related to Tobin Q 
2. Outsider directors with longer tenure is 
positively related to Tobin Q 
 
Hossain et al. 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
1991-
1995 
633 firm-years of 
New Zealand  
Outsider Tobin Q Ownership 
concentration 
1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
positively related to the firm performance 
2. The interaction between outsider directors and 
legislation is insignificant suggesting that 
Company Act 1993 do not affect such 
association 
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Hutchinson and 
Gul (2004)   
1998-
1999 
310 top listed 
Australian firms 
Insider  ROE Insider ownership 1. The interaction between Investment 
Opportunity Set and non-executive directors is 
positively related to ROE suggesting that 
negative association between IOS and 
performance is weaker with higher proportion 
of outsider directors. 
 
Judge Jr. (1994) 1985 – 
1987 
162 general 
medical hospitals 
Outsider Financial 
performance, 
Social 
performance 
None 1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
negatively related to financial performance 
2. The proportion of outsider directors is 
positively related to social  performance 
 
Kesner (1987) 
 
1983 250 firms of 
fortune 500  
Insider  ROA, ROE, PM, 
EPS, Market 
return  
 
None 1. The proportion of insider directors has positive 
association with ROA and PM 
 
Krivogorsky 
(2006)  
2000-
2001 
81 firm of EU 
listed in US 
Outsider  
Insider  
ROA, ROE, 
MTB 
Blockholder 
Managerial ownership 
1. The proportion of outsider directors has positive 
relation with firm performance 
2. Insider directors is insignificantly related to 
firm performance 
 
Lawrence and  
Stapledon (1999) 
1995 100 top listed 
Australian firms  
Outsider  Market return None  1. The proportion of outsider directors is 
negatively related to the market return. 
2. The proportion of outsider directors is 
insignificantly related to accounting 
performance 
 
Matolcsy et al. 
(2004) 
2001 306 Australian 
listed firms  
Outsider  Market value of 
equity per share 
None  1. The interaction between the proportion of 
outsider directors and growth is positively 
related to firm performance indicating that 
outsider directors are beneficial at the presence 
of growth options 
 
Peng, Buck and  
Filatotchev 
(2003) 
1995-
1996 
314 large Russian 
firms from six 
major industrial 
region 
 Perceived ROI  
within 7 Liker 
scale 
Firm size 1. No significant positive association between the 
proportion of outsider directors and firm 
performance  
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Postma et al. 
(1999) 
1996 94 firms of Dutch 
non-financial firm 
listed in 
Amsterdam 
Exchange 
 
Outsider Return, 
Composite 
average of ROA, 
ROE, ROS 
None 1. Board attribute have no significant impact on 
firm performance 
Rosenstein and 
Wyatt  (1990) 
 
 
 
 
1981-
1985 
1251 
announcements 
(622 non-
contaminated, 629 
contaminated) 
Outsider  Market return 
(cumulative 
standardized 
prediction error) 
None 1. The announcements of outsider directors’ 
appointment produce positive return for total 
and non-contaminated sample is significantly 
positive. However, abnormal returns are small 
in absolute magnitude 
Rosenstein and 
Wyatt  (1997) 
1981-
1985 
170 inside 
directors 
appointment 
announcement of 
NYSE firms 
Insider  Market return Leadership structure 
and insider ownership 
1. The announcements of insider director’s 
appointment produce positive return for 
intersection of inside ownership 5% to 25% and 
outsider directors 60%.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 25: Empirical Studies Investigating the Association between Leadership Structure and Firm Performance  
Authors  Period 
of data  
Sample  Measure of firm 
performance  
Control for governance 
mechanism 
Results  
Baliga et al. 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980-
1991 
61 firms changes from 
separate-to-combined 37 
firms changes from 
combined-to-separate 12 
firms remain separated 
and 111 firms remain 
combined 
 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return, ROA, ROE, 
Operating cash flow to 
total assets ratio, 
Operating cash flow to 
sales ratio 
None 1. Leadership structure is insignificantly 
related to firm performance as the 
performances insignificantly differs 
between groups 
2. The authors mention the possibility that 
such result might be driven by other 
governance mechanism adopted by the 
firms 
Brickley, 
Coles and 
Jarrell (1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1984– 
1991 
 
1628 US firms   
 
Return on Capital 1988, 
Stock return 1988, 
Industry-adjusted return 
on capital 1988, Industry-
adjusted stock return 
1988, Return on Capital: 
1989-91, Stock 
Return1989-91, Industry-
adjusted return on capital 
1989-91, Industry-
adjusted stock return 
1989-91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO tenure 1. The relationship between leadership 
structure and performance indicators is 
inconsistent. The authors suggest that the 
prevalence of separated leadership is best 
viewed as a succession strategy (passing 
the button)  
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Carapeto, 
Lasfer and 
Machera 
(2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995-
2003 
119 announcements to 
split and 49 to combine 
leadership of UK firms 
CAR, Q ratio, ROE None 1. Split announcement is positively related 
to abnormal return 
2. Combined announcement is negatively 
related to abnormal return 
3. Split and combined announcement is not 
related the performance improvement 2 
years after the decision 
4. ROE before announcement is positive 
implying that the decision to split the 
roles of the CEO and COB is not driven 
by poor performance 
Chen et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
1999-
2003 
169 fraud investigations 
of China Listed firms 
Company fraud Outsider directors, board 
meeting, directors tenure, 
ownership concentration 
and owners identity 
1. Combined leadership has insignificant 
relationship with fraud 
Coles, 
McWilliams 
and Sen 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
1984– 
1988 
 
144 large US firms Cumulative abnormal 
return 
Outsider directors, insiders 
ownership and blockholders 
1. Truly independent leadership is related to 
return 
2. Report substitutability effect between 
independent leadership and the fraction of 
outsider directors suggesting that board 
with independent leadership and greater 
outsider representation might face 
information flow problem 
Dahya, Lonie 
and Power 
(1996) 
 
1989– 
1992 
 
76 UK firms Average abnormal stock 
returns 
 
 1. Reported significant negative 
relationships  
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1992) 
 
1990  
 
100 US firms in Inc. 
magazine 
 
ROA, ROE, P/E ratio Outsider directors and 
founder involvement in 
management  
1. CEO duality is insignificantly associated 
with firm performance  
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1993) 
1988  186 small US firms  
 
ROA, ROE, P/E ratio Outsider directors and 
founder involvement in 
management  
1. CEO duality is insignificantly related to 
all performance indicators 
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Daily and 
Dalton 
(1994) 
 
 
 
1972– 
1982 
 
57 matched pairs of 
bankrupt and survivor 
US firms 
 
Corporate bankruptcy Outsider directors 
 
1. Bankrupt firm have greater incidence of 
CEO duality than survivor firm 
2. Reported a significant positive interaction 
effect for CEO duality and the proportion 
of affiliated directors  
Davidson, 
Worrell and 
Cheng (1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 157 events by Fortune 
500 firms 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns  
None 1. Reported significant positive 
relationships between CEO duality and 
firm performance  
2. The author’s hypotheses focused on the 
announcements of consolidation of board 
leadership structure as an executive 
succession mechanism. 
Dehaene, De 
Vuyst and 
Ooghe (2001) 
 
1995 Pairing of 61 listed and 
61 non listed  firms  
ROA and ROE Outsider directors and board 
size 
1. Duality have positive impact on ROA 
Desai , Kroll 
and Wright 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980-
1990 
149 firms announcing 
acquisitions 
Cumulative abnormal 
Return 
Outsider directors, outsider 
directors ownership, CEO 
compensation 
1. Separated leadership demonstrate 
positive CAR and combined leadership 
demonstrate negative CAR 
2. Leadership structure moderate the 
association between the fraction of 
outsider directors and return 
3. The authors offer competing hypotheses 
derived from agency and stewardship 
theory 
 
Faccio and 
Lasfer (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996-
1997 
1650 firms of London 
Stock Exchange firms  
Q ratio Outsider directors, board 
size, management 
ownership 
1. Separated leadership firms have higher 
Q. This result only robust with low level 
of managerial ownership 
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Fosberg, and 
Nelson (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989-
1992 
54 firms with stable 
leadership  
Operating income to asset 
ratio 
Market to book value 
None 1. The result shows that separated 
leadership is associated with subsequent 
performance improvement while duality 
is insignificantly related to changes in 
firm performance.  
2. The authors’ offer two competing 
hypothesis: agency and normal 
succession theory 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) 
 
 
 
1996-
2000 
347 firms (1735 
observation) of Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange  
Q ratio, ROA Outsider directors, board 
size, multiple directorships, 
ownership by directors and 
top five owners 
2. CEO duality is insignificantly related to 
Q ratio and negatively related to ROA. 
Krivogorsky 
(2006) 
 
2000-
2001 
81 EU firms listed in US ROA, ROE, MTB  Outsider directors, 
ownership by management, 
controlling family, and 
blockholder 
 
1. Combined leadership is negatively 
related to firm performance 
Pi and 
Timme 
(1993) 
 
 
  
1987– 
1990 
 
112 US commercial bank 
holding companies 
 
ROA, Cost efficiency 
 
Managerial ownership 1. Combined leadership is negatively 
related to firm performance.  
2. Reported a significant negative 
interaction effect for CEO duality and 
CEO ownership 
Schmid and 
Zimmermann 
(2008) 
 
 
2002 152 Swiss listed firms Q ratio Outsider directors, board 
size, ownership by 
management, directors, and 
blockholder 
1. Reported insignificant relationships 
2. Entrenchment effect of combined 
leadership might be mitigated by higher 
incentive alignment of insider ownership 
Tian and Lau 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
1996-
1997 
113 Chinese listed firms  1. Return on assets 
2. Return on equity 
3. ratio of owner equity to 
total assets 
Outsider directors, board 
size, ownership by state 
1. the effect of combined leadership on firm 
performance is positive 
2. The author offered competing hypotheses 
derived from agency and stewardship 
theories 
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Vafeas and 
Theodorou 
(1998) 
1994 250 UK firms Market to book value Outsider directors, insider 
directors ownership 
1. CEO duality is insignificant predictor of 
firm performance 
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Appendix 3 
Figure 14: Indonesian Legislation System  
 
Sources: TAP MPR No: III/MPR/2000  
MPR Resolution 
(Ketetapan MPR)  
House of Representatives  
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) Law (Undang-undang) 
• Government Regulation Substituting Law 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang) 
• Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) 
• Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden) 
Ministerial Decree (Keputusan Menteri) 
Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah) 
National Assembly 
(MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat) 
Department 
Ministry  
President  
Regional 
government 
agencies 
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Appendix 4: Normal Probability Plot and Standardized Residual Scatterplot of 
Regressions Analyses  
 
Figure 15:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of 
 ROA2003 on Board Composition 
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Figure 16:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of ROA2002 on Board Composition 
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Figure 17:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of 
 ROA on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Shareholding  
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Figure 18:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of ROA2002 on Board Composition 
 and Controlling Family Shareholding  
3210-1-2-3
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
 
 
 
 216 
 
Figure 19:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROA  
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Involvement in Management   
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Figure 20:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROA2002 on Board Composition and Controlling 
  Family Involvement in Management   
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Figure 21:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 ROA on Board Composition and Controlling  
 Family Involvement on the Board 
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Figure 22:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROA2002 on Board Composition and Controlling 
  Family Involvement on the Board   
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 Figure 23:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROA  
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Ownership, the Involvement in Management and  
 on the Board   
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Figure 24:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROA2002 on Board Composition and Controlling  
 Family Ownership, the Involvement in Management and  
 on the Board 
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Figure 25:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROA  
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Ownership, the Involvement in Management and  
 on the Board and Control Variables   
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Figure 26:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROA on Board Composition and Controlling  
 Family Ownership, the Involvement in Management and  
 on the Board and Control Variables 
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Figure 27:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROA 
 on Board Composition and Blockholders Ownership, 
 Controlling Family Involvement in Management and 
 on the Board and Control Variables 
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Figure 28:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of ROA on Board Composition and  
 Blockholders Ownership, Controlling Family  
 Involvement in  Management and on the Board  
 and Control Variables 
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Figure 29:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of 
 ROE on Board Composition 
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Figure 30:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROE on Board Composition  
3210-1-2-3
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
 
 222 
 
 
Figure 31:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROE 
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Ownership 
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Figure 32:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of ROE on Board Composition and  
 Controlling Family Ownership  
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Figure 33:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROE 
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Involvement in Management   
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Figure 34:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROE on Board Composition and Controlling  
 Involvement in Management  
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Figure 35:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 ROE on Board Composition and Controlling  
 Family Involvement on the Board 
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Figure 36:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROE on Board Composition and Controlling 
  Family Involvement on the Board   
3210-1-2-3
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
 
 225 
 
Figure 37:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROE 
 on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Ownership and the Involvement in Management  
 and on the Board and Control Variables 
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Figure 38:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS Regression  
 of ROE on Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Ownership, the Involvement in Management and on  
 the Board and Control Variables 
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Figure 39:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of ROE 
 on Board Composition and Blockholders Ownership, 
 Controlling Family Involvement in Management and 
 on the Board and Control Variables 
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Figure 40:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of ROE on Board Composition and  
 Blockholders Ownership, Controlling Family  
 Involvement in  Management and on the Board  
 and Control Variables 
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Figure 41:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 Changes in ROA on Changes in Board Composition,  
 Controlling Family Ownership, Blockholders  
 Ownership, Controlling Family Involvement in 
 Management and on the Board 
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Figure 42:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of Changes in ROE on Changes in 
 Board Composition and Controlling Family 
 Ownership, Blockholders Ownership, Controlling  
 Family Involvement in Management and on the  
 Board  
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Figure 43:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 Changes in ROA on Changes in Board 
 Composition and Controlling Family Ownership 
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Figure 44:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of Changes in ROE on Changes in 
 Board Composition and Controlling Family 
 Ownership 
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Figure 45:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 Changes in ROA on Changes in Board 
 Composition and Controlling Family Involvement  
 in Management 
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Figure 46:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of Changes in ROE on Changes in 
 Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Involvement in Management  
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Figure 47:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 Changes in ROA on Changes in Board 
 Composition and Controlling Family Involvement  
 on the Board 
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Figure 48:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of Changes in ROE on Changes in 
 Board Composition and Controlling Family  
 Involvement on the Board 
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Figure 49:  Normal Probability Plot of OLS Regression of  
 Changes in ROA on Changes in Board 
 Composition, Blockholders Ownership,  
 the Family Involvement in Management and on  
 the Board  
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Figure 50:  Standardized Residual Scatterplot of OLS  
 Regression of Changes in ROE on Changes in 
 Board Composition, Blockholders Ownership 
 and the Family Involvement in Management  
 and on the Board  
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